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Sources of Moderation in Soviet Security Policy

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In December 1987, Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan signed the first bilateral U.S.–Soviet arms control agreement since the ill-fated SALT II treaty was completed in 1979. After a period of serious deterioration in U.S.–Soviet relations during the late 1970s and much of the 1980s, the treaty eliminating intermediate- and shorter-range missiles appeared to herald a new atmosphere of international cooperation. How can we account for such a dramatic change from what some observers characterized as a “new cold war” to what appeared to be a new *détente*?

Historians and political analysts will continue to debate the sources of Ronald Reagan’s apparent turnaround on policy towards the Soviet Union (Lapidus and Dallin, 1989; Gaddis, 1989). According to William Safire, the main candidate explanations are “fatigue, lameduckiness and place-in-history Nancyism” (*New York Times*, 10 March 1988). In attempting to understand the change in U.S. policy, analysts will have the benefit of interviews with Reagan advisers and, eventually, whatever becomes available of the documentary record.

How can we account, however, for comparable changes in Soviet policy? Soviet officials are not as accessible for interviews; even if they were, there is no Freedom of Information Act to provide documents as a check against self-serving accounts of recent history. Yet one should not overstate the paucity of evidence for Soviet decisions. Much can be learned from an eclectic mixture of sources, including memoir accounts, U.S. intelligence analyses, the negotiating record, and the Soviet press. Furthermore, the policy of *glasnost* promises further access both to Soviet officials and to archival materials. Analysts of Soviet policy would do well to prepare for the increasing availability of new data by identifying the gaps in their knowledge and setting priorities for the acquisition of new information. Finally, by employing deductive theory to generate the questions that most need to be addressed, analysts can make the best use of existing evidence and know what to look for in the future (Snyder, 1984/1985, 1988*b*).

The behavioral and social sciences offer a number of potentially promising theoretical frameworks that could be applied to the question of change toward moderation in Soviet security policy. These include regime theory, notions of learning, and game-theoretic and psychological approaches to cooperation and conflict. In the policy realm as well, several candidate explanations enjoy wide currency. Among the most common are the view that the Soviets change their policy in response to pressure from adversaries who pursue “negotiation from strength;” or that the Soviets react to conciliatory policies and compromise by moderating their own policies; or that Soviet moves toward moderation are driven by internal constraints, such as economic stringency.

The purpose of this chapter is to review the academic theories and to

integrate them with more popular explanations into a larger framework that seeks to illuminate the sources of change in Soviet policy. It then attempts to evaluate the components of the framework in light of available evidence and, where evidence is lacking, to suggest the kind of information that would be required to test competing explanations. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the most promising methodological approaches to understanding the sources of Soviet change and a presentation of hypotheses, linking aspects of the various explanations, that could be tested in future research. From a policy standpoint, it is particularly important to propose hypotheses and to adopt methods that help identify factors that encourage moderate behavior on the part of the Soviet Union, especially those factors that may be susceptible to influence by the United States and other countries.

The evidence presented in this chapter, however, indicates that the factors most commonly assumed to induce Soviet moderation—economic constraints or U.S. negotiation from strength, for example—do not typically work in a direct or deterministic fashion. Rather, they become subject to domestic debates between opponents and proponents of moderation. Understanding the sources of moderation in Soviet security policy ultimately depends on understanding how Soviet policy entrepreneurs and domestic coalitions prevail in foreign policy debates.

Assessing Change in Soviet Security Policy

The problems of applying generalizations derived from the behavioral and social sciences to specific policy questions are myriad (Tetlock, 1989). Moreover, the study of Soviet security policy is less developed than many of the social sciences, and, given the impossibility of conducting controlled experiments, its conclusions are always subject to dispute. Trying to account for, or even recognize, change toward moderation in Soviet policy is further complicated by problems of definition and the fact that analyses are often heavily influenced by unspoken biases and assumptions that are essentially nonfalsifiable.

Definitions

The first problem that we encounter is simply trying to define “change toward moderation” in Soviet policy. Although one of the goals of this chapter is to examine what constitutes meaningful change in Soviet security policy, we still need a working definition to start. Many obvious definitions would entail tautological reasoning if used to explain the sources of moderation. For example, if we define moderation as a reduction in resources allocated to the

military, we automatically call attention to explanations that focus on economic stringency. We must also distinguish moderation from cooperation. Keohane (1984:51) defines "intergovernmental cooperation" as that which "takes place when the policies actually followed by one government are regarded by its partners as facilitating realization of their own objectives, as the result of a process of policy coordination" (for a similar definition, see Weber, forthcoming). Thus, if we equate Soviet moderation with actions that lead to formal or tacit bilateral or multilateral cooperation, we make our judgments dependent on the perceptions of the Soviet Union's adversaries as to whether Soviet actions facilitated achievement of their own objectives. If these objectives include *avoidance* of cooperation, then the unwillingness of Soviet adversaries to come to agreement to coordinate policies might make us overlook instances of Soviet moderation. Consider, for example, how U.S. policymakers in 1956 publicly dismissed Soviet troop reductions as insignificant because the Eisenhower administration was not interested in coordinating arms reductions with the Soviet Union (Evangelista, 1990a), or, more recently, how the Reagan administration ignored the 19-month Soviet unilateral nuclear test moratorium, because it opposed in principle negotiation of a test-ban agreement (Evangelista, 1986). By emphasizing cooperation, we would have to exclude such initiatives as evidence of Soviet moderation—regardless of actual Soviet intentions.

For our purposes, we should define a change toward moderation broadly enough to encompass most such initiatives that could have policy implications for the United States. Therefore, we include in the definition any actions that meet one of the following three criteria: (1) they limit actual or potential future Soviet military capability; (2) they could plausibly be intended to reduce the adversary's perception of threat; or (3) they could plausibly be intended to signal willingness to restrain the arms race through tacit cooperation or to negotiate formal agreements limiting the competition. By employing this definition, we obviously risk including actions that could be interpreted as moderate but were not intended so (such as temporarily reorienting resources from military to civilian uses to gain a "breathing space") or policies that were simply declaratory in nature with no substantive content. For policy purposes it seems worth erring on that side for now, to make sure to evaluate all the possible signals of Soviet moderation. Later in the chapter, when we consider the specific evidence from Soviet cases, we can be more discriminating in identifying what constitutes significant change.

For the purposes of this study, *security policy* is defined as military policy regarding nuclear weapons, conventional ground and air forces, and related arms control policies. These appear most immediately relevant to the objective of this series of books—contributing to "the prevention of nuclear war." This chapter limits consideration of such issues as Soviet policy toward the

Third World, military intervention abroad, and naval policy, although these are surely relevant to the question of nuclear war. The chapter also excludes discussion of topics appropriate to a broader definition of security—economic welfare, human rights, environmental policy, and so forth—except where they are explicitly raised by Soviet officials in their attempts to pursue moderation in the more narrowly defined security realm.

Assumptions, Bias, and the Problem of Nonfalsifiability

Among social-scientific endeavors, the study of Soviet security policy is certainly one of the most difficult to pursue “objectively,” in isolation from current policy concerns and the individual analyst’s policy preferences and prejudices. Disagreements among analysts often stem from divergent assumptions about such basic issues as the nature of the Soviet Union, the structure of the international system, and the appropriate role of force in interstate relations. Assumptions are rarely made explicit, yet they influence fundamentally the policy implications an analyst draws. A more serious barrier to analysis of Soviet security policy stems from Herrmann’s (1985) observation that the three dominant “models” for understanding Soviet motives (communist expansionism, realpolitik expansionism, and realpolitik self-defense) are non-falsifiable. Most evidence can fit any of the models, especially given the imprecise definitions of such key concepts as defense, provocation, risk, and opportunity. To take the most prominent example, a status-quo-oriented Soviet Union is difficult to distinguish from an expansionist-yet-cautious Soviet Union. In the absence of overt aggression, one could plausibly argue either that the Soviet Union was expansionist, but deterred from aggression, or that the Soviet Union was simply not interested in aggression.

One of the most fundamental disagreements among analysts of Soviet security policy concerns the nature of Soviet nuclear doctrine and strategy. As Jack Snyder (1988*b*) characterizes the debate, one side argues that the Soviets accept the implications of a deterrent relationship based on the threat of mutual assured destruction (MAD), whereas the other side maintains that the Soviets reject Western conceptions of deterrence and pursue a war-winning capability. Both explanations seem impervious to falsifying evidence. Evidence that appears to undercut the former view of Soviet acceptance of MAD—such as deployment of the SS-18 missile and other “counterforce” systems—are explained away as vestigial hedges against the failure of deterrence. Evidence that seems to contradict the latter view of a war-winning posture—such as Soviet acceptance of the treaty limiting antiballistic missile systems (ABMs)—are described as temporary expedients imposed by technological constraints.

Underlying this debate about Soviet strategy is an even more fundamental one about the nature of nuclear weapons. Different interpretations of Soviet nuclear strategy apparently reflect analysts' divergent beliefs about such issues as whether nuclear weapons can be considered to fulfill actual combat functions during a war, whether there are meaningful advantages to striking first, given the existence of virtually invulnerable retaliatory forces, and whether one can conceive of "victory" in nuclear war (Green, 1987:9). Probably an analyst who believes that it makes no sense under any circumstances to initiate first use of nuclear weapons, given the near certainty of devastating retaliation, would be more inclined to find Soviet acceptance of MAD plausible. By contrast, an analyst who believes that meaningful military advantages accrue to the side that strikes first and pursues a war-winning, counterforce strategy would find it incredible for the Soviets to foreswear such an option. Divergent views about the political utility of a nuclear war-fighting posture or "nuclear superiority" are similarly based on axiomatic beliefs and therefore not easily subject to falsification.

In principle one could devise ways to test competing explanations that appear nonfalsifiable by linking them to propositions derived from deductive theory. Snyder (1988*b*), for example, evaluates competing interpretations of Soviet nuclear strategy by introducing game-theoretic deductions about the links between nuclear weapons and crisis behavior. In a similar fashion, Herrmann (1985) develops propositions deductively from theories of cognitive psychology to evaluate contrasting interpretations of Soviet intentions. Unfortunately, however, such efforts are extremely rare.

Given the state of knowledge in Soviet security studies, a review essay of this sort cannot systematically evaluate all of the competing assumptions inherent in the many possible explanations for Soviet policy change. Ideally, one would need to identify the underlying assumptions of each explanation, link them to propositions derived from deductive theory, and test them against appropriate empirical evidence (Snyder, 1988*b*)—a task well beyond the scope of this chapter. The goals of this essay are more modest: to present a range of explanations for change toward moderation, calling attention to areas of overlap as well as dispute; to indicate when underlying assumptions contribute to disagreements about causal factors; and to be sensitive to the effect of competing assumptions when reviewing the empirical evidence.

Explaining Change Toward Moderation

Over the years, a number of scholars have written about change in Soviet security policy with an eye toward policy implications for the United States.

By and large, however, they have not taken advantage of the theoretical literature on cooperation and change, perhaps because much of it is based in another subfield of political science—the study of international political economy. Nor have Sovietologists made a systematic effort to evaluate even such popular notions as “negotiation from strength” or economic stringency, although these explanations are implicit in much of their work. Making valid generalizations about the sources of moderation in Soviet security policy is not an easy matter then, because much of the work still needs to be done.

This survey of the research on Soviet security policy confronts problems familiar to those who have undertaken such efforts in the past (Horelick, Johnson, and Steinbruner, 1973; Meyer, 1984; Green, 1987). The conclusions of a 1973 Rand Corporation survey are still valid today (Horelick, Johnson, and Steinbruner, 1973:27): “only a small portion of the Soviet foreign policy literature contains a self-conscious and reasonably systematic effort to employ an explicit theoretical framework. . . . There is little cumulation of comparable propositions and hypotheses.” Another shortcoming identified by the Rand study—sparsity of case studies on Soviet foreign policy—no longer obtains to the same extent (Meyer, 1984). At the same time, however, the existing case-study literature is largely descriptive, does not seek to evaluate competing theoretical perspectives or test hypotheses, and has yielded little cumulative knowledge about the sources of Soviet policy (Snyder, 1984/1985, 1988*b*). Thus, a review of this sort in Soviet studies cannot, as in some other disciplines, even fully spell out the main hypotheses in operational terms, let alone present “findings” from the existing body of research.

Academic Theories

This section reviews the academic literature on foreign policy change relevant to understanding the sources of Soviet moderation. It draws particularly from the literature on sources of cooperation in international economic policy. The section proceeds “backwards,” as it were, in that it presents theories of cooperative outcomes—as represented in this case by international regimes—and then inquires into the means by which such outcomes are obtained. The inquiry relies on theories at different levels of analysis, many of which are complementary rather than competing. In general, the discussion covers those theories at a higher—systemic—level first, and then moves increasingly towards lower-level theories that focus on political coalitions, bureaucracies, and individuals. Theories that link across levels—for example, notions of “transnational alliances”—are also considered.

REGIME THEORY

Students of international political economy often view regimes as the main goal of efforts at interstate cooperation. In the widely accepted definition, regimes are a set of "implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge" (Krasner, 1983:2). If we seek to understand the process leading to moderation in Soviet security policy and U.S.-Soviet cooperation, we might benefit from considering how a U.S.-Soviet international security regime could emerge. A number of analysts have already attempted to apply regime theory to security policy. Some have been skeptical of its relevance (Jervis, 1983), while others have found some of the insights of regime theory valuable (Caldwell, 1981; George, Farley and Dallin, 1988, Nye, 1987).

If regimes matter, they should serve to constrain states' behavior in ways that the existing distribution of power in the international system does not already do (Krasner, 1983). According to Jervis (1983:190), for example, if the fear of retaliation deters nuclear attack, one need not invoke strategic arms control as a "regime" in order to explain the prevention of nuclear war. To demonstrate the existence of a regime in the sphere of arms control, one must show that the rules, principles, and norms associated with arms treaties have "the potential to alter unilateral decision-making" within states in ways that would not have been done otherwise (Rice, 1988:298), or—by related criteria—that the states exercise restraint in the pursuit of narrow, short-run self-interest in favor of longer-term goals of cooperation (Jervis, 1983:186-187; Nye, 1987:396).

Assuming that regimes could exist in the security sphere and that they would influence behavior in the direction of moderation, one is still left with the question of how regimes are established. As Alexander George and his colleagues put it (George, Farley, and Dallin, 1988:716-717), "How, under what circumstances, and why do incentives for security cooperation emerge?" They found that a prerequisite for U.S.-Soviet security cooperation was a perception on the part of the leaders of both countries of mutual interests that could be served better by cooperation than by unrestrained competition. The question then becomes what leads policymakers to change their estimates of the relative merits of unilateral versus cooperative policies. Or, as Axelrod and Keohane (1985:229) argue, "to understand the degree of mutuality of interests (or to enhance this mutuality) we must understand the process by which interests are perceived and preferences determined." Yet the conditions under which a perception of mutual interests emerges are not well specified, and the regime literature's lack of attention to domestic politics exacerbates the problems (Haggard and Simmons, 1987).

COOPERATION THEORY

Students of international political economy have only begun to consider how preferences and interests are determined (see for example, Stein, 1983). They have paid more attention to the structural limitations and possibilities for cooperation. Even if two adversaries perceive a mutual interest in cooperation, these analysts maintain, the structure of their interaction may make cooperation difficult to achieve. The anarchic international system, unlike most domestic polities, has no central government to enforce cooperative agreements. States operate on the basis of self-help and feel obliged to provide for their own security through arming rather than trust their opponents to abide by a disarmament agreement. Game theorists have described this situation as a "prisoners' dilemma" game, where each side would prefer to cooperate, but continues to arm for fear that the other side would defect rather than adhere to mutual disarmament.

A number of analysts have proposed solutions to the prisoners' dilemma. Robert Axelrod, for example, has suggested that a strategy of "tit-for-tat" reciprocity holds great potential for inducing cooperation in such cases (Axelrod, 1984; see also Brams, 1985). He argues that if one side takes the initiative and adopts a "nice" strategy (by not being the first to defect), and both sides follow a rule of reciprocity, cooperation can evolve through a tit-for-tat mechanism. The main condition is that the two sides anticipate interacting many more times, so that the "shadow of the future" is cast over present actions. Axelrod has explicitly suggested that his cooperation theory should apply to U.S.-Soviet arms negotiations: "Certainly, the fact that the United States and the Soviet Union know that they will both be dealing with each other for a very long time should help establish the necessary conditions [for arms control]" (Axelrod, 1984: 181).

One assumption of the prisoners' dilemma is that mutual interest in cooperation exists, but that it is difficult to establish. Some analysts have argued, however, that many arms races are not actually prisoners' dilemmas, where each side would prefer to cooperate, but the game of deadlock, where at least one side prefers conflict (defection) to cooperation (Downs, Rocke, and Siverson, 1985). As Kenneth Oye puts it, "When you observe conflict, think Deadlock—the absence of mutual interest—before puzzling over why a mutual interest was not realized" (Oye, 1985:7). Others have argued that the pursuit of relative advantage severely limits the scope of mutual interests and makes efforts at cooperation even more difficult than advocates of strategies of reciprocity admit (Waltz, 1979; Grieco, 1988).

Even if mutual interests do exist, one or both sides may fail to recognize that the opponent favors cooperation. Deborah Larson has argued, for example, that if the target of a conciliatory action "has an inherent 'bad faith' image

of the initiator, a single cooperative action may be ignored, reinterpreted to conform to preexisting beliefs, or discounted as a ploy to trick the target into letting down its guard" (Larson, 1987:30-31). In her view, the potential for such misperceptions poses barriers to implementing a strategy of tit-for-tat reciprocity (Larson, 1987:30-31; Lebow and Stein, 1987:41-47; Van Evera, 1985).

Another problem with the prisoners' dilemma, and therefore the tit-for-tat solution, is that a state's actions cannot always be understood as the product of a unitary rational actor but must often be seen as the consequence of struggle between competing domestic institutions and individuals (Gowa, 1986:138). If some of those substate actors argue against the existence of mutual interests and manage to prevail, the situation becomes a deadlock, even if objectively cooperation could have benefited both sides. Writing of Soviet-U.S. security relations, Alexander George argued that internal U.S. "disagreements over the correct image of the Soviet Union can call into question the scope as well as the desirability of cooperative arrangements with the Soviets and reinforce a preference for relying on unilateral policies for assuring U.S. security interests" (George, Farley, and Dallin, 1988:660). Factors at the substate level may also hinder implementation of strategies of reciprocity: "Internal factional, organizational, and bureaucratic dysfunctions may limit the ability of nations to implement Tit-for-Tat strategies. It may be easier to sell one unvarying line of policy than to sell a strategy of shifting between lines of policy in response to the actions of others" (Oye, 1985:16).

A number of analysts have argued in favor of alternative strategies that take account of psychological barriers, the possibility of misperception induced by mistrust, and the existence of hardliners in domestic coalitions. A strategy of graduated reciprocation in tension-reduction, or GRIT, some maintain, can promote cooperation through a series of unilateral initiatives and concessions aimed at dispelling the opponent's "enemy image" (Osgood, 1962; Plous, 1985, 1987; Larson, 1987). Lebow and Stein (1987) favor a mixture of strategies, including reciprocity and limited security regimes, all under the rubric of "reassurance."

The perception of mutuality of interests appears to be central to the success of both tit-for-tat and GRIT. As George points out, tit-for-tat seems to apply mainly "when mutuality of interests clearly exists in a particular issue-area and is recognized by the two sides" (George, Farley, and Dallin, 1988:705). GRIT, by the same token, acknowledges that psychological barriers and mistrust may obscure the mutuality of interests between adversaries, but it assumes that one side recognizes the problem and sets out on a course of unilateral initiatives in order to persuade the other side that cooperation is in their mutual interest. In order for these approaches to be adopted as a means

of securing cooperation, at least one side (for GRIT) or both sides (for tit-for-tat) must come to believe that a mutuality of interests exists. In game-theoretic terms, they must change their perception of the competition from one of deadlock to one of prisoners' dilemma.

The recognition of mutual interest, then, is a prerequisite for establishing cooperation through tit-for-tat or GRIT mechanisms as well as for institutionalizing cooperation through regimes. But is it possible for states to change their perceptions in order to recognize a mutuality of interests where none was visible before? This would appear to entail a redefinition of their interests. One problem with game-theoretic approaches that posit a unitary rational actor and a structure of fixed preferences is that they fail to account for the possibility that substate actors may change the definition of national interest (Haas, 1980; Lebow and Stein, 1987:46; Nye, 1987:378). Because the payoff matrix defines the game, game theorists can represent a change in preferences (the "national interest") only by changing the game itself (Axelrod and Keohane, 1985:229-230). But as Jervis (1988:324) points out, "by taking preferences as given we beg what may be the most important question on [sic] how they are formed." International relations theorists increasingly recognize that accounting for changes in preferences "requires an examination of the internal politics of states" (Morrow, 1988:96). Thus, both regime theory and cooperation theory point us in the direction of actors at the substate level of analysis (Haggard and Simmons, 1987).

COALITION THEORY

By focusing on the domestic level of analysis, one can identify a number of ways that definitions of the national interest can change. The most straightforward is a change in political leadership, resulting from an election, a coup, or longer-term generational change (Nye, 1987:378; Jervis, 1988:326-327). Students of international political economy have also identified links between international pressures and the formation of domestic coalitions as a means of explaining policy changes (Gourevitch, 1986; Kurth, 1979; Gershenkron, 1962).

Soviet studies provides a relevant literature that explains policy change by focusing on the process of coalition-building among important institutions, such as the military, the heavy industrial sector, the party apparatus, and so forth (see, for example, Breslauer, 1982). Applied to foreign policy, this analysis suggests that changes in Soviet external behavior result from new alliances between domestic institutions (Snyder, 1987/1988). The members of the new coalition criticize the policies of the old coalition as atavistic and dysfunctional. The new coalition pursues new policies and new goals, in

effect manifesting a changed definition of the national interest that in some cases could favor more cooperative relationships with adversaries.

Some coalition theorists see changes in the coalitions that determine Soviet foreign policy as a consequence of domestic stimuli, generated by such factors as the "objective requirements of the stage of intensive development" of the economy, the "natural processes of modernization," or opportunistic political maneuvering (Snyder, 1987/1988:110). In this view, foreign policy ideas play a role mainly "in rationalizing and reconciling group interests" of the domestic coalitions (Snyder, 1987/1988:99). An alternative explanation, however, holds that new foreign policies are adopted because the old policies have failed and become discredited, because they cannot meet changing international conditions, or because they become too costly (Bialer, 1988:475-490). In such cases, scholars often write of a country's ability to adapt its foreign policy in terms of learning, rather than in terms of the product of domestic political realignment.

The coalition and learning explanations are not necessarily incompatible; it might be possible to use them together and in combination with other approaches. One could argue, for example, that groups which have learned important foreign policy lessons may come to achieve political power because the governing coalition's inability to learn has resulted in foreign policy failures. Several advocates of regime theory also try to incorporate notions of learning into their explanations for international cooperation. In order for policymakers to support the establishment of international regimes, it is argued, they often need to learn that such cooperative efforts serve their interests better than unilateral policies do. At the same time, argue some analysts, international regimes themselves can enhance learning in a number of respects, particularly through providing contacts with, and information about, the other participants (Keohane and Nye, 1977; Keohane and Nye, 1987:751; Nye, 1987:400-401). Thus, for many analysts, understanding the potential for strategies of reciprocity and for the establishment of international regimes depends on knowing how foreign policy learning takes place (Lebow and Stein, 1987:46, 62-63; Keohane, 1984:132; Keohane and Nye, 1987:752-753; Nye, 1987).

Unfortunately, however, the literature on learning is not sufficiently developed to fit in so neatly with theories of coalitions and regimes, and in some cases the approaches make competing claims. The disagreements have been highlighted in studies of international political economy. Odell, for example, favors cognitive learning explanations for change in U.S. monetary policy and approvingly quotes Keynes' famous dictum that "the power of vested interests is vastly exaggerated compared with the gradual encroachment of ideas" (Odell, 1982:12-13). Gourevitch, by contrast, maintains that "ideas for solv-

ing economic problems are plentiful, but if an idea is to prevail as the actual policy of a particular government, it must obtain support from those who have political power. . . . The victorious interpretation will be the one whose adherents have the power to translate their opinion into force of law" (Gourevitch, 1986:17). Naturally, there are points of overlap in the two explanations for change. Odell's attention to the notion of policy "triggers" that facilitate change, for example, bears some resemblance to Gourevitch's focus on international economic crises as stimulants to policy change.

Before trying to disentangle the competing interpretations offered by the learning and coalition approaches, we must inquire into the various conceptions of learning available in the literature and their potential application to moderation in Soviet security policy.

LEARNING

Several analysts have recently attempted to explain changes in Soviet security policy under Gorbachev by applying the concept of learning. One should consider then whether the concept could prove useful in accounting for change toward moderation in Soviet security policy in general. The task is hindered, however, by a number of factors, not the least of which is the interdisciplinary nature of the original body of literature on learning and the plethora of competing and overlapping definitions. The two problems are related in the sense that definitions of learning depend in part on whether they are used, for example, by psychologists, students of organizational behavior, or specialists in artificial intelligence. Political scientists who use learning to account for foreign policy change are often inclined to propose their own definitions, subdefinitions, and categories. Furthermore, as Steinbruner (1974) points out, different models of decision making have associated with them different processes of learning, so that "learning" to those who favor a rational, analytic model is something very different from what those who favor a cognitive model would understand.

A useful starting point for examining the various definitions is the National Academy of Sciences' project on learning in U.S. and Soviet foreign policy, organized by George Breslauer and Philip Tetlock. Tetlock proposes five definitions of learning: minimalist, cognitive content, cognitive structural, efficiency, and institutional. A *minimalist* definition "posits that learning can be said to have occurred whenever, as a result of experience, there has been a discernible change in the probability of a verbal or policy response" (Tetlock, 1988:3). This definition draws on the behaviorist tradition in psychology and does not take into account cognitive variables. The *cognitive content* definition, by contrast, focuses on individual belief systems and sees learning essentially as a change in beliefs resulting from experience or knowledge.

Belief systems are understood to be hierarchically organized "with general policy objectives or values at the apex of the system, strategic beliefs and preferences at the intermediate level, and tactical beliefs and preferences at the base of the system." Tetlock (1988:4-5) proposes a three-part hypothesis to the effect that decision makers faced with the failure of existing policy will seek first to change tactics; then, after tactical solutions repeatedly fail, they consider shifting strategies; and, finally, only after both tactical and strategic solutions meet with repeated failure do they reconsider basic goals.

Cognitive structural learning "involves the acquisition by policy-makers of progressively more differentiated understandings of the workings of the political environment with which they must cope and of the complex trade-offs that policy-making requires" (Tetlock, 1988:7). Whereas beliefs (cognitive content) can shift without entailing structural change, a change in structure necessarily leads to changes in beliefs. *Efficiency* learning relates not to the content or structure of beliefs but to the process and outcome of policies: "According to this definition, learning has occurred whenever policy-makers have learned to match means and ends in more efficient and effective ways" (Tetlock, 1988:8). To learn in this sense means either to "discover more effective strategies or means for pursuing one's original goals" or "to redefine one's goals in more realistic ways" (Tetlock, 1988:8). Finally, Tetlock (1988:16-17) proposes an *institutional* definition of learning. It concerns the ability of policymakers to translate their new cognitive beliefs or structures into actual policy by overcoming institutional and domestic political barriers.

Notions of learning have appealed to students of Soviet policy, probably because many of the definitional distinctions resonate with common debates about Soviet intentions and behavior. Consider, for example, Nye's definitions of "simple" and "complex" learning (which are similar to the two types of efficiency learning proposed by Tetlock). *Simple* learning "uses new information merely to adapt the means, without altering any deeper goals in the end-means chain" (Nye, 1987:380). It leads to changes in tactics. *Complex* learning, "by contrast, involves recognition of conflicts among means and goals in causally complicated situations, and leads to new priorities and trade-offs" (Nye, 1987:380). Much of the debate over the significance of changes in Soviet security policy centers around whether they entail only a change in tactics or whether they constitute a meaningful long-term reassessment of goals (Griffiths, 1972:449-478; Lynch, 1989). Soviet gestures of moderation give rise to such questions as: Have Soviet leaders abandoned the goal of world revolution, or are they merely seeking a breathing space? Is the Soviet Union's renunciation of nuclear superiority genuine, or is it merely a ploy to lull its adversaries into a false sense of security? Questions such as these lie at the heart of the debate over the so-called new thinking in foreign and security

policy under Mikhail Gorbachev and probably account in part for the growing academic interest in notions of learning.

Whereas the definitions considered so far concern the individual and organizational levels of analysis, Robert Legvold (1988*b*) has proposed three additional definitional distinctions that bear on relations between countries: *independent* learning "is the kind that occurs apart from or even contrary to the learning taking place in other societies;" *joint* learning "occurs when two or more societies learn simultaneously;" and *interactive* learning "occurs when one society learns from another." He finds that all of these types of learning have occurred at various times in U.S.–Soviet relations, although independent learning has probably been most prevalent.

Despite the high level of interest, there is reason to question how much the literature on learning is able to contribute to understanding moderation in Soviet security policy. This is due partly to the fact that many of those who write about learning are pursuing questions that are sufficiently different from the focus of this essay so as to make it difficult to apply their hypotheses. The National Academy of Sciences study, for example, uses notions of learning in part to try to understand "the processes by which governments adapt or fail to adapt to changing circumstances" (Tetlock, 1988:22). It focuses on the question of whether or not learning has occurred, rather than on the question of how to account for change (for example, toward moderation) while considering learning as only one possible explanation. So far there has been little systematic testing of a "learning hypothesis" against competing explanations for a given phenomenon.

Learning hypotheses that are grounded in the literature of cognitive psychology, while better substantiated than some of their competitors from other fields, present problems when applied to foreign policy. The most apparent problem is the familiar one of levels of analysis (Tetlock, 1989). How can one take theories developed to analyze the belief systems of individuals and apply them to the behavior of nation-states? One must consider also the higher level of organizations and bureaucracies that make up governments. Most analysts would agree with Nye (1987:381) in this regard that "individual learning is a necessary, but insufficient, basis for organizational learning." So far, however, the literature on foreign policy learning does not stand on a foundation of theoretical knowledge about organizational learning comparable to what is available for individual, cognitive learning.

To the extent that foreign policy analysts have drawn on existing theories of organizational learning, they have probably exacerbated rather than resolved the problems inherent in attempting to apply learning to foreign policy. Many proponents of learning explanations emphasize, for example, the importance of avoiding normative definitions of learning. As Nye (1987:380) puts it, "the

question is whether the new information or skills [that could contribute to learning] have enabled the actors to achieve their purposes better, regardless of whether the observer likes those purposes or not" (see also Tetlock, 1988). Yet much of the literature on organizational learning comes from a field—business management—that explicitly advocates a normative goal, namely improving the operation of a business firm. The text by management professors Chris Argyris and Donald Schön (1978), most frequently cited by foreign policy analysts seeking insights into organizational learning, is explicit on this point: "We believe that a preoccupation with a normative theory of intervention provides the best starting point for a theory of organizational learning" (Argyris and Schön, 1978:iv). Indeed the normative focus is embedded in the authors' very definition of their subject: "Organizational learning involves the detection and correction of *error*" (Argyris and Schön, 1978:2, emphasis added).

The notion of error presupposes that one can judge unambiguously what is right and what is wrong. For a business, whose main goal is increasing market share or profitability, such a judgment may be relatively straightforward. For countries pursuing "security," it is far more difficult to identify good and bad policies. Not only are errors difficult to detect, but policymakers frequently disagree over the impact of policies because they disagree over fundamental questions about the nature of international relations. Political scientists who define foreign policy learning in such terms as a "growth of *realism*," or an increase in understanding "processes actually operating in the world" (Eth-eredge, 1985:66, original emphasis) neglect the extent to which differences in perception and interpretation of reality among policymakers render notions of learning problematic. There is a considerable risk that analysts' own normative views influence their assessment of whether learning has taken place.

Some of the best-known studies of the "lessons" of foreign policy—the works of Richard Neustadt and Ernest May—are normative in the tradition of Argyris and Schön (1978) in that they seek to improve the performance of policymakers. The case studies used in their collaborative project (Neustadt and May, 1986) were originally developed for teaching a public-policy course mainly to midcareer professionals. May's earlier (1973) study was also intended to help policymakers use history more effectively. Their work assumes that historical "reality" can be ascertained and that one can reliably detect error in the uses of history by policymakers (at least in retrospect). In focusing on performance, the authors evince an implicit normative agreement with the goals of policy. Thus, they tend to neglect the self-serving or opportunistic uses to which policymakers can put historical "lessons" in their struggles over policy objectives.

In contrast to the professional-school approach to foreign policy learning,

John Lovell (1984) has deliberately formulated an operational definition of organizational learning that avoids normative assumptions. Perhaps most importantly, he recognizes the central role of politics by conceptualizing "lessons" as "the product of an organizational *and political* dynamic, rather than as products of the application of logic and pure reason to analysis of the past" (Lovell, 1984:134, emphasis added). He defines learning not only as the changes that organizations make in response to experience but also the "political accommodations that they make in order to cope with the effects of experience" (Lovell, 1984:134). Operationally, his definition of learning includes the following "discernible effects of policy experience" on the organization:

modifications of the doctrine and "conventional wisdom" that provide institutionalized guideposts for action; changes of policy procedures and processes in ways that acknowledge the "lessons" of experience; an alteration of policy structures to reflect such lessons; a revision of policy-related personnel systems to bring incentive structures into accord with the felt needs of experience; and a revision of policy commitments and budgetary commitments on the basis of experience (Lovell, 1984:134-135).

Perhaps most notable about Lovell's definition, besides its rare operational specificity, is that it is most suitable to studying a particular bureaucracy or organization, rather than a government as a whole. Indeed, in his preliminary use of the framework, he compared the lessons learned by the U.S. State Department versus those learned by the U.S. Army regarding U.S. military involvement abroad (Lovell, 1984). Lovell's approach could be useful for studying change in the organizations that make up the Soviet security-policy apparatus. Unfortunately, however, most analysts have attempted the more ambitious and dubious task of generalizing about learning at the level of the Soviet government as a whole. Moreover, they have rarely done so with the requisite degree of precision in setting forth their operational definitions of the phenomenon.

These problems with applying learning to foreign policy are certainly not unfamiliar to serious students of the subject. In discussing efficiency learning, for example, Tetlock acknowledges the difficulty of determining whether it has occurred. In the absence of "well-designed evidential standards for determining success and failure," if it is impossible "to conduct controlled experiments to test and eliminate alternative causal hypotheses," and if policymakers are unable "to get quick and unambiguous feedback concerning the correctness of their predictions," then we cannot definitively establish that efficiency learning has taken place (Tetlock, 1988:9-10). Analysts must rely on counterfactual reconstructions of history that are always subject to dispute.

The epistemological problems associated with the study of learning in foreign policy are evident from attempts to apply the concept to the Soviet Union. In the Sovietological literature learning has generally been associated with shifts away from ideological thinking in Soviet foreign policy toward more pragmatic or "realistic" views of the world (Zimmerman, 1969; Breslauer, 1987). Because traditional Soviet ideological tenets entail such ambitious goals—such as the ultimate victory of communism worldwide—any recognition of impediments to achieving those goals seems to represent a more realistic picture of the external environment, a process that is often characterized as learning (in the efficiency sense, as Tetlock defines it). If such learning becomes the basis for changes in Soviet foreign policies, those policies are likely to be more moderate in that they are less ambitious in the face of newly acknowledged barriers. The relevance to understanding moderation in Soviet security policy appears obvious.

Yet problems arise in trying to identify which picture of the world is accurate or realistic as compared to the one seen through an ideological prism. Robert Darst has made the provocative claim that U.S. academic analysts tend to credit the Soviet government with learning when it begins to view the international system in terms compatible with those favored by the analysts themselves (Darst, 1989:155–157). William Zimmerman, for example, writing in the late 1960s, argued that Soviet foreign policymakers had "learned" because they had come to accept the notion of states as the primary actors in an international system, and had called into question the ideological stereotype of the "two camps" of socialism and imperialism (whose conflict would inevitably result in war) (Zimmerman, 1969, 1970). Robert Legvold (1988*b*), by contrast, describes as learning the process by which Soviet policymakers began to stress the importance of thinking of international relations as more than the interaction of nation-states; rather than focus exclusively on national interests, for example, Soviet leaders have called attention to such concepts as "common security" and "interdependence," and have emphasized the importance of international organizations such as the United Nations in furthering common goals. For Darst, Zimmerman's view of reality reflects the dominant paradigm in U.S. academic study of international relations—often called "structural realism"—whereas Legvold's reality represents the competing paradigm that emerged during the 1970s as "complex interdependence." Darst concludes that "the gap between 'reality' as Zimmerman perceives it and 'reality' as Legvold perceives it suggests that determining the standard against which Soviet learning is to be measured is no simple task" (Darst, 1989:156). It may be that both Zimmerman and Legvold accurately describe shifts in the dominant views of Soviet foreign policymakers. The difficulty lies in attributing such shifts to "learning."

Despite such difficulties, academic interest in learning persists, and many analysts find the notion particularly persuasive in accounting for changes in Soviet policy under Gorbachev (Legvold, 1988*b*; Weber, 1989). There is no doubt that policies pursued by Gorbachev and his reform-minded colleagues differ from those of previous leaders, and that the "new thinking" in foreign policy is fundamentally new in many ways (for example, its rejection of zero-sum thinking in favor of notions of common security and interdependence, and its devaluation of the military instrument in foreign policy in favor of diplomacy and domestic economic health). Yet Gorbachev is not the Soviet Union; and even the Politburo, not to mention the armed forces, contains people whose views differ substantially from those of the general secretary (Parrott, 1988; Lynch, 1989). Here the anthropomorphism of the concept of learning becomes highly problematic. How can one speak of shifts in belief systems of a *government* or *state*, when serious differences in beliefs among foreign policy influentials persist, and it is not clear that any particular individual's views have actually changed? As Goldmann (1988:35) points out, cognitive factors "operate only at the individual level. Hence, the structure of officially adopted beliefs—a foreign policy doctrine, a party program—is relevant only insofar as the official beliefs are also widely shared by the members of the policymaking system."

Ernst Haas, a political scientist who began discussing foreign policy learning before the current wave of interest, emphasized this point as well. Learning, for Haas, is a change in the definition of the national interest. In order for learning to occur, there must be acquisition of *consensual knowledge*. "A claim to knowledge becomes consensual whenever it succeeds in dominating the policy making process—and that implies acceptance by all major actors involved in that process" (Haas, 1980:370). Although he writes mainly in regard to policymaking between rather than within states (he is interested in how states agree to form international regimes), the same arguments would apply to the domestic decision-making process. One cannot argue that a state has learned if important members of the policymaking community disagree about the lessons.

Proponents of learning explanations vary in the extent to which they take into account disagreements between policymakers. They often anthropomorphically represent the state as a unitary, cognitive actor even while employing language that suggests otherwise. Nye, for example, argues that learning may occur when "leaders notice changes in the structure of the situation which affects their effectiveness, and they adapt their behavior as a result of anticipation or experience . . . or learning may occur simply through *perceptions* of change in the structure of the situation" (Nye, 1987:388–389, emphasis added). He gives as an example that the United States and Soviet Union may have

perceived a decline in the bipolar nature of the international system in the mid-1960s, which reinforced their interest in nuclear nonproliferation. But states do not "perceive" anything—only individuals do. And individuals disagree in their perceptions of such vague concepts as the polarity of the international system. Current disagreements about the relative decline of the U.S. economy (and the attendant academic debates on "hegemonic stability") attest to the importance of avoiding assumptions of consensus when there is none. Even the appearance of consensus may deceive. As Breslauer (1987:447) points out, even if all relevant policymakers learn the same lesson, they may do so for different reasons: thus, "their perspectives are likely to evolve in diverse directions, for objective circumstances to which they point may change at differential rates."

Proponents of learning explanations do at some point take account of substate-level disagreements about how to interpret the international environment. An appreciation of the role of domestic politics underlies Nye's observation that "shifts in social structure and political power determine whose learning matters" (Nye, 1987:381). He admits that "some changes in 'national interest' depend not upon new affective or cognitive views in the society at large, but merely on changes of political elites. Such political change may occur because of domestic issues largely unrelated to foreign policy" (Nye, 1987:378). Breslauer argues that generational change and political leadership succession in the Soviet Union "facilitate regime learning by providing the impetus, political incentive, and political opportunity for a significant re-evaluation of assumptions" (Breslauer, 1987:443). Tetlock (1988:22–23) observes that fundamental forms of learning "appear to require major personnel shifts" (see also Steinbruner, 1974:136–137). This observation leads him to wonder whether "a political version of a natural-selection model may provide a more appropriate description of how governments adapt to a changing international environment than does a learning framework." He discusses other possible explanations that put more emphasis on politics, personal opportunism, and chance—including the "garbage can model" developed by Cohen, March, and Olsen (1972).

Tetlock and others believe that many of the competing explanations for how governments adapt are not necessarily incompatible with a learning framework. For the purposes of this chapter, however, it is important to call attention to points of disagreement between competing approaches. Considering the significance for policy, we should especially try to identify the explanations that provide the best understanding of whether Soviet moderation is likely to be of a temporary or enduring character. Although learning explanations do not focus specifically on moderation, they do give attention to reversions to past policies following a learning-induced change of some duration.

Analysts tend to speak in such cases of "unlearning" or "forgetting." As Tetlock (1988:17) describes: "Lessons drawn from experience at one time can be 'forgotten' or 'unlearned'—either because the individuals who originally drew the lessons no longer see them as useful guides to policy or because these individuals have been replaced by a new cohort who subscribe to a different set of goals or strategic and tactical beliefs." Only the first possibility seems best understood by cognitively based notions of learning at the individual level of analysis. In the second case, when foreign policymakers are actually replaced, it makes more sense to concentrate on political explanations at higher levels of analysis. Notions of learning, unlearning, and forgetting in such cases seem superfluous, as when Nye writes of "occasional forgetting as coalitions shift in domestic politics" (Nye, 1987:382). If one is interested in explaining change, the explanation in this case is a domestic political realignment. "Forgetting" is merely a descriptive term of limited explanatory value.

Despite problems with the metaphor itself, those who have used notions of learning to account for change in Soviet foreign policy have captured an important aspects of Soviet behavior. Soviet academic writing on such subjects as the international system and the determinants of U.S. policy has evinced a growing sophistication since the foundation of international relations as a field of research in the Soviet Union (Zimmerman, 1969). Much of the sophistication became evident in the rhetoric and actions of top policymakers as well, many of whom were apparently influenced by academic analysts in their capacity as policy advisers. Learning is a suitable description for what academic researchers do. It is not so clear, however, that the learning metaphor is appropriate for describing policymakers who adapt to events in the international environment, even with the help of new knowledge and advice—especially given the existence of competing policy options and contrary advice.

Yet Sovietologists have been drawn to learning metaphors largely, it seems, in reaction to the tenacity and longevity of explanations focusing on *ideology*. In only slightly caricatured form, these explanations hold that "the ideological imprint of Marxism-Leninism on the Soviet political mentality is so strong that the Soviet vision of international relations has stood fast before the challenges posed by the contemporary world" (Lynch, 1987:1). In countering such generalizations analysts such as Griffiths (1972, 1984), Zimmerman (1969, 1970, 1980), Breslauer (1987), and Lynch (1987) have made an important contribution. But one does not need to invoke learning to argue that Soviet leaders managed to adapt their views and policies to such ideologically uncomfortable developments as the emergence of a Communist Chinese threat or the continued viability of capitalist economies—unless one assumes that ideology constrains Soviet foreign policy like a straightjacket. From

Brest-Litovsk on, however, Soviet foreign policy has manifested considerably more flexibility than that, as advocates of a learning approach themselves have pointed out. The problem is not with the reality that these analysts describe, but with the metaphors that they employ.

Cognitive psychological theories of learning have the potential to make a strong contribution to understanding foreign policy change. An important obstacle is the difficulty of reconciling individual-level psychological approaches and political theories of coalition-building without reifying the concept of learning. Notions of learning would appear most valuable in cases where one can demonstrate that a coalition had fallen from power and had been replaced precisely owing to general agreement that foreign-policy failures had resulted from the erroneous beliefs or defective cognitive structures held by members of the coalition. The important assumptions here are that the coalition was replaced for reasons of foreign, rather than domestic, policy; that there was close to consensus within the policymaking community that faulty cognitive beliefs were responsible for foreign policy failures; and that the new coalition came to power owing to its alternative conceptions of foreign policy. Notions of learning may still be useful even if such stringent requirements are not fulfilled. If the requirements were met, however, learning would demonstrate a clear superiority over rival explanations that seek to account for change in foreign policies.

POLICY ENTREPRENEURSHIP

If foreign policy changes come about as the result of new internal political alignments, as coalition theories suggest, and if these shifts in coalition are the product of learning, as some advocates of that approach assert, there is still a piece missing from the puzzle. We must explore the mechanism by which these new alignments themselves come about, or—if the learning metaphor is appropriate—how individuals who have changed their minds manage to produce a change at the organizational and governmental levels. An important body of literature in U.S. politics suggests that policy entrepreneurs play a key role in promoting new ideas in order to build political coalitions around them (Kingdon, 1984; Lewis, 1980; Ferguson, 1984). In the field of Soviet politics, a comparable argument has appeared that focuses on the role of policy specialists in influencing the top leadership, who then in turn put together coalitions around the policies they find attractive (Löwenhardt, 1981; Solomon, 1978; Gustafson, 1981; Bunce, 1981).

A key insight of the literature on policy entrepreneurs concerns the concept of the "policy window" (Kingdon, 1984). It refers to an opportunity that typically appears in the form of a new problem. Individuals or groups seize the opportunity to promote the policies they have long favored in order to deal

with the new problem. This phenomenon, of "an answer actively looking for a question," has been termed the "garbage can model" of organizational choice (Cohen, March, and Olsen, 1972:3).

Policy entrepreneurs may play a role in foreign policy learning if their arguments are persuasive enough to form the basis for "consensual knowledge" (Haas, 1980). If, however, decision makers are "uncommitted thinkers," in Steinbruner's (1974) terms, and there are other entrepreneurs promoting competing policies, the learning metaphor seems less useful. For by definition such a "high-level policy maker, beset with uncertainty and sitting at the intersection of a number of information channels, will tend at different times to adopt *different* belief patterns for the same decision problem" (Steinbruner, 1974:129, original emphasis). To the extent that the policies that flow from the different belief patterns contradict one another, learning theorists would probably have to speak of a process of learning (and unlearning) contradictory lessons in potentially rapid succession—a pattern that calls into question what it means to learn.

On a number of occasions Sovietologists have used notions of learning that are compatible with policy entrepreneurship but are very different from the ones discussed in the previous section. Rather than anthropomorphize the Soviet Union as a unitary actor, William Zimmerman (1980:560), for example, emphasizes the "widespread differences in Soviet foreign policy priorities" among elites. In his view, competing elite "perspectives are formed out of divergent values, career backgrounds, and political roles" (Zimmerman, 1980:558). Thus, when he and Axelrod (1981) write of "learning" in the Soviet context, they describe a highly politicized process by which different institutions promote self-serving "lessons" from international events such as the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam: "Our survey of Soviet lessons of Vietnam shows that the notion of monolithic Soviet preferences is flatly wrong. When one speaks of Soviet goals, it is necessary to specify the particular individuals, institutions, or media sources, as well as the context" (Zimmerman and Axelrod, 1981:17). The language here is quite far from notions of learning as development of "consensual knowledge" or changes in individual cognitive structures. By implicitly describing "lessons" of Vietnam as policy windows through which entrepreneurs push their preexisting preferences for Soviet policy Zimmerman seems much closer to the coalition-building and policy-entrepreneurship perspectives on Soviet foreign-policy change than to the cognitive learning approaches. Griffiths (1972, 1984), while rejecting (as Zimmerman does as well) overly schematic divisions of Soviet policymakers into moderates and hardliners, still stresses competition between contrasting "tendencies" in Soviet foreign policy and uses "learning" to describe a political process of promoting competing images of the adversary. In this case,

reconciling the competing approaches of coalition-building/entrepreneurship and learning demands fundamentally reinterpreting the latter.

LEADERS

Learning approaches could be useful for explaining at the individual level of analysis how top Soviet leaders change their views about foreign policy. Various types of content-analysis techniques have been developed to evaluate the views of leaders (see, for example, Axelrod, 1976; Hermann, 1980). Although emphasizing the individual level of analysis always risks ignoring more important explanatory factors, the approach may be more appropriate for a highly centralized system such as the Soviet Union than for other polities. Margaret Hermann's (1989) personality profile of Gorbachev is a useful start. One would especially be interested, however, in analyzing leaders of long tenure, in order to assess the degree of change over time in their foreign policy views. Notions of learning could be particularly valuable in explaining changes in the "operational codes" of decision makers (George, 1969).

Unfortunately, Sovietologists have not devoted a great deal of attention to a systematic evaluation of changes in the individual foreign-policy views or operational codes of Soviet policymakers. Richard Herrmann's work (1985, 1988) indicates, however, that the data and methods are available for undertaking such efforts. Even if one found evidence of changes in views, in order to support a learning explanation one would still need to demonstrate that leaders were not simply "uncommitted thinkers," temporarily influenced by the most persuasive policy entrepreneurs they encountered. Studies of this sort would also have to control for factors at other levels of analysis.

Within Soviet studies, more attention has been focused on the influence of new leaders than on changes in views of old ones. The Gorbachev phenomenon has led many observers to focus on the role of new leaders in instigating foreign policy change, and, in this case, change toward moderation. In studies of Soviet domestic politics, debates about the impact of new leaders have generated considerable interest if not definite conclusions (Breslauer, 1982; Bunce, 1980, 1981; Roeder, 1985; Bunce and Roeder, 1986). One major obstacle to generalization is the paucity of cases: even if we include leaders with extremely short terms of office, such as Malenkov, Andropov, and Chernenko, we generate barely more than a half-dozen cases since Lenin. The same problem applies to security policy. Even if we broaden consideration beyond the person of the general secretary to include other members of the security policy elite (for example, Politburo and Defense Council), the number of new leaders who have dealt extensively with issues of security policy and international cooperation in the nuclear age is not many.

There is a body of literature in Soviet security studies that puts particular emphasis on the role of individual leaders. The most explicit presentation of this view is Karl Spielmann's (1978) articulation of a "national leadership model," which he counterposed to rational-actor and bureaucratic-politics models. Spielmann was interested mainly in the determinants of Soviet force posture and weapons, but one could also apply his model to arms control negotiations and other aspects of security cooperation and moderation, as many analysts have been inclined to do since Gorbachev came into office. In his review of literature on Soviet national security policy, Stephen Meyer agrees with Spielmann that "leadership preferences have been a dominating influence in Soviet defense decision making," but he maintains that "the national leadership model offers little in the way of predictive capability" (Meyer, 1984:265-266).

Meyer's (1988) own recent work on the sources of new Soviet thinking on security suggests consistency with his earlier views. He argues that "if one looks carefully at the history of military doctrinal change in the Soviet Union, one inescapable conclusion is clear: individual general secretaries do matter. . . . It is not so much a matter of 'personalities' as it is personal policy agendas, priorities, and images of what has gone before and what needs to be done now" (Meyer, 1988:127-128). Meyer's article also reinforces his skepticism about the ability of leadership models to generate accurate predictions. Discussing, for example, the possibility of unilateral reductions in Soviet military forces, Meyer (1988:147) wrote, "I fail to find any evidence that such notions reflect policy at the present time." He argued that a bold advocacy by three Soviet academics (Zhurkin, Karaganov, and Kortunov, 1987) of unilateral reductions "is not a widely shared perspective among new thinkers" (Meyer, 1988:147). With regard to conventional forces, he maintained that "Gorbachev seems to be more in line with the old thinkers than he is with the new thinkers" in countenancing Soviet reductions "only with strictly matched compensating reductions on the NATO side" (Meyer, 1988:149). Meyer concluded his article with the observation that "it may be that the period of Gorbachev's greatest freedom of action in arms control is passing" (Meyer, 1988:163).

Within weeks of the publication of Meyer's article, Gorbachev announced a unilateral Soviet reduction of 500,000 troops, 10,000 tanks, 8,500 artillery pieces, and 800 combat aircraft—an initiative that even the most skeptical observers of Soviet military policy welcomed as significantly reducing the capabilities for a Soviet conventional attack (U.S. House of Representatives, 1989). Since then the Soviets have announced a 14.2 percent decrease in their military budget and a 40 percent cut in tank production; they have welcomed U.S. observers to inspect laser test ranges and laboratories and ballistic mis-

sile silos and launch facilities; and they have unilaterally withdrawn some of their tactical nuclear weapons from Europe.

Of course, Meyer is not the only analyst to have been surprised by Gorbachev's initiatives; it has become more the rule than the exception among Sovietologists. His article reinforces his own point that leadership models may serve well for *ex post facto* explanation of policy, but fare poorly for prediction. As Meyer himself is well aware, to understand the sources of change in Soviet security policy, one needs to incorporate other levels of analysis besides the individual preferences of the general secretary.

TACIT TRANSNATIONAL ALLIANCES

The theoretical perspectives discussed so far have emphasized the international, domestic, and individual levels of analysis. Another possibility, suggested by the literature on interdependence, focuses on transnational or trans-governmental relations, with actors participating simultaneously in interstate relations and domestic politics (Keohane and Nye, 1977). The notion of a "tacit alliance" between actors in different countries promoting their domestic goals through the pursuit of an international agreement seems compatible with the literature on policy entrepreneurs and policy windows. In international relations, presumably, arguments or information received from counterparts in the adversary country who are fellow members of a tacit alliance could serve as a window to help policy entrepreneurs pursue their goals. Here a link to coalition theory is evident. "Where a nation may lack a winning coalition domestically," Haggard and Simmons (1987:517) wonder, "can pressure or support from external actors tip policy in the direction favored by the cooperative minority?" The hypothesis seems plausible for such issue-areas as economic relations (Putnam and Bayne, 1987; Putnam, 1988) and environmental policy (Haas, 1989; Young, 1989), and the approach has been proposed specifically as a means to security cooperation as well (Singer, 1984:245-255, 267-269). Analysts have suggested that international contacts, say between U.S. and Soviet scientists discussing arms control issues at international meetings, or even between arms negotiators themselves, can lead to tacit alliances to promote moderation in their respective countries' policies (Dallin, 1981:382-386; Legvold, 1988*b*; York, 1987).

In the security realm, such tacit alliances are more likely to be successful if they serve to change the image of the adversary from hostile to benign. Changes in enemy images can be an important contributor to foreign policy change and would probably constitute examples of "cognitive content" learning, in Tetlock's definition (Holsti, 1967; White, 1984; Larson, 1985; Tetlock, 1988). Sovietologists have paid considerable attention to how Soviet views of the United States change, and have related Soviet perceptions of a

more benign U.S. adversary to a greater propensity for cooperative behavior on the part of the Soviet Union. There is some disagreement, however, over whether views of the adversary are used merely to rationalize domestic political goals or whether they represent genuine beliefs or "tendencies" (Griffiths, 1972, 1984; Dallin, 1981; Snyder, 1987/1988; Jackson, 1981). If tacit alliances genuinely change beliefs, we could speak of them as enhancing "interactive" learning, in Legvold's (1988*b*) sense.

Popular Notions

In the popular U.S. discourse on Soviet foreign policy, a number of explanations claim to account for change toward moderation in Soviet security policy. Integrating them into the academic literature poses certain problems for the analyst. Some of the explanations—those that give prominence to individual Soviet leaders, for example—appear both in academic and popular discussions, so the only problem is the possible arbitrariness of placing them in one category or another. Other popular explanations—such as "negotiation from strength" or economic stringency—have clear counterparts in the academic literature, but where to situate them in an overall framework for understanding sources of Soviet policy depends in large measure on the analyst's own theoretical proclivities. Analysts inclined to "black box" Soviet internal decision-making and treat the state as a unitary actor would consider such factors as declining growth rates and military pressure from Soviet adversaries as exogenous or independent variables. In this view, they relate directly to the degree of Soviet moderation—the dependent variable—that we seek to explain.

As the preceding review indicates, however, there is criticism as well as support for such realist assumptions about international politics within the theoretical literature on international cooperation. Robert Putnam (1988:432), for example, maintains, that "on nearly all important issues, 'central decision-makers' disagree about what the national interest and international context demand" (see also Young, 1989). Competing policies for dealing with external or internal pressures become the stuff of coalition politics (Gourevitch, 1986). Seemingly objective or exogenous factors become "endogenized" in domestic political debates and the outcome cannot easily be predicted. In this interpretation, factors such as military pressure or economic constraints become intermediate rather than independent variables; they affect the prospects for Soviet moderation in indeterminate ways.

Although in reviewing the empirical material on Soviet security policy I will be sensitive to the possibility of straightforward relationships between "exogenous" factors and Soviet policy outcomes, in the theoretical framework

developed here I treat them as mediating rather than determining influences. There are a number of reasons for this approach. First, statistical tests of correlations between, say, U.S. hostile behavior and Soviet conciliatory behavior or change in Soviet economic growth and change in security policy do not indicate a simple causes-and-effect relationship (Bennett, 1989). Second, in U.S.–Soviet security affairs, perhaps more than most areas, it is difficult to determine the appropriate policy for dealing with even the starkest evidence of economic decline or increase in the adversary's hostility. It is nearly as difficult, in internal debates about security, to persuade opponents that a given policy has failed—that it is too costly, too conciliatory, or too conflictual: the most clear-cut indication of a failed security policy would be the outbreak of superpower war or the collapse of a national economy, neither of which has happened. In the absence of those events, advocates of competing policies are unlikely to yield to their opponents. Even obvious failures short of superpower war—for example, U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam—are subject to contradictory interpretations at home and abroad, as Zimmerman and Axelrod (1981) point out.

One way to incorporate seemingly “objective” factors such as external military pressure and economic constraints is to consider them as windows that entrepreneurs can use to try to build coalitions in support of their preferred policies. Thus, the notion of the policy window can provide a bridge between academic theories of policy change and explanations current in the public debate. Specifically, it can point to the kinds of internal and external pressures that are often credited with inducing changes in Soviet security policy, and it can also incorporate events, such as the advent of new leaders, that otherwise have little predictive power.

MILITARY EXIGENCIES

One common explanation for changes in Soviet security policy maintains that they are dictated by military requirements. Given a limited military budget, the argument goes, the Soviets cannot give the same priority to all of their military programs at once. One should expect to see restraint in certain programs (for example, strategic nuclear weapons) at times when other programs (say, conventional forces) are receiving higher priority. When applied to instances of moderation in Soviet security policy, this view maintains that what appears as moderation is not in fact moderation but merely a shift in priorities. At its extreme, this explanation can account even for absolute decreases in Soviet military budgets and substantial reductions in forces (for example, through disarmament agreements). These actions are described as “breathing spaces,” necessary to prepare the Soviet Union for future military competition.

This explanation begs the question, however, of how military requirements are formulated, what gives rise to new ones, and how priorities are set and changed. One argument that we have already encountered holds that military requirements reflect the desires of domestic political coalitions (Snyder, 1987/1988:123–126). Other arguments, however, focus on the role of external factors in shaping Soviet military requirements and priorities, in particular military developments by Soviet adversaries (McCgwire, 1987). To the extent that changes in priorities are viewed as rational responses that enhance Soviet security, this explanation accords with—and shares the drawbacks of— notions of “efficiency” learning. For our purposes, the controversial questions remain: Are external threats likely to produce change toward moderation in Soviet security policy or merely a reorientation of Soviet military efforts? How can one distinguish genuine, enduring moderation from a temporary breathing space? Explanations that focus narrowly on military exigencies do not provide satisfactory answers.

NEGOTIATION FROM STRENGTH

A popular notion in the U.S. policy debate holds that external pressure and threats do induce moderation—specifically, that moderation in Soviet security policy results from a U.S. practice of negotiation from strength. In some versions, the notion is narrowly defined to mean that Western military programs, in the form of “bargaining chips,” are necessary to secure reductions or limitations in Soviet forces (Einhorn, 1985; Rose, 1988). More expansive versions focus on strength more than on negotiation, in that their proponents often oppose negotiations on principle. Consistent in some respects with the coalition-theory approaches, they maintain the Soviet moderation is only possible as a result of internal social, economic, and political change. Such change can be induced only by external Western pressure, in the form of both military programs and economic warfare, until the Soviet leadership sees no alternative but to reform (Pipes, 1984). An unwavering policy of U.S. “strength” will contribute to that end, even without formal negotiations.

The negotiation-from-strength approach resembles some of the more mechanistic (for example, “minimalist”) notions of learning, in that repeated failures of Soviet policy in the face of U.S. firmness are understood to lead to changes in Soviet behavior. It is also consistent with George Kennan’s predictions about the consequences of a U.S. policy of “containment” of the Soviet Union: he maintained that the Kremlin could not “face frustration indefinitely without eventually adjusting itself in one way or another to the logic of that state of affairs” (Kennan, 1947:581). Such adjustment would entail either the “break-up or the gradual mellowing of Soviet power” (Kennan, 1947:581;

also Hough, 1987). The latter possibility implies a change consonant with transformation of cognitive content or structure, as learning approaches hold.

Contrary to coalition theorists, but consistent with some learning approaches, proponents of negotiation from strength typically do not differentiate Soviet policymakers into hardliners and moderates or argue that U.S. policy should try to support the latter. A conception of a monolithic Soviet decision-making system is implicit in arguments that U.S. military pressure would put such a strain on the Soviet economy "that the Soviet leadership would have little choice but to make substantial concessions on arms control" (Gaddis, 1989:13). Unrecognized—because their arguments did not prevail—is the possibility that some Soviet policymakers would be willing to strain the economy even further to meet the challenge, whereas others would seek to minimize the threat posed by U.S. pressure by appealing to arguments about the adequacy (and "overkill" potential) of the existing Soviet nuclear arsenal.

ECONOMIC STRINGENCY

An important assumption of the expansive negotiation-from-strength perspective is that economic pressure will force the Soviets to limit their military spending and therefore show restraint in their security policy. A corollary of this assumption is that the U.S. must continue to maintain external pressure until Soviet internal reform is complete; otherwise the Soviet leaders will try to use foreign policy successes as a means of diverting the populace from demanding reform (Pipes, 1984). This argument, however, entails a logical fallacy. If Soviet leaders need to distract their citizens, they should be able to do so at least as effectively by invoking foreign threats as by mounting successful foreign adventures. Foreign threats could create a "rally 'round the flag" response that would attract attention away from the popular desire for reform. There is some precedent, dating back to the 1920s, for Soviet leaders to use "war scares" for internal political purposes (Meyer, 1978; Shlapentokh, 1984). Even if hardline U.S. policies managed to discredit Soviet hardliners (rather than reinforce their image of a hostile adversary), there is a danger that U.S. proponents of pressure, as those most skeptical of Soviet intentions, would not recognize a Soviet change toward moderation. At that point, continued pursuit of a hostile U.S. policy could undercut the Soviet reformers' efforts (Snyder, 1989).

An alternative view holds that the Soviets are already concerned about the economic consequences of military spending and would welcome the opportunity to limit it through arms control agreements. In this view, inducements in the form of favorable trade agreements will tend to encourage Soviet cooperation in disarmament, whereas efforts at economic pressure will proba-

bly be counterproductive (Clemens, 1973:65–66; Cohen, 1979, 1988). In the words of one “Doonesbury” cartoon character (a freshman in Dr. Kissinger’s seminar), “the Soviets don’t mind being bribed, but they hate being blackmailed.” According to the notion of “linkage,” conciliatory Soviet behavior in arms negotiations is more likely if the U.S. makes economic cooperation contingent upon Soviet moderation (Skinner, 1987; Druckman and Hopmann, 1989). This view does often distinguish between hardline and moderate elements in the Soviet leadership, but it does not spell out the mechanism by which moderates use U.S. actions to promote their preferred policies or to consider how such efforts might backfire.

Another view simply relates Soviet military programs to the state of the Soviet economy. When the growth rate declines, when competition for resources between the civilian and military sectors becomes particularly severe, when major bottlenecks occur, the Soviets will be inclined to slacken their military efforts, even without a formal agreement, if in their view the international situation permits. Under such conditions, one could argue, policy entrepreneurs who favor reductions in military spending could promote a more benign image of the adversary in order to bolster their case. Certainly the actual policies of the adversary make a difference as well. Contrary to the negotiation-from-strength perspective, this view would maintain that extreme external pressure at a time of tight resource stringency would make it more difficult for proponents of reduced military spending to argue their case persuasively.

UNILATERAL INITIATIVES

In contrast to the negotiation-from-strength view, many analysts argue that the Soviet Union will not show restraint in its military programs in response to U.S. pressure, but will reciprocate U.S. unilateral initiatives of restraint. This view is the equivalent in the public debate of academic notions of tit-for-tat and GRIT. Its supporters often cite historical examples from the U.S.–Soviet nuclear arms race, particularly nuclear testing moratoria of the late 1950s and early 1960s. The view also seems to inform a number of congressional initiatives aimed, for example, at maintaining the integrity of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) agreements, preventing an arms race in antisatellite weapons, and securing a comprehensive nuclear test ban. A comparative study of five cases in which the U.S. attempted unilateral initiatives of restraint (of various degrees of seriousness) reported mixed results for the technique (Rose, 1988).

SOVIET STRENGTH

Although not very common in the U.S. debate today, the argument is at least logically tenable that the Soviets are willing to moderate their behavior

and come to mutually beneficial agreements only when they have caught up or are ahead in the arms race. Indeed, in the Soviet debate, the notion was rather widespread, at least during the 1970s, that the "correlation of forces" had shifted in the Soviet Union's favor and, for that reason, the United States was finally willing to negotiate strategic arms control (Payne, 1980; Schwartz, 1978; Zagladin, 1986). Similar reasoning did often appear to underlie the Nixon administration's pursuit of arms control, especially its efforts to curtail the emerging Soviet advantage in "heavy" intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). It is worth considering, then, whether moderation in Soviet security policy correlates with periods of relative Soviet strength.

A related Soviet argument links this proposition about military strength to the overall state of the economy. It suggests that the U.S. will be better disposed toward superpower cooperation in the security realm at times when the Soviet economy is performing well, whereas the U.S. will take advantage of periods of Soviet economic weakness to pursue a confrontational policy. Thus, in this view, the prospects for security cooperation are positively related to the performance of the Soviet economy or at least to the seriousness of Soviet attempts to accelerate economic growth (Zagladin, 1986).

PUBLIC OPINION

A state may moderate its foreign policy under pressure from domestic or international public opinion. It may do so to gain a propaganda advantage over an adversary or to sow discord among the adversary's allies. It may try merely to give the appearance of moderation for any of these reasons. These points are frequently raised in the course of debates about Soviet intentions in the security realm—especially when the Soviets conduct "public diplomacy" by announcing initiatives related to ongoing arms control negotiations in an effort to induce U.S. concessions. Explanations that focus on public opinion as a source of cooperation or moderation also figure prominently in certain academic approaches, including regime theory (for example, its focus on norms) and GRIT.

Distinguishing between sincere, voluntary gestures of moderation and feigned moderation or moderation resulting from pressure would at first appear a crucial task. In fact, however, for many purposes the distinction is not essential. A state that is only feigning moderation in some particular initiative risks having its bluff called, so to speak. In response, it would either have to come through with a genuinely cooperative gesture or sacrifice whatever propaganda advantage it had anticipated. For the GRIT approach, the initiatives by definition have to be of some significance in order to break the opponent's "enemy image" (Osgood, 1962; Larson, 1987). If they are intended as propaganda gestures, they will not trigger a response. Only when they

become widely recognized at home and abroad as significant will the target state feel obliged to respond—even if its central decision makers (as the ultimate repository of the enemy image) are still not convinced of the initiator's sincerity. For the long-term objective of tension-reduction and cooperation, it does not matter if the decision makers are still skeptical. As Larson (1987:33) points out, "regardless of whether the response is motivated by internal conviction or by domestic political pressures, the result is the same; the target state reciprocates with another cooperative act." If the process is to continue, the initiator must reciprocate with further meaningful, cooperative gestures, leading to changes in attitudes about the adversary on both sides and ultimately a reduction in tensions.

Reluctant reciprocation or initiation of moderate policies under pressure of public opinion need not be considered less significant than comparable policies pursued with conviction. Support for this argument comes from, among other places, theories of social and cognitive psychology. Cognitive dissonance theory, for example, would argue that policymakers forced to pursue certain policies come to adopt belief systems that justify them. The policies then are viewed as appropriate and correct. Self-perception theory, using competing assumptions and for different reasons, comes to a similar conclusion (Larson, 1985:29–34, 42–50). These theories, if valid, would suggest that policymakers caught in a spiral of conciliatory initiatives—reciprocated originally for reasons of "public relations"—would come to believe that moderation is in any case a sound policy. Presumably they would also respond to "positive reinforcement" (to mix psychological metaphors) from the public opinion that initially pressured them to pursue moderation. Counterintuitive as these arguments may appear, they do find some support in the empirical material considered below.

Evidence from the Soviet Case

There are a number of possible ways to organize the evidence on change in Soviet security policy. One is to focus on particular chronological periods—for example, the tenure in office of the major Soviet leaders. Another is to look at specific areas of security policy—for example, strategic weapons procurement, nuclear testing, military doctrine, or arms control. Some theoretical concepts would seem to lend themselves to one approach over the other, although there are ambiguities. One might not expect a security regime, for example, to exist in only a narrow sphere of the East–West military competition. Nye (1987), however, has argued that the concept does apply to the issue-area of nuclear nonproliferation but not to the U.S.–Soviet security

relationship as a whole. By the same token, coalition theorists would not expect a different constellation of domestic forces to form in each security-related issue-area, but the relative influence of hardline and conciliatory groups might vary from issue to issue. For both of these approaches, analysis by chronological leadership period would seem necessary, but not sufficient.

For evaluating other approaches, analysis by leadership period would not seem particularly appropriate. It would be difficult, for example, to consider the merits of a tit-for-tat strategy if every action relevant to the arms race during a given leader's tenure had to be taken into account; it would make more sense to focus on a particular issue-area, such as nuclear testing or the SALT I negotiations. Choosing the best approach for evaluating other theoretical approaches is even less clear-cut. Learning, for example, could take place in fairly narrow issue-areas, or in relation to the overall pattern of foreign policy behavior. In a similar sense, one could equally expect to find policy entrepreneurs favoring specific new approaches to strictly defined problems or promoting a reconceptualization of policy as a whole. Strategies such as GRIT would appear to lend themselves to testing in specific issue-areas (Etzioni, 1967), but according to some versions GRIT specifies that the "initiatives should be diversified in sphere of action and geographical location" (Larson, 1987:32).

A comprehensive study of change in Soviet security policy should probably combine both the chronological and issue-area approaches. For the purposes of this chapter, we settle on a compromise. The following sections are organized by chronological leadership period (including Andropov and Chernenko as part of "The Brezhnev Era") and selectively by issue-area within each period. It is not possible in a single chapter to "test," or even to give systematic attention to each of the dozen or so theoretical approaches and variations enumerated above. The requisite research has simply not been done; in many cases, the historical data have not even been compiled. Instead, the chapter highlights those explanations that for a given issue-area or chronological period seem to have strong explanatory value, appear to receive little support from the evidence available, or might be promising but require more empirical research before we can know for sure.

Table 5.1 provides a list of simple hypotheses, derived from the preceding literature review, to help guide the reader through the discussion of historical cases. It must be emphasized, however, that the discussion that follows does not constitute a test of the hypotheses, for several reasons. First, the cases do not represent a random sample: their selection was based on availability of secondary accounts, and, to some extent, primary materials. Thus, it is not possible to indicate conclusively which hypotheses were validated and which were disproved. Second, the hypotheses are formulated in a general way,

TABLE 5.1 Hypotheses on Soviet Moderation

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- 1a. Moderation results from a security regime.
 - 1b. Moderation leads to a security regime.
 2. Moderation results from learning.
 3. Moderation results from domestic political realignments.
 4. The *appearance* of moderation results from changes in military requirements.
 - 5a. Transnational alliances facilitate moderation.
 - 5b. Transnational alliances hinder moderation.
 - 6a. Soviet policymakers who desire moderation will use GRIT to induce international cooperation from Soviet adversaries.
 - 6b. GRIT works to facilitate moderation.
 - 7a. Soviet policymakers who desire moderation will use tit-for-tat to induce international cooperation from Soviet adversaries.
 - 7b. Tit-for-tat works to facilitate moderation.
 - 8a. Unilateral U.S. concessions or initiatives of restraint produce Soviet moderation.
 - 8b. U.S. negotiation from strength produces Soviet moderation.
 - 8c. Moderation is more likely to occur under conditions of relative Soviet strength rather than weakness.
 9. Moderation results from efforts of policy entrepreneurs to take advantage of policy windows.
 - 10a. Moderation is most likely under conditions of relative Soviet economic weakness.
 - 10b. Moderation is most likely under conditions of relative Soviet economic strength.
 11. Leadership preferences determine the degree to which the Soviets will pursue policies of moderation.
 - 12a. Concern for public opinion leads policymakers to pursue moderation.
 - 12b. Public opinion reinforces reciprocity in gestures of moderation.
-

rather than in more precise, operational terms. This choice was dictated by the nature of the existing secondary literature. Most of the relevant work in the field is of a descriptive and historical nature, and virtually none presents and tests propositions. Relying on this secondary literature does not permit the degree of specification that one would use to develop hypotheses in an original research design. Finally, even a chapter of this length cannot give systematic attention to 20 hypotheses over 3 major leadership periods for several issue-areas.

Although it cannot present conclusive findings from the field of Soviet security studies, let alone provide specific policy prescriptions, the following review should, nevertheless, prove useful to indicate the nature of the evidence available to support policy-relevant hypotheses about Soviet behavior.

It also suggests areas where future research could fill in gaps, and, along with the preceding literature review, forms a basis for the more specific hypotheses with which the chapter concludes.

The Khrushchev Era

East–West security cooperation was absent throughout the Stalin period and most of the Khrushchev era as well. One certainly cannot speak of anything resembling a *security regime*. Under Nikita Khrushchev there were a number of major changes in security policy, but many of them—the nuclearization of the Soviet armed forces, for example—were not in the direction of moderation. On the other hand, the advent of nuclear weapons and the “mutual hostage” relationship between the two superpowers led Khrushchev to make a major ideological pronouncement that portended a change in Soviet attitudes toward nuclear arms control.

MILITARY DOCTRINE

At the Twentieth Party Congress in 1956, Khrushchev declared that war between the two rival social systems—capitalism and socialism—was no longer “fatalistically inevitable” (Holloway, 1983:84–86). This declaration apparently called into question Lenin’s analysis of war as an inevitable consequence of imperialism, the “highest stage of capitalism.” It set in motion a process that resulted in a more differentiated view of U.S. politics, one that identified “realists” who were willing to resist the pressures of the “military-industrial complex” and come to some agreements with the Soviet Union to slow the arms race.

Some analysts would argue that the Khrushchev pronouncements constitute evidence of *learning* (Zimmerman, 1969; Griffiths, 1972). Certainly there were changes in the means pursued to achieve Soviet security objectives, especially with the addition of limited cooperation with the United States in the form of arms control. Probably there were changes in ends as well—the demise of the capitalist world was no longer considered the *sine qua non* of the Soviet Union’s survival. Perhaps there were changes in the cognitive structures of Khrushchev and other leaders—their views of the sources of U.S. policy were probably more differentiated than those they held before coming to power. Yet not all members of the Soviet foreign-policy community accepted these views. Even after the Twentieth Party Congress, Khrushchev faced opposition from hardliners such as Viacheslav Molotov, who had served as Stalin’s foreign minister and was later a member of the “anti-Party group” that tried to depose Khrushchev in 1957. Throughout Khrushchev’s tenure, far more simplistic and hostile images of the United States (especially, but not

exclusively, in the military) competed with his own views and dogged his efforts to pursue arms control (Jönsson, 1979; Griffiths, 1972; Kolkowicz, 1967).

As Tetlock (1988) points out, it is always difficult to evaluate whether "efficiency" learning has taken place. Certainly those of Khrushchev's colleagues who successfully conspired to remove him from power in 1964 doubted that his policies had achieved Soviet objectives more effectively than the alternatives. For descriptive purposes, one might nevertheless argue that certain types of learning did occur but that "institutional" learning was not fully achieved or that some lessons were "unlearned" or quickly forgotten. Such arguments, however, are mainly ways to save the learning metaphor. Accounts that incorporate the domestic political struggles over competing images and policies would seem to provide more satisfactory explanations for changes during the Khrushchev period.

THE TROOP REDUCTIONS

Among the more concrete signs of change in Soviet policy was a greater flexibility and willingness to compromise in the pursuit of arms control agreements with the West. Disarmament negotiations had been held under the auspices of the U.N. since 1946, but by most accounts—including recent Soviet ones—the Soviet Union did not take them seriously until the mid-1950s, after Stalin had died (Bloomfield, Clemens, and Griffiths, 1966; Shevchenko, 1985:78; Zubok, 1988). Starting in 1954, talks were conducted by a subcommittee of the U.N. Disarmament Commission, with representatives from the United States, the Soviet Union, France, Great Britain, and Canada (Bechhoefer, 1961). The most significant indication of Soviet interest in an agreement came on May 10, 1955, when the Soviet delegation put forward a proposal that incorporated the main features of an earlier Western memorandum including, among other things, the total prohibition of the use and manufacture of nuclear weapons, major reductions in all armed forces and conventional armaments, and the establishment of adequate organs of control and inspection (Noel-Baker, 1958:12–30; Griffiths, 1972:399–407; Evangelista, 1990a). The Soviet Union's adherence to the plan would have entailed cutting back the Soviet armed forces from 5.7 million to between 1 and 1.5 million men. These figures, proposed originally by the Western powers, would have constituted a significantly disproportionate reduction in Soviet forces, compared to those of France, Great Britain, or the United States. In return the Soviets would benefit from the eventual destruction of stocks of U.S. nuclear weapons, but their own would have to be destroyed as well.

The fact that the Western powers, on U.S. initiative, retracted their earlier proposal instead of pursuing an agreement makes it difficult to evaluate Soviet

intentions (Bloomfield, Clemens, and Griffiths, 1966; Noel-Baker, 1958). In order to identify the May 1955 proposal as constituting a meaningful change in Soviet policy, one would have to cite evidence that the proposal was not merely a bluff, but that the Soviets were willing to carry out the disarmament measures they had proposed. Evidence for such counterfactual reconstructions is by definition difficult to obtain. In this case, however, we have a number of promising leads. For example, a Soviet defector, who had specialized in disarmament at the Foreign Ministry, reports that a major change in the Soviet Union's approach took place following the death of Stalin. He quotes his superior as revealing that "we're starting a new policy that will mean serious negotiating on disarmament" (Shevchenko, 1985:78). A Yugoslav diplomat, whom Khrushchev treated somewhat as a confidant, presents further evidence, from their conversations, of the new leader's interest in the issues (Mičunovič, 1980:157, 166). Western scholars as well recognize Khrushchev's willingness to make concessions in the disarmament sphere and on related issues, such as the status of Austria (Bloomfield, Clemens, and Griffiths, 1966; Larson, 1987). Perhaps the strongest corroboration of Soviet interest in disarmament was provided by Soviet actions following the U.S. rejection of the May 1955 plan. In the wake of failure to obtain Western agreement on mutual, large-scale reductions in the conventional forces, the Soviets reduced their army unilaterally. From 1955 through 1957, the Soviet Union cut back its armed forces by an estimated 1.84 million men (*Pravda*, 15 January 1960; Wolfe, 1970:162-166). If the Soviets were willing to undertake such measures unilaterally, one would assume that they would much prefer to have had the Western powers limit their forces as well.

A number of explanations have been put forward to account for Khrushchev's reductions. Indeed, the case provides a typical example of overdetermination of causes that is so common in the study of the arms race (Kurth, 1971). The best that can be done here, as in the rest of this section, is to call attention to explanations that do not appear to fit the evidence, indicate the several candidate explanations that do, and, later, in the section on methodology and future research, propose how to go about choosing between equally plausible competing explanations.

One explanation holds that Khrushchev's reductions were not a sign of moderation in security policy at all, but merely a product of *military exigencies*. In this view, mass armies of the traditional type were no longer necessary in an age of battlefield nuclear warfare: the extensive demobilization of ground and tactical air forces was a sensible means to "modernize" the Soviet armed forces. From this perspective, the troop reductions were entirely in the Soviet interest and should not be considered as concessions intended to demonstrate a new cooperative attitude towards disarmament. In some interpreta-

tions, the initiative might constitute a form of "efficiency" *learning*, because the Soviet Union successfully adapted itself to the nuclear age.

The interpretation that the reductions did not hurt but rather benefited Soviet military capabilities apparently stems from the belief that nuclear weapons—especially tactical nuclear weapons—compensated for cuts in conventional forces. The "more bang for the buck" argument was widely promoted in the United States by the Eisenhower administration to support nuclearization of NATO forces on grounds of cost-effectiveness. Khrushchev put forward his own version—often dubbed "more rubble for the ruble"—to justify his disarmament proposals and his unilateral troop cuts (Evangelista, 1988). As it turned out, many prominent U.S. Army officers disagreed with Eisenhower, starting with the Army chief of staff himself. In 1954, General Matthew Ridgway claimed that the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons "does not warrant the assumption that the need for soldiers will become less. On the contrary," he argued, "there are indications that the trend will be in the opposite direction" (quoted in Evangelista, 1990a). He cited several reasons for needing more forces: the increased depth of the battlefield, the need for greater dispersion of forces, and the multiplication of maintenance and support facilities to supply large numbers of small, mobile combat units (Evangelista, 1990a). Prominent Soviet military officers cited such arguments by U.S. Generals Bradley, Collins, Ridgway, Taylor, and others to support a case for maintaining mass armies, arguing that the prospect of a nuclear battlefield "calls not for the reduction of the numbers of combatants, but for their logical further increase, since the threat of wiping out divisions grows, and large reserves will be needed for their replacement" (Krasil'nikov, 1956, discussed in Garthoff, 1958:124–125; Zubok, 1988). Such borrowing of arguments suggests that a *tacit transnational alliance* was at work, in this case between opponents rather than proponents of arms control.

In retrospect, it seems possible that Khrushchev did not view the reductions merely as a means to modernize the Soviet armed forces. Such a limited objective would hardly seem worth the risk of alienating important segments of the military, as he evidently did. Although military criticism of Khrushchev's reductions became particularly vocal following the announcement of a new round of cuts in 1960 (Gallagher, 1964; Wolfe, 1965:238–242; Tiedtke, 1985:54–62; Ritvo, 1962), recent evidence attests to the demoralization and discontent that even the initial reforms of the mid-1950s engendered. A commander of a Soviet air defense division writes in his memoirs, for example, that the late 1950s were "a difficult time for us military people. We still hadn't managed to survive the first unilateral reduction of the Soviet armed forces when a second began. Some of us didn't take the so-called reforms very cheerfully. Sometimes it seemed that everything we had done up until then

was now unnecessary" (Lavrinenkov, 1982:225). In addition to their effect on military capability, the cuts also entailed problems of morale and dislocation, as hundreds of thousands of soldiers and officers were forced to reintegrate themselves into the civilian work force (*Krasnaia zvezda*, 20 January 1960; Tiedtke, 1985:157–179). Thus, the argument that the reductions were solely the product of military exigencies or efficiency learning is problematic at best. There were disagreements at the time concerning the wisdom of the cuts, and they have recently been revived in the context of the current debate about the similar initiatives of Gorbachev (Zhurkin, Karaganov, and Kortunov, 1987; Tret'iak, 1988).

Economic stringency evidently played a role in Khrushchev's reductions as well as in his other disarmament proposals. In the transcript of his tape-recorded reminiscences, Khrushchev mentions the reductions directly after expressing his belief that the United States was using the arms race to destroy the Soviet economy "and by that means to obtain its goals even without war" (Khrushchev, 1971:403). Khrushchev would probably have liked to curb the arms competition by negotiated agreement, but failing that, he thought that he could achieve some economic benefits through the transfer of labor from the army to the civilian work force; therefore, he was willing to carry out the reductions unilaterally (Tiedtke, 1985; Zubok, 1988). In this case, Khrushchev's moderation was not a response to *unilateral initiatives* from the U.S. side, but was a means by which he hoped, in vain, to gain U.S. reciprocation.

If we assume that Khrushchev genuinely wanted to lessen the military burden on the Soviet economy, then bargaining strategies associated with *cooperation theory* (such as tit-for-tat or GRIT) are consistent with his actions. Khrushchev does seem to have hoped that the United States would view the reductions as a concession that would improve the prospects for a disarmament agreement. In his reminiscences, he justified the cuts by associating them with his broader disarmament proposals: "to fight for disarmament or arms reductions at the time the Soviet Union had such an enormous army—no one would believe it" (Khrushchev, 1971:403–404). Because Khrushchev carried out the reductions without demanding or receiving tit-for-tat reciprocity from the West, it seems plausible that he was pursuing a GRIT strategy intended to moderate his adversary's enemy image of the Soviet Union. Remarks he made in retirement suggested that he had grasped the basic insight of the security dilemma—that "frightening the opponent" can be counterproductive (Khrushchev, 1971:406). One might characterize such insights as instances of foreign policy *learning* (of the cognitive structural sort) on the part of Khrushchev (Griffiths, 1972:310–312), but they did not become "consensual knowledge" in any sense and were not institutionalized.

The standard account of Khrushchev's effort to break through the cognitive

barriers of U.S. leaders—specifically Secretary of State John Foster Dulles—describes it as a failure (Holsti, 1967). In fact, while publicly the U.S. dismissed as propaganda such initiatives as the unilateral reductions in Soviet armed forces, in closed meetings of the National Security Council, Dulles argued that “the Soviets had effected a complete alteration of their policy. Their policy had been hard and was becoming soft.” According to Dulles, the Soviets were seeking “some limitation on the arms race, some easing of the armaments burden. This they were seeking not merely as a trick, but because they could ill afford to sustain this burden” (quoted in Evangelista, 1990a). Dulles’s perception of Khrushchev’s genuine interest in an accord was not sufficient to get the U.S. government to put forward a negotiable proposal as a basis for compromise. The failure to come to an agreement owed mainly to opposition from the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC).

In game theoretic terms, the disarmament negotiations in the mid-1950s were not a prisoners’ dilemma, in which both sides prefer mutual cooperation (bilateral disarmament) to mutual defection (an arms race), but a deadlock, in which at least one side prefers to continue the arms race regardless of whether the other side would be willing to disarm. This was explicitly the position of the JCS and the AEC at the time (Evangelista, 1990a). Thus, while Khrushchev’s GRIT strategy worked in other issue-areas during the same period—most notably in the Austrian settlement (Larson, 1987)—it failed in the disarmament sphere. *Public opinion* did not, as suggested above, pressure the U.S. to respond favorably to the Soviet disarmament plan. It did, however, figure prominently in the Eisenhower administration’s “Open Skies” counterproposal, an initiative that U.S. policymakers were confident the Soviets would reject (Evangelista, 1990a). Thus, public opinion did not in this case reinforce moderate tendencies.

The fact that Soviet disarmament initiatives during the 1950s stemmed in part from economic concerns, and that prominent U.S. policymakers such as Dulles recognized that fact, raises the possibility that the United States was pursuing a policy of *negotiation from strength*, and that we can attribute Soviet moderation to that policy. There is little doubt that some of Khrushchev’s initiatives were intended to induce the United States to restrain its military programs. Indeed, that is one of the main purposes of pursuing arms agreements. Specifically, some authors have suggested that Khrushchev wanted to tie his troop reductions to restraints on U.S. deployments of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe and the rearming of West Germany (Bloomfield, Clemens, and Griffiths, 1966:85–86; Evangelista, 1988:265–267). The U.S. weapons might have served as bargaining chips to achieve further Soviet concessions, as the narrow version of negotiation-from-strength would pre-

scribe. In the event, however, the chips were never cashed in, because the U.S. government—divided internally, but dominated by opponents of arms control—was not interested in a negotiated outcome. The policy of strength-without-serious-negotiation proved counterproductive. The Soviets built up their own force of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe and with the ouster of Khrushchev began a conventional-force buildup as well (Evangelista, 1988).

To what extent did *Soviet strength* constitute a prerequisite for Soviet concessions and moderation? A number of analysts, including a prominent Soviet defector, have argued that the change in the international atmosphere, characterized by the “spirit of Geneva” in 1955, resulted from the Soviet Union’s growing confidence in its military power (Shevchenko, 1985:82–83). Even reform-oriented Soviet commentators, who in recent years have criticized excessive Soviet military spending, give Khrushchev credit for achieving nuclear parity with the United States, viewing it as a necessary starting point for negotiating arms control (Burlatskii, 1988*a*, 1988*b*; Zubok, 1988). In the case of the 1955 proposal, the record is mixed. The Soviets were clearly ahead in overall numbers of troops, but behind in most indices of nuclear capability. Their proposal sought to trade off their strengths for U.S. ones. If they had been ahead in all respects, it is unlikely that the Soviets would have proposed such a compromise. On the other hand, the fact that the Soviets were by the mid-1950s achieving success with their thermonuclear weapons program probably gave them the confidence to pursue negotiations with the United States, because some very basic form of nuclear parity appeared in sight (Holloway, 1983:25–27; Shevchenko, 1985:83).

Some of the insights of *coalition theory* are useful for understanding how Khrushchev implemented his troop reductions, despite opposition from certain sectors of the military. In order to prevail, Khrushchev evidently relied on Marshal Georgii Zhukov’s authority and prestige within the military (Zubok, 1988). Zhukov was brought back from the virtual exile imposed on him by Stalin and was made defense minister in 1955. He became part of the first secretary’s political coalition and proved his value during the attempt by the “antiparty group” to ouster Khrushchev in June 1957 (Burlatskii, 1988*a*). Presumably Zhukov was also helpful in countering the arguments of army officers who wanted to maintain mass armies even as nuclear weapons became available.

Later Khrushchev adopted a similar coalition-building strategy when he decided to emphasize missiles as the main delivery vehicle for Soviet strategic and tactical nuclear weapons. In 1959, he coopted Chief Marshal of the Artillery Mitrofan Nedelin to head the Strategic Rocket Forces, whose ranks were made up of troops from the artillery and air defense forces (Tolubko, 1979:188). Khrushchev announced a new round of troop reductions in January

1960 when he argued that nuclear "firepower" now mattered more than "how many soldiers we have under arms, how many people are wearing soldiers' greatcoats" (*Pravda*, 15 January 1960). Because the new emphasis on nuclear weapons entailed substantial reductions in artillery and air forces, it was useful for Khrushchev to have cultivated allies within those services (Evangelista, 1988:228-229).

One should not, however, overstate the importance of coalition-building in this case. Khrushchev evidently did not see Zhukov as an indispensable ally, considering that he fired him in October 1957, but continued to pursue reductions in the armed forces (Burlatskii, 1988a). The coalitions were useful but they were not the impetus behind the changes in Soviet policy. Here economic stringency seems to have been a more important motivation (Tiedtke, 1985; Zubok, 1988); the desire to use unilateral initiatives to persuade the United States to agree to further arms restraint also played an important role (Evangelista, 1988, 1990a); and the limits of Khrushchev's ability to pursue a greater degree of moderation in his policy were probably more influenced by external factors—namely, U.S. unwillingness to reciprocate—than by internal power politics.

THE TEST BAN

The case of nuclear testing is worth reviewing for several reasons. The Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963 was the only major arms control accord successfully negotiated during Khrushchev's tenure in office, and, furthermore, it was the first significant agreement of the nuclear age. From a theoretical standpoint, the series of U.S. and Soviet initiatives leading up to the treaty appear to constitute a good test for *cooperation theory*. Other theoretical approaches may be useful for understanding Khrushchev's motives for pursuing a test ban.

The first international proposal for a nuclear test ban came from Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru in 1954, largely in reaction to the danger of radioactive fallout posed by U.S. and Soviet thermonuclear tests in the atmosphere. The Soviet Union put the test ban on the agenda of the U.N. Disarmament Commission as part of its May 1955 proposal, but the test ban became tied to disputes over other aspects of a comprehensive disarmament plan and made no progress. On March 31, 1958, following an extensive series of nuclear tests, the Soviet Union announced a unilateral moratorium on further testing and invited the Western powers to reciprocate. If we assume that the nuclear arms race could at this time be represented as a prisoners' dilemma, a tit-for-tat strategy would have prescribed Western reciprocation of this seemingly cooperative Soviet move. Instead, the United States reacted as

psychological theories would predict, by calling into question the Soviet Union's good faith (Jacobson and Stein, 1966:45-49).

On August 22, 1958, the United States suggested a multilateral moratorium to accompany test ban negotiations, which it proposed to convene in Geneva starting on October 31. The Soviets had meanwhile begun preparing to resume testing and probably saw President Eisenhower's announcement as a propaganda ploy, because this time it was the United States that had just completed a major test series. Although one could view Eisenhower's August proposal as a positive response to the Soviet moratorium, in the sense of tit-for-tat, each country still had reason to suspect the other's motives (Divine, 1978:229).

The Soviets would not commit themselves to a moratorium in the autumn of 1958; they did, however, agree to the negotiations in Geneva. The United States proposal for a moratorium led to "a last-minute rash of testing by all three nuclear powers"—the United States, Soviet Union, and Great Britain (Divine, 1978:231). The United States completed its tests the day before the conference opened; the Soviet Union broke its unilateral moratorium on September 30 and continued testing until November 3. Thereafter a multilateral moratorium remained in effect until the fall of 1961, but indications of its fragility were evident many months before. In December 1960, Eisenhower announced that the United States was formally ending its moratorium but would not test without prior warning. He urged President-elect Kennedy to resume testing (Seaborg, 1981:25). In February 1961, France became a nuclear power by testing its first atomic weapon; at the United Nations, the United States delegate supported the French right to nuclear testing, even though the Soviets had warned that they considered a test by France, a NATO member, as equivalent to one by the United States or Great Britain. On September 1, the Soviets resumed testing, and 2 weeks later the United States followed suit.

The series of events resemble in some respects a pattern of tit-for-tat reciprocity of both cooperative acts and defections. In fact, however, many of the ostensibly cooperative moves were viewed by the other side as propaganda maneuvers and did little to induce genuine cooperation. Furthermore, it seems apparent that the situation approximated a prisoners' dilemma only intermittently, if at all. Internal policymaking in the United States was fragmented, as critics of tit-for-tat would predict (Gowa, 1986); the situation frequently gave test ban opponents a veto over U.S. cooperative gestures (Divine, 1978; Neidle, 1988). In the Soviet Union, as well, internal pressure to continue testing meant that the government did not always favor mutual cooperation (Jönsson, 1979; Khrushchev, 1971:940-942; Garthoff, 1972). The nearly 3-year moratorium, from autumn 1958 to autumn 1961, is not

easily explained, it seems, as the result of a straightforward tit-for-tat mechanism.

It is unlikely that a GRIT strategy can be credited with the mutual moratorium. If Khrushchev wanted to use test suspensions as part of GRIT, he was often stymied by internal opposition from hardliners such as fellow Presidium (Politburo) members Frol Kozlov and Mikhail Suslov (Jönsson, 1979; Slusser, 1973). Soviet policy did not demonstrate the degree of unilateral concession and risk that GRIT entails; at best the Soviet Union pursued a strategy of contingent restraint. As for the U.S. side, it is doubtful that Eisenhower changed his view of Soviet intentions in response to Soviet test-ban initiatives, as GRIT would suggest. He seemed to be more influenced by the scientific (and pseudoscientific) arguments concerning verifiability, and his support for a test ban waxed and waned with his understanding of the technical prospects for detection of cheating.

Considerations of *military exigencies* appear to account in some measure for the inconsistencies of Soviet test-ban policy. The Soviets were generally behind in nuclear-warhead technology. At times they evidently anticipated falling further behind and preferred that both sides maintain the status quo by observing a moratorium and negotiating a comprehensive test ban. At other times—especially following the U.S. test series in the summer of 1958 and the French tests in 1961—the Soviets apparently found their lag intolerable and initiated tests to catch up. In the latter case, as analysis of the tests suggested, the Soviets were particularly interested in understanding the effects of high-altitude atmospheric explosions useful for antiballistic missile defense. They also used the 1961 series to narrow the gap with the United States in large-yield warhead technology (Seaborg, 1981:119–123; Garthoff, 1972:187–190; Jönsson, 1979:37). These goals were sufficiently pressing for a dominant faction in the leadership to decide to break the 3-year test moratorium with the United States and Great Britain. Khrushchev, moreover, saw an opportunity to use the test resumption as part of his war of nerves during the 1961 Berlin deadline crisis (Seaborg, 1981:70; Slusser, 1973; Sakharov, 1974:32). Although U.S. advantages in warhead technology at times motivated the Soviets to seek a test ban, explicit U.S. attempts at negotiation from strength had mixed results. The Soviets occasionally took the position that because the United States had tested nuclear weapons first (in 1945), the Soviet Union had the right to test them last. In 1958, for example, they were unwilling to enter a moratorium until they had matched the U.S. test series with one of their own. In 1963, Soviet Ambassador Anatolii Dobrynin complained—perhaps disingenuously—that U.S. resumption of underground testing, although intended by the Kennedy administration to pressure the Soviets into making concessions in the test ban negotiations, actually helped the Soviet proponents of testing; they argued for the need to keep up to the

United States and they questioned the administration's good faith (Seaborg, 1981:202).

Economic stringency does not appear to have been an explicit motive behind the test ban policy. In a general sense, any resources transferred from the military to the civilian sector would be welcome (Garthoff, 1972:68–69), but during the mid-1950s the most substantial benefits were anticipated to come from troop reductions. During the months preceding negotiation of the Limited Test Ban Treaty in 1963, Khrushchev did, however, accelerate his efforts to shift investments from military to civilian purposes. Especially following the signing of the treaty, he emphasized the opportunities that the emerging U.S. *détente* provided for decreasing military expenditures (Kolkowicz, 1967:292–293).

Evidently it is not difficult to explain the lack of cooperation or moderation in nuclear testing—that is, the inability of the nuclear powers to agree to a comprehensive test ban. Indeed, the outcome is overdetermined, beginning with the explanation that states facing a security dilemma are likely to pursue unilateral policies rather than risk cooperation (Jervis, 1978). More difficult to account for, however, is the nuclear test moratorium that the United States, Soviet Union, and Great Britain maintained for 3 years. *Military exigencies* certainly shed some light on the question—the United States wanted to freeze its lead, the Soviet Union wanted to keep from falling further behind (Neidle, 1988). Yet given the vast disagreements within each country concerning the merits of a test ban and the relative advantages that would accrue to each side, this explanation is hardly determining. Concern for *public opinion*—for attaining a propaganda coup or limiting the propaganda benefits of the adversary's initiative—appears to have played a crucial role at key junctures. Public concern about radioactive fallout was an early and persistent stimulus to the various test-ban initiatives (Divine, 1978; Sakharov, 1974). The fact that negotiations were conducted under the auspices of the United Nations reinforced the saliency of international public opinion (Jacobson and Stein, 1966). Although focusing on public opinion would not allow one to predict continuation of the moratorium at any given point, the factor clearly figured in decisions on each side about whether to pursue it (Seaborg, 1981; Jönsson, 1979).

How well do the various hypotheses explain the successful achievement of the Limited Test Ban Treaty in 1963? Amitai Etzioni argues that the pattern of events starting with John F. Kennedy's American University speech on June 10, 1963 and continuing through the signing of the treaty on August 5 and up until Kennedy's death provide a test of the theory that "psychological gestures initiated by one nation will be reciprocated by others with the effect of reducing international tensions" (1967:361). Although sometimes misunderstood as

a test of the GRIT strategy, Etzioni's approach is closer in some respects to tit-for-tat. GRIT consists of a series of moderately risky concessions that continue for some time even without reciprocation. Tit-for-tat entails a cooperative move of unspecified risk, and demands immediate reciprocity by the other side in order for cooperation to continue. Etzioni's strategy involves merely a symbolic initiative that entails no risk, and he would not prescribe more than a few such gestures in the absence of reciprocity. He specifically distinguishes his strategy from Charles Osgood's GRIT according to these criteria (Etzioni, 1967:364-365). Etzioni considers Kennedy's speech to have been precisely the kind of symbolic, low-risk initiative that his theory prescribes, although it is possible that Khrushchev and his advisers viewed it as more of a gamble, given their notions of the power of a U.S. military-industrial complex (Adzhubei, 1988:118-119). (Bunn and Payne, 1988:14 also consider it to have been an "extraordinary" political risk.)

In practice, Etzioni describes the steps that the United States and Soviet Union took during the summer of 1963 as an exercise in tit-for-tat reciprocity (1967:366-369). The process worked as Axelrod (1984) would predict. Indeed, when the U.S. government decided to cease reciprocating Soviet initiatives in late October, in apparent concern for the "psychological disarmament" of the U.S. public, the process ground to a halt (Etzioni, 1967:371-372). In game-theoretic terms, defection was met with defection. Here is further evidence that concern for *public opinion* cuts both ways.

There were other factors at work besides the resolution of a prisoners' dilemma game through a tit-for-tat mechanism. Unlike the classic prisoners' dilemma, which assumes unitary rational actors and no communication between the "prisoners," the test ban debate involved internal lobbying by *policy entrepreneurs* on both sides and *tacit transnational alliances* of test ban proponents. Scientists, for example, played an important role in several respects. At the Conference of Experts in Geneva they provided the first agreed technical basis for verifying a test ban, even through subsequent research disputed some of their conclusions (Jacobson and Stein, 1966). Soviet scientists and officials met with U.S. counterparts at international meetings of Pugwash and the Dartmouth Conference, and they often employed the arguments that they heard at those meetings in later internal Soviet debates about the test ban (Seaborg, 1981:177; Richmond, 1987:118-119). For example, E.K. Fedorov, a former participant in the Conference of Experts, published an article in the Soviet Union in support of a test ban at a time when Khrushchev was apparently the only top leader who strongly endorsed the measure (Jönsson, 1979:149-151). Fedorov, whose article had originally been presented at a Pugwash meeting, appeared to be trying to bolster Khrushchev's position (Fedorov, 1959). International concern about radioactive fallout gave such

Soviet scientists as Andrei Sakharov a *policy window* through which to promote their proposals for test moratoria (Divine, 1978: 161, 233–234; Sakharov, 1962; 1974). Sakharov specifically claims that the arguments of Soviet scientists, including himself, helped to persuade Khrushchev to agree to the Limited Test Ban Treaty (Sakharov, 1974:33–34; Sakharov, 1982:216). Khrushchev could placate international *public opinion* by removing the source of fallout (atmospheric tests), but still avoid alienating the Soviet military (or so he hoped) by allowing them to continue tests underground. Much the same logic convinced Kennedy to pursue only a limited test ban (Seaborg, 1981).

One should not assume that *transnational alliances* between proponents of moderation on each side always enhance the prospects for cooperation. The early history of the test ban debate provides a strong counterexample. During the 1956 presidential campaign in the United States, Adlai Stevenson, the Democratic contender, seized on the issue of a test ban to rally popular support for his candidacy. The Soviet leadership, which had been pressing the United States to agree to a test ban, wrote to President Eisenhower in September, renewing the offer and remarking favorably that “certain prominent public figures in the United States” supported the move as well (Divine, 1978:98–99). The administration released the letter to the press, which interpreted it as a Soviet endorsement of Stevenson—the kiss of death for his campaign, and a major setback for the test ban. Ironically, Eisenhower appeared to be close to agreeing to explore the possibility of a test ban with the Soviets in September 1956. According to Divine (1978:111), “Stevenson brought the issue into the presidential campaign and made a diplomatic initiative impossible.”

The test ban case suggests that *coalition theory* has something to contribute to understanding the possibilities for and constraints on moderation in Soviet security policy. Clearly Khrushchev’s test ban proposals had many opponents; the zig zags of his initiatives appear to correlate to some extent with the domestic constellation of forces favoring or opposing a *détente* policy at a given time (Jönsson, 1979). While the formation of a coalition in favor of moderation is dependent on a number of domestic political and economic factors (Snyder, 1987/1988), international events play an important role as well. In the case of the test ban, for example, Kremlin hardliners evidently took advantage of a *policy window*—the flight of Gary Powers’s U-2 spy plane over the Soviet Union on May 1, 1960—to derail a process that seemed to be leading to a test-ban accord. By most accounts, including recent Soviet ones, Khrushchev felt pressured by test ban opponents to use the U-2 as a pretext to scuttle the upcoming Paris summit, at which he apparently had hoped to finalize a treaty (Jönsson, 1979:166–168). After the Soviet Union shot down the plane and captured the pilot, Khrushchev demanded an apology from Eisenhower and a promise of no further aerial espionage missions.

Eisenhower refused and Khrushchev broke up the summit (Adzhubei, 1988:113–114).

An even more dramatic international event—the Cuban missile crisis—is often credited with providing the impetus to the improvement in East-West relations that ultimately resulted in the Limited Test Ban Treaty (Seaborg, 1981:176, 199). One could argue that the incident contributed to Khrushchev's *learning* about his adversary. In this view, the U.S. willingness to give the Soviets an opportunity for a face-saving retreat (the commitment not to invade Cuba) and to compromise (the promise to remove U.S. missiles from Turkey) gave Khrushchev a new understanding of U.S. interest in achieving a mutually beneficial outcome to the test ban negotiations. Judging by Khrushchev's interpretations of U.S. policymaking before and after the crisis, however, his view did not change substantially. He had already differentiated, for example, between "sober" elements and "lunatics" among U.S. decision makers, and he used the outcome of the crisis to reinforce his view that the lunatics could be overruled (Garthoff, 1972:80). The fact that Khrushchev's views continued to meet resistance at high levels—and in particular that his image of the United States was rejected (Jönsson, 1979:200–207)—calls into question the utility of the learning metaphor. An alternative explanation would view the crisis as another example of a *policy window* that test ban proponents, including Khrushchev, used to bolster their arguments both about the danger of the arms race and about the prospects for getting it under control.

The Brezhnev Era

The Brezhnev period saw the emergence of negotiated arms control as a major component of U.S.–Soviet relations. If regime theory were to account for developments in the security sphere, it should apply to this time when the Soviets voluntarily entered into agreements to restrict their nuclear capability. One also would want to investigate whether these cooperative agreements stemmed from military or economic pressure, came about as a result of the entrepreneurial efforts of longtime proponents of cooperation, or should be attributed to policymakers who had experienced some form of learning that made them more amenable to cooperative approaches to security policy. Did bargaining strategies such as tit-for-tat or GRIT prove useful in achieving cooperative outcomes? Ideally one would also want to account for failures to achieve moderation. Even under the terms of the SALT agreements, for example, the Soviets increased their nuclear capability substantially and engaged in a program of conventional-force modernization as well.

ORIGINS OF SALT

Most analysts argue that SALT became possible only after the Soviet Union had achieved an approximate parity with the United States in strategic nuclear

forces. In this sense, considering that the Soviets endured most of the 1960s in a position of relative strategic inferiority vis-à-vis the United States, it was the growth of *Soviet strength* that helped bring about SALT. There is, however, an argument that the most important agreement resulting from SALT—the 1972 Antiballistic Missile Treaty—came about as a consequence of *U.S. negotiation from strength*. Specifically, the argument goes, it was the 1969 decision by the U.S. Senate (passed by a single vote) to fund Phase I of the Nixon administration's Safeguard ABM system that motivated the Soviets to agree to negotiate a treaty limiting ABMs (Einhorn, 1985:2–3; Hampson, 1987:84–85; Rose, 1988:87–102). Although the U.S. program probably did increase Soviet incentives to limit ABMs, there was far more behind Soviet reevaluation of strategic defense and the merits of a treaty than the prospect of a few U.S. ABM complexes (Garthoff, 1984; Garthoff, 1985:182–183; Holloway, 1985). In fact, since the Soviet ABM system around Moscow had appeared several years before Safeguard was even proposed, one could equally argue that it was the Soviet system and the prospect of a race in both offensive and defensive weapons that induced the United States to pursue arms control seriously (Farley, 1988).

There is little doubt that economic motives were relevant to Soviet decisions about entering into arms control negotiations. An arms race in both defensive and offensive weapons would surely have put a major burden on the Soviet economy. Much of the internal Soviet debate about technology and the economy in the early 1970s appears to have been linked to disagreements about the economic implications of arms control (Parrott, 1983:242–256). Brezhnev expressed the optimistic view that the United States had originally wanted to ruin the Soviet economy by means of an arms race, but had come to believe that such a policy was futile: “Now everyone can see that socialism is sufficiently powerful to secure both reliable defense and the development of the economy, although, of course, without large defense expenditure we would be able to drive our economy forward even faster” (Brezhnev, 1971:390). On the other hand, Brezhnev did impose restraints on the growth rate of Soviet military spending starting in the mid-1970s (Kaufman, 1985, 1988).

The precise link between domestic economic concerns and Soviet arms control policy in the SALT era could still use further exploration. Did *economic stringency* give the United States any bargaining leverage in inducing Soviet concessions? There appears to be general agreement that when the United States makes economic cooperation explicitly contingent on Soviet behavior in other spheres, the tactic backfires. A number of Soviet émigrés who were involved in the policy process during the détente period have argued that economic pressure—for example, in the form of the Jackson-Vanik amendment linking U.S. trade concessions to emigration of Soviet Jews—

works against the Soviet proponents of cooperation (Dallin, 1981:383–386; Garthoff, 1985:465–467). On the other hand, U.S. willingness to agree to arms control measures that would save the Soviets money would probably bolster the case of the Soviet moderates. It could serve as a *policy window* for them to promote their own agenda for reallocating resources to the civilian sector.

Clearly, the origins of the ABM treaty and Soviet acceptance of constraints on offensive and defensive systems are too complex to be encompassed by simple notions of negotiation from strength, whether Soviet or American, or economic pressure. For the purposes of this chapter, the key question is what changed Soviet views about the desirability of limiting defenses.

Among the explanations that could account for the Soviet change are those that focus on *learning*, and, especially, the role of *transnational alliances*. There is evidence, for example, that some prominent Soviet scientists, military officers, and political officials heard the views of their U.S. counterparts, and perhaps changed their minds, through meetings in groups such as Pugwash; the Soviet–American joint study group, organized by Paul Doty of Harvard; and the Dartmouth Conference (Garthoff, 1984; Newsom, 1987). One could argue that these individuals experienced cognitive structural learning as they became aware of the complexities and paradoxes of offense, defense, and crisis stability in the nuclear age. Some of the Soviet participants in international meetings, and others who followed the discussions from inside the Soviet Union, became *policy entrepreneurs* advocating arms control measures such as ABM restrictions (Sakharov, 1972:197–205).

The result of transnational alliances and policy entrepreneurship was to fashion a new domestic coalition that redefined Soviet national interests to include the pursuit of arms control and, in particular, limitations on Soviet ballistic missile defenses. The fact that not everyone in the Soviet security policy community accepted arguments about the destabilizing consequences of ABM (it is well to remember that not everyone accepts them in the United States today) has made a number of analysts unwilling, however, to maintain that the 1972 ABM Treaty constitutes Soviet *learning* (Blacker, 1989; Weber, 1989). *Military exigencies* appear to have played an important role, in that Soviet ABM technology was substantially inferior to that of the United States and, regardless of their views about stability, the Soviets would not have wanted to be on the losing side of an ABM race. Moreover, because the Soviets continued to pursue military programs that portended similarly destabilizing consequences (namely, multiple-warhead missiles with counterforce capabilities), many analysts deny that they grasped the essence of the arms controllers' critique of ABM (Blacker, 1989; Weber, 1989).

Coalition theory may account for the apparent inconsistency of the simulta-

neous Soviet pursuit of arms control and counterforce advantage—the argument being that Soviet policy resulted from a process of log-rolling (Snyder, 1987/1988). The apparent support that some officers of the Strategic Rocket Forces showed for the ABM Treaty—in particular by countering the claims of the Air Defense Forces, the service responsible for Soviet ballistic missile defenses (Parrott, 1987)—indicates the presence of particularly strange bedfellows of the sort that log-rolling interpretations would expect.

As George and his colleagues (1988:705) point out, once two sides have identified a mutuality of interests, bargaining strategies associated with *cooperation theory* become relevant to understanding subsequent outcomes. One possible outcome is the establishment of a regime. In the case of the SALT negotiations, the process of bargaining from the end of 1969 until SALT II was signed in 1979 was clearly one of reciprocal concessions (Jensen, 1984). Although the pattern was not regular enough to represent tit-for-tat, it suggested that concessions were mostly met with concessions. In general, there were few retractions; those that occurred sometimes precipitated a period of nonreciprocating behavior, but in other cases the Soviet Union would respond to a hardening of the U.S. negotiating position by increasing its rate of concessions (Jensen, 1984:539–541). It appears evident that the SALT treaties did not result from a GRIT strategy, in which one side makes a series of moderately risky concessions in order to break the cognitive barriers of the other side's leaders and convince them of its willingness to cooperate. Both sides seemed to recognize a mutuality of interests by 1969, despite actions such as the U.S. escalation of the war in Vietnam and the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia that should have reinforced stereotypical enemy images.

MILITARY DOCTRINE

Despite apparently successful bargaining strategies that resulted in the SALT treaties, Robert Jervis has argued that SALT did not evolve into a *regime*. His notion of a regime is based on the Concert of Europe, which lasted from 1815 until the outbreak of the Crimean War in 1854. Jervis calls the Concert “the best example of a security regime,” because “the regime influenced the behavior of the states in ways that made its continuation possible even after the initial conditions had become attenuated [as early as 1823]” (1983:178, 181–182). In the case of U.S. and Soviet security policy, Jervis argues that one cannot speak of a regime that constrained state behavior. Even within the limitations posed by the SALT treaties, both sides continued unilaterally to pursue military doctrines aimed at achieving “war-fighting,” counterforce advantages. The core problem is that each “state may believe that its security requires making others insecure” by threatening their retaliatory capabilities (Jervis, 1983:191). Thus there is no basis for a security regime.

Jervis calls particular attention to the problems posed by Soviet military doctrine: "If the Soviets believe that in order to deter American expansionism or cope with an American attack they need the capability to come as close as possible to military victory, then, even if they do not think that their security requires infringing on U.S. vital interests, forming a security regime will be extremely difficult" (Jervis, 1983:191). Jervis, in keeping with many analysts of Soviet military policy, singles out the apparent contradiction—that Soviet officials of the Brezhnev era refused to recognize—between the goals of preventing a nuclear war and preparing to wage one (Holloway, 1983:55–58). It is worth considering, then, the extent to which Soviet military doctrine of the Brezhnev period did inhibit the formation of a security regime that would serve to moderate Soviet (and U.S.) policy.

Although the tension between the deterrent and war-fighting aspects of Soviet military doctrine was never resolved during the Brezhnev era (Kokoshin, Sergeev, and Tsymburskii, 1988), there were significant doctrinal changes. In particular, the Soviets rejected pursuit of their long-declared goal of military superiority in favor of parity; they unilaterally foreswore the first use of nuclear weapons; and they denied the possibility of victory in a nuclear war. How can one confidently judge such declaratory policies as signifying meaningful change? The problem is especially acute when the characteristics of the Soviet nuclear force posture permit analysts to argue that it supports a strategy of preemptive attack aimed at victory and that in several important numerical indices it is superior to the U.S. force. In this view, the declaratory statements are false and intentionally misleading.

The means traditionally used to resolve this dilemma are rather eclectic. First, one seeks to determine whether the public statements disavowing superiority, first use, and victory are consistent with internal, nonpublic, especially military, sources. Then, one looks to evidence from the record of arms negotiations and the Soviet nuclear force posture itself for further corroboration.

In June 1982, Leonid Brezhnev made a formal, unilateral pledge that the Soviet Union would not be the first to use nuclear weapons. It seems clear, in retrospect, that the decision was taken many years earlier. In the early 1970s the Soviet military evidently was instructed to base its planning on the assumption that the Soviet Union would use nuclear weapons only if an opponent used them first. According to a 1975 article in *Military Thought*, the confidential journal of the Soviet General Staff, the military "was guided by the instructions of the Central Committee of the CPSU [Communist Party of the Soviet Union] that the Soviet Union shall not be the first to employ nuclear weapons" (quoted in Garthoff, 1987:42). In subsequent years, indications of the no-first-use decision appeared in other authoritative Soviet military pub-

lications, although Western analysts did not appreciate their significance at the time. In the key article on "Military Strategy" in the *Soviet Military Encyclopedia*, for example, Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov described the principle of no-first-use as the foundation of Soviet military strategy (Garthoff, 1987:44).

Further evidence for the seriousness of the Soviet no-first-use pledge comes from a combination of the strategic logic of the Soviet Union's military situation and the character of its force development since the 1960s. Unlike the United States, which relies on the threat of first use of nuclear weapons to help deter a Soviet conventional attack against its European allies, the Soviet Union does not require such "extended deterrence." Soviet territory is contiguous with that of its Warsaw Pact allies. Therefore the Soviet Union can rely directly on defense of those territories against a conventional invasion. While the U.S. first-use policy risks Soviet nuclear retaliation in the event of a European war, the Soviet Union can at least put the onus to escalate on U.S. decision makers by forswearing first use. No-first-use appears to make strategic sense for the Soviet Union.

The trend in development of Soviet military forces presents evidence both consistent and inconsistent with a no-first-use policy. Since the late 1960s, the Soviet Union has invested enormous sums to improve its conventional forces, intending them to meet any contingencies short of nuclear war. At the same time, according to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the growth rate of spending on Soviet strategic nuclear forces has evidently stagnated (Kaufman, 1985, 1988; MccGwire, 1987). For some analysts, the serious attention paid to conventional capabilities demonstrates an intent to avoid nuclear escalation; in their view, a no-first-use policy contributes to that goal as well. That the Soviets were willing to cap the growth of their missile force through arms control appears to support this reasoning. One must, however, consider important counterarguments. Even though spending on the strategic arsenal and the growth rate of the missile force itself flattened out, the counterforce capabilities of Soviet strategic forces nevertheless increased substantially during the 1970s and 1980s through the process of putting multiple warheads (MIRVs—or multiple, independently targetable reentry vehicles) on a fixed number of missiles.

For many analysts, the presence of considerable Soviet counterforce potential belies a no-first-use policy. This argument is not entirely sound, however. Certainly a Soviet minimum deterrent force of clearly retaliatory weapons would appear more compatible with no first use. Yet counterforce does not presume first use. Reasoning by analogy to the U.S. case might give that impression, in that U.S. pursuit of counterforce has often been justified as a means of enhancing the credibility of extended deterrence (the threat of nuclear first use). The Soviets, however, have probably pursued counterforce for

different reasons, most prominently perhaps for "damage limitation." In this reading, they would not equate *preemption* with first use, because they would intend to launch their weapons only after unambiguous evidence of a U.S. decision to initiate nuclear use. Of course, no U.S. decision maker would feel reassured to know that Soviet nuclear restraint depended on the accuracy of Soviet leaders' perceptions of U.S. intentions in the heat of a major conventional war. Moreover, the fact that one has to delve so deeply into the arcana of Soviet nuclear strategy to make no first use appear consistent with the pursuit of counterforce capabilities makes it easily understandable why the Soviet pledge was not taken as evidence of moderation.

Even if the Soviet no-first-use pledge were accompanied by the "de-MIRVing" of missiles and reduction down to a few hundred systems, the simultaneous strengthening of offensively oriented conventional forces would continue to raise doubts about what constitutes moderation. Apparently the Soviet conventional buildup was intended to enable Soviet forces to destroy NATO nuclear weapons with nonnuclear attacks at the outset of a war to prevent nuclear escalation. Such a strategy could, however, have the opposite effect. NATO military leaders might fear an early loss of their nuclear weapons and press their political superiors to give them more flexibility in deciding when to use them. In a crisis situation, the offensive Soviet conventional posture could bring about the outcome—nuclear escalation—that the no-first-use policy was supposed to prevent (Lebow, 1985; Snyder, 1987/1988:123–124).

Should the no-first-use pledge be considered a sign of moderation at all? In particular, did the Soviet leadership intend the pledge to signify moderation? Here the arguments again cut both ways. The timing of the pledge was clearly designed to affect *public opinion* and, in particular, to help derail the NATO decision to deploy new U.S. missiles in Europe. Hypothetically, the United States could have called the Soviet Union's bluff by insisting on operational changes in strategic and conventional forces that would appear more compatible with a no-first-use posture. If any of these were forthcoming, the pledge could have evolved into a series of reciprocal initiatives of restraint, as the previous discussion of public opinion suggested. Yet NATO and the United States had no interest in bolstering the credibility of a Soviet no-first-use pledge for fear of undermining the U.S. commitment to use nuclear weapons first in defense of its European allies ("flexible response").

The significance of the pledge as a gesture of restraint *from the Soviet perspective* should not be dismissed simply because no first use makes strategic sense for the Soviet Union and creates problems for NATO doctrine. Many analysts believe that it makes sense for the United States and NATO as well (Bundy, et al., 1982; Steinbruner and Sigal, 1983). The Soviets clearly

see the U.S. threat of first use as a hostile posture; presumably they would view a U.S. no-first-use pledge as a sign of moderation and considered their own pledge in the same light, despite the anticipated propaganda benefits. Brezhnev evidently did not find it easy to make the Soviet policy public, judging by the near decade that separated the secret Central Committee decision from the public announcement. The 1982 unilateral pledge prompted some criticism in Soviet military circles along with demands for further strengthening conventional forces and nuclear readiness (Tetekin, 1982; Ustinov, 1983). If the pledge were intended for propaganda purposes alone, one would not anticipate such a reaction.

THE SALT AGREEMENTS

One can find evidence in the internal Soviet literature, including *Military Thought* (Garthoff, 1987), for a change in Soviet doctrine toward rejection of both victory in nuclear war and superiority as a goal of Soviet policy. Evidence from Soviet negotiating behavior and force posture is somewhat more ambiguous, however, but points in the same direction. The issue here is whether the Soviets accepted the principle of numerical parity and whether they were willing to constrain their counterforce capabilities to the extent necessary to dispel concerns that they believed in the possibility of military victory in nuclear war.

Michael MccGwire (1987) maintains that by the late 1960s the Soviets came to accept an ICBM force equal in size to the U.S. one and that this entailed cutting the annual production rate of their missiles by 60 percent. He argues further that "in the course of the SALT negotiations, the Soviets accepted a cap on 'heavy' ICBMs that was probably 40 percent less than they had originally planned" (MccGwire, 1987:269). This argument is plausible, although it depends on assumptions about planned Soviet missile production runs that we cannot know for certain. Raymond Garthoff argues in a similar fashion that the Soviets signaled their willingness to constrain their forces during the SALT I negotiations by curtailing construction of ICBM forces already underway. He points out that the Soviet Union started launch sites for at most 80 new missiles during the 2½ years of the negotiations, compared to some 250 to 350 new launchers in each of the preceding 3 years (Garthoff, 1985:183). These arguments focus perhaps too extensively on launchers to the neglect of warheads. As with the United States a few years earlier, the stabilization of numbers of Soviet launchers coincided with the process of "MIRV-ing" the missiles, thereby increasing the number of warheads and the overall counterforce threat.

Looking specifically at the SALT treaties, one does nevertheless find evidence to support the arguments of MccGwire and Garthoff that the Soviets did

constrain their counterforce capabilities more than they would have done in the absence of an agreement. By limiting their SS-18 force to 308 missiles with 10 warheads each in the SALT II treaty, and at the same time allowing the United States to deploy MX missiles in a mobile mode, as was then envisioned, the Soviets gave up the possibility of destroying the U.S. land-based missile force in a counterforce attack: they simply would not have enough warheads to barrage the mobile force. Even if the Soviets intended to limit the SS-18 force to a few hundred missiles, they need not have deployed only 10 MIRVs on each: the missiles are apparently capable of carrying two or three times that many—although perhaps not with the same degree of accuracy. By accepting the overall limits of SALT II and the restrictions on anti-ballistic missile systems from SALT I, in combination with the characteristics of the U.S. force posture (thousands of warheads on invulnerable submarines, plus the possibility of deploying mobile land-based missiles), the Soviet political leadership acknowledged the impossibility of achieving a meaningful damage-limitation capability. The Soviets could not expect to launch a first strike against U.S. forces without suffering tens of million of casualties in retaliation (Levi, von Hippel, and Daugherty, 1987/1988). The Soviet military nevertheless appear to have pursued damage limitation within the constraints posed by the SALT agreements and budgetary considerations, thus encouraging U.S. observers to dismiss the political renunciation of victory and superiority as propaganda.

It may be, as Jervis suggests (1983:191–192), that the U.S. perception of Soviet military doctrine as committed to victory in nuclear war posed a major barrier to making SALT into a security regime. Ironically, however, the Soviet political leaders seem to have desired to establish a regime to sanction their own doctrinal changes, such as the principle of no first use. As Garthoff (1987) describes, the Soviets made persistent efforts to get the United States to agree to a bilateral no-first-use pledge. The issue was raised once unsuccessfully during the SALT negotiations at the end of 1970; subsequently efforts were pursued through unpublicized diplomatic contacts between Henry Kissinger and Soviet Ambassador Anatolii Dobrynin, and later through a series of Soviet, Warsaw Pact, and United Nations proposals (Garthoff, 1985:182, 335; Garthoff, 1987). The latter proposals were presumably intended to influence *public opinion* and fulfilled in part a propaganda function, whereas the backchannel overtures to Kissinger probably represented a more serious attempt to solicit U.S. interest in a bilateral no-first-use pledge. In any case, the importance that the Soviets attached to this initiative—as well as to those “paper agreements” that were achieved, such as the 1973 statement on Prevention of Nuclear War—suggests that the political leadership believes in the constraining power of principles, norms, and rules associated with se-

curity regimes. That they were willing to be constrained themselves is suggested by their later adoption of a no-first-use pledge unilaterally and its apparent use as a tool for reorienting Soviet military doctrine and forces to prevent nuclear escalation. No first use would no doubt have been easier for Brezhnev to impose domestically if it had been sanctioned by an international regime.

Condoleezza Rice has made the argument, contrary to Jervis's views, that the SALT agreements can be considered part of a limited security regime. She identifies three principles on which the regime was based: (1) "acceptance of parity as a virtually irreversible condition;" (2) "the recognition of mutual vulnerability as an objective technological fact of the nuclear age;" and (3) the offense-defense link: "the recognition that the acquisition of defensive weapons would drive the other side to acquire more offensive firepower in order to overwhelm the defense" (Rice, 1988:297). In support of her view that the SALT regime actually constrained unilateral decisions, or short-range self-interest, as Jervis (1983:186-187) or Nye (1987:396) would put it, Rice points to several pieces of evidence. First, in implementing the accord, the Soviet Union removed over 1,200 land-based and submarine-based strategic missiles and 20 strategic missile-carrying submarines (SSBNs); the United States dismantled 8 Polaris SSBNs. Second, the SALT subceilings constrained the Soviet military from developing an optimal counterforce posture. Third, both sides have complied with the main provisions of SALT II, even though the treaty was never ratified. Moreover, until 1986, the Reagan administration, despite its evaluation of the SALT treaties as "fatally flawed," agreed not to undercut the treaty so long as the Soviets abided by its limits. As Rice points out, "the existence of this unratified treaty made the President's job of breaking out of the SALT limitations very difficult" (1988:298-299). Even when the administration moved to exceed the SALT limits, and especially with its plans eventually to violate the ABM treaty by testing and deploying a strategic defense system, the SALT regime had a constraining role. As Rice argues, the administration was at pains to justify "its decision to break out of the treaty limits through a skillfully orchestrated campaign of charges that the Soviets have already violated the treaty" (Rice, 1988:299). It was considered necessary, at least for the sake of *public opinion*, to demonstrate that it was the Soviet Union that defected from the regime first (Rice, 1988:299).

Three additional factors relevant to consideration of SALT as a security regime pertain to *learning*, particularly in its institutional definition. First, SALT created or reinforced domestic institutions and processes favorable to a continuation of the regime. The U.S. Congress, NATO allies, and until 1986, the Joint Chiefs of Staff argued for continued compliance with the SALT

limitations (Rice, 1988:298). Second, as Keohane and Nye (1987:751) might argue, SALT contributed to "incremental" learning by changing the standard operating procedures of national bureaucracies. In the Soviet Union, for example, new institutions, such as the General Staff's Legal and Treaty Department, were set up to monitor Soviet military programs to ensure compliance (Rice, 1988:299). Third, the SALT process established *transnational alliances* with the potential to enhance compliance in the face of recalcitrant governments. In the view of Keohane and Nye, such "new coalition opportunities" are the product of regimes, which also contribute to incremental learning by providing "information about compliance with rules, which facilitates learning about others' behavior" (1987:751). Whether the use of the term "learning" to describe these various processes risks reifying the concept is an open question. Much of the behavior that proponents of learning approaches find relevant does, however, appear to be present in the case of SALT.

There are a number of good examples of *transnational alliances* working to maintain the arms control achievements of the 1970s and to continue the process. After the Soviets broke off official negotiations with the United States in late 1983, following deployment of new U.S. missiles in Europe, semi-private delegations of prominent arms control supporters on each side continued to meet to discuss possible ways out of the impasse (Stewart, 1987; Mattison, 1987). More recently, Soviet proponents of arms control have attempted tacit cooperation with the U.S. Congress to make sure that the research program of the Reagan administration's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) did not exceed the limits of the ABM treaty. Soviet science advisers, notably Evgenii Velikhov, persuaded the Soviet leadership to allow a U.S. congressional delegation to visit the Krasnoiarsk radar—suspected of being a violation of the ABM treaty—in order to improve the domestic climate for arms restraint in the United States. Given the close attention that Congress had paid to SDI and the question of treaty compliance up to that time (Crawford and Hildreth, 1987), it was reasonable for such *policy entrepreneurs* as Velikhov and his U.S. "allies" to hope that such a dramatic initiative would have some impact on the U.S. domestic debate (Huber, 1989:122–124). It could, for example, have been expected to create a *policy window* that would improve prospects for restraining SDI. In the event, however, the outcome of the Krasnoiarsk visit was indeterminate. Experts in the U.S. delegation found Soviet claims of a space-tracking role for the radar implausible, but dismissed as well the Pentagon's claim that the system would be useful for "battle management" as part of a nationwide ballistic missile defense system. They found it best suited for early warning of a missile attack, although they were not particularly impressed with its capabilities even in this area (*New York Times*, 7 September 1987). Finally, the transnational alliance succeeded: the Soviets admitted that the radar violated the treaty and agreed to

tear it down. Subsequent coordinated efforts by Soviet and U.S. entrepreneurs have been equally successful: visits by U.S. delegations to top-secret Soviet laser test ranges and laboratories have revealed far less relevance and capability for ABM purposes than the Pentagon had claimed (von Hippel and Cochran, 1989).

Despite the apparent compatibility of the SALT legacy with aspects of theories of regimes and learning, Rice argues that SALT was only a *limited* regime. In her view, it never succeeded in providing a set of *norms* around which the two sides' expectations converged (see also Weber, 1989; Blacker, 1989)—an important component of the generally accepted definition of regime (Krasner, 1983). On the other hand, she does describe the maintenance of parity as an example of agreed expectations: "since arms control is premised on the implicit understanding that neither side will accept inferiority, periodic demonstrations of resolve in defending parity should be expected" (Rice, 1988:297). In Rice's assessment, the recognition that each side was obliged to maintain parity—because the achievement of parity itself was a condition for successful negotiation of the treaties—introduced "a self-reinforcing dynamic into the agreement" (Rice, 1988:296–297). The problem is that by basing the regime on such an ambiguous notion as parity, the parties to the SALT treaties opened the way for persistent accusations that each was striving to overturn parity and achieve superiority (Holloway, 1983:48–55). In the atmosphere of deteriorating relations in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the delicate balance of cooperation and competition inherent in the maintenance of a regime based on parity could not be sustained.

Ironically, the desire to maintain parity was, in Rice's view, both the motivation for and the demise of the SALT regime. Unlike Jervis, who argued that the superpowers were sufficiently confident in the stability of mutual deterrence to rule out the need for a regime, Rice maintains that from the Soviet vantage point, "the fact of mutual deterrence was not deemed to be enough. . . . [T]he real demand for the regime stemmed from the realization that mutual deterrence needed to be codified" (Rice, 1988:296). The codification of parity was important politically for domestic purposes—to give Brezhnev a justification to contain military spending—and for reasons of international prestige. Jervis, by contrast to Rice, doubts "whether there will ever be strong political pressures in favor of a regime unless there is dramatic evidence that individualistic security policies are leading to disaster" (Jervis, 1983:194).

The Gorbachev Era

The period since Mikhail Gorbachev came into office in March 1985 provides an important body of evidence against which to evaluate competing

theories of change in Soviet security policy. Changes in both word and deed indicated a shift toward greater moderation in Soviet policy and greater interest in cooperation. Starting in the mid-1980s, Soviet officials began to acknowledge publicly the existence of a security dilemma—the fact that actions intended as defensive by one side are often interpreted as offensive by the other (Litherland, 1986). Gorbachev (1986b:25) himself renounced the “egoistical attempts to strengthen one’s security at another’s expense” that Jervis (1983) had identified as a barrier to establishment of a U.S.—Soviet security regime. The language reflects what the Soviets call the “new thinking” about the nature of national security.

Soviet analysts credit the new thinking with several major precedents in Soviet arms control policy under Gorbachev, including: the agreement eliminating all U.S. and Soviet intermediate- and shorter-range nuclear missiles, known as the INF treaty; extensive on-site verification procedures associated with that treaty; the unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing that the Soviet Union maintained for 19 months without U.S. reciprocation; the invitation for Western scientists to set up seismic monitoring equipment adjacent to Soviet nuclear test sites to verify the moratorium (Schrag, 1989); the unilateral reduction of 500,000 Soviet troops and 10,000 tanks; the willingness to consider further asymmetrical reductions and restructuring of conventional forces in Europe; the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan; and greater Soviet interest in international organizations such as the United Nations, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund. In order to understand the relationship between the changes in word and the changes in deed, and how the various explanations account for both types, we should examine issue-areas that encompass both rhetoric and action.

MILITARY DOCTRINE

In the Soviet Union changes in military doctrine are often articulated at the highest level before they are fully developed and implemented. The changes under Gorbachev fit this pattern. At the Twenty-Seventh Party Congress in 1986, Gorbachev (1986a) announced that “reasonable sufficiency” should serve as the criterion for the Soviet military posture, but he did not explicitly define the term. Many civilian analysts and politicians were quick to interpret sufficiency as a less demanding alternative to the strict maintenance of parity that had characterized Soviet objectives during the SALT period (Zhurkin, Karaganov, and Kortunov, 1987; Garthoff, 1988). Military officials, by contrast, were more reluctant to renounce parity and were more inclined to make Soviet moderation contingent on comparable U.S. behavior (Garthoff, 1988; Phillips and Sands, 1988; Parrott, 1988).

A second important change in Soviet doctrine is the emphasis on preventing war as its primary goal. Although this change has in some respects been an evolutionary one, the magnitude of the transformation is suggested by a comparison of authoritative statements on military doctrine from the early 1970s with those of the Gorbachev period. In 1971, for example, Marshal Andrei Grechko, Soviet defense minister at the time, described Soviet doctrine as "a system of scientifically founded and officially endorsed views on questions of the preparation and the victorious waging of war in defense of the interests of the Soviet Union and the countries of the socialist commonwealth" (quoted in Garthoff, 1988:137). Gorbachev's defense minister, Army General Dmitrii Iazov, by contrast, stressed that Soviet military doctrine is "a system of fundamental views on the *prevention of war*" as well as the waging of it (Garthoff, 1988:136–137, emphasis added). In May 1987, the Warsaw Pact issued a declaration that its military doctrine, as well as that of the Soviet Union itself, "is *subordinated* to the task of preventing war, nuclear and conventional," a point also emphasized by Iazov (quoted in Garthoff, 1988:137, emphasis added).

A third change relevant to Soviet military doctrine is consistent with the emphasis on preventing war, but has deeper roots and broader implications for Soviet foreign policy as a whole. In a sharp, ideological departure from official rhetoric, Soviet analysts and political leaders have spoken of the need for "all-human values," most notably the preservation of peace, to take precedence over the narrower interests of class struggle (Shenfield, 1987; Shevardnadze, 1988; Lynch, 1989). This new formulation has evident implications for U.S.–Soviet competition in the Third World, but it also implies a willingness to cooperate on a wide range of issues in order to strengthen the foundations of "mutual security." Soviet officials have emphasized the necessity of resolving the security dilemma through such cooperative policies. They stress the importance of norms, principles, and trust in international relations (Dobrynin, 1986; Falin, 1988; Gorbachev, 1987; Iakovlev, 1987, 1988; Shevardnadze, 1988).

Soviet officials have clearly begun to use the language of *regime theory* to express their preferences for the evolution of the U.S.–Soviet security relationship. Their rhetoric does not, of course, mean that one can speak of the existence of a security regime under Gorbachev. Regime theory is nevertheless useful for understanding the likely goals of Gorbachev and his civilian advisers. They appear to want to embed Soviet security policy in an international regime in order to justify restraints on their own military policy—much as Brezhnev would have liked an international sanction for his no-first-use pledge. This goal is one possible interpretation of the Warsaw Pact's offer to NATO of mutual consultation on the military doctrines of the two alliances

(*Pravda*, 30 May 1987). Subsequently, representatives of 85 countries met in Vienna in early 1990 for a doctrinal "seminar." Such initiatives make even the operational aspects of Soviet military doctrine a subject of international political scrutiny, and therefore the responsibility of Soviet diplomats rather than the narrow purview of the Soviet military. An international regime that created expectations that military doctrine would be open to examination by the Soviet Union's adversaries—as a means of alleviating the security dilemma—would also widen the scope for participation by other Soviet analysts from outside the uniformed military, including natural and social scientists (Kokoshin, 1988c). It would be consistent with calls by prominent Soviet political figures for civilian academic analysts to become more involved in studying Soviet military doctrine (Dobrynin, 1986; Iakovlev, 1987; Shevardnadze, 1988). Civilian reformers have also called explicitly for international—and transnational—cooperation in a program of conversion of military industry to civilian purposes. Although such measures could be carried out unilaterally, Soviet reformers seek international participation—including publication of national plans and development of joint proposals—deliberately in order to gain leverage over the Soviet military whom they do not trust to oversee the demilitarization of the Soviet economy (Izyumov, 1988; Melman, 1989; Vasilchuk, 1989).

Western analysts are generally not satisfied with declaratory changes in Soviet military doctrine or mere proposals from reformist intellectuals. They seek evidence in actual Soviet behavior, preferably in force posture or—if it is too early to identify operational indicators of doctrinal changes—in positions taken in arms negotiations (which eventually affect force posture). In looking for signs of substantive change in Soviet security policy under Gorbachev, analysts would expect to find more than the tacit acceptance of mutual societal vulnerability that characterized the SALT regime. In Soviet arms control proposals, for example, one would expect to see evidence of greater willingness to limit those forces that appear threatening to the U.S. side, a less rigid adherence to "parity" as the main objective of the accords, and a decrease in the propensity to interpret parity in ways that favor the Soviet side at the expense of the United States. All of these characteristics are apparent in the rhetoric of Gorbachev and his advisers, and the emerging evidence from the arms proposals themselves seems generally consistent.

THE START TALKS

One sign of willingness to take U.S. concerns into account is the Soviet acceptance of deep cuts in the SS-18 force (for details of the negotiations, see Hardenbergh, 1985–1990). In his memoirs, Andrei Gromyko, Soviet foreign minister at the time, described the Carter administration's March 1977 pro-

posal for a 50 percent reduction of Soviet heavy SS-18 missiles as "not only unacceptable, but absurd" (Gromyko, 1988, vol. 2:218). Gromyko's opinion probably never changed, but with the advent of Gorbachev, Soviet negotiators began to accept such reductions as part of an agreement in the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START). At the 1986 summit meeting in Reykjavik, Marshal Sergei Akhromeev, then chief of the Soviet General Staff, apparently offered explicitly to cut the SS-18 force in half, a position confirmed in subsequent Soviet statements (Garthoff, 1988:136). Despite this offer, however, some Western analysts, including General Brent Scowcroft, expressed concern that a START agreement would give the Soviets counterforce advantages over the United States by decreasing the ratio of vulnerable U.S. targets to accurate Soviet warheads (Hardenbergh, 1987:611.B.429; 1988:611.C.53-54).

There is a fundamental problem inherent in scrutinizing Soviet arms proposals for evidence of a decision to deemphasize the pursuit of counterforce advantages. In some respects the only indisputable evidence would be a shift to a minimum deterrent force, manifested by Soviet willingness to take deep asymmetrical cuts in their most potent counterforce weapons (something that could actually be done without an arms control quid pro quo from the U.S. side). Gorbachev would, presumably, have great difficulty carrying out such a unilateral restructuring, even if he wanted to do so. For one thing, most of the existing Soviet missile force possesses the technical capability for counterforce attacks, and the Soviets could hardly be expected to build a new retaliatory force of inaccurate, single-warhead missiles. Here *economic stringency* as a factor influencing Soviet moderation plays an ambiguous role. On the one hand, Gorbachev wants arms agreements as a way to signal the Soviet military to reduce their demands for future weapons. On the other hand, to satisfy its negotiating partner by building a new missile force that would lower the U.S. perception of threat would be prohibitively expensive.

The START negotiations are unlikely to yield an unambiguous Soviet minimum deterrent force. Studies of bargaining strategies associated with *cooperation theory* suggest that a treaty would result from a series of moderate mutual concessions (Jensen, 1984) or from a pattern of tit-for-tat reciprocity (Axelrod, 1984). Given that the U.S. negotiating position assumes retention of extensive counterforce capabilities in the U.S. arsenal, it is doubtful that the positions of the two sides would converge around an agreement that would eliminate comparable Soviet capabilities. Looking at the domestic level of analysis reinforces this conclusion: any Soviet leader who tried to move to a minimum deterrent in the face of U.S. efforts to extend its own counterforce capabilities against Soviet forces would encounter considerable internal opposition. Evidence of such U.S. efforts is readily available. Even while nego-

tiating for reductions in Soviet counterforce potential, the United States has continued developing earth-penetrating warheads to destroy the hardened facilities of the Soviet command and control system (*Wall Street Journal*, 13 September 1988). The U.S. Strategic Air Command has been revising its war plans to enhance its counterforce capabilities; it is particularly interested in destroying the Soviet leadership and in trying to find ways to target Soviet mobile missiles (*New York Times*, 2 November 1988, 23 November 1988). Finally, SDI is interpreted on the Soviet side, and by most U.S. analysts, as part of an offensive, counterforce strategy and, as such, it serves as an additional barrier to potential Soviet efforts to abandon counterforce—or even to carry out substantial reductions, given the possible future need for sufficient redundancy in retaliatory capability to overwhelm a defense.

The strategic arms negotiations will probably not produce evidence to convince diehard skeptics of a change toward moderation in Soviet military doctrine. This is in part, however, a question of self-fulfilling prophecies. As the literature on *tacit transnational alliances* would suggest, the proponents of counterforce strategies on the U.S. side reinforce the arguments of their counterparts on the Soviet side (Griffiths, 1984; Singer, 1984:245–271), especially when there is good evidence of official U.S. pursuit of counterforce. Or, as the Soviet poet Evgenii Evtushenko put it, “your hardliners help our hardliners, and our hardliners help your hardliners” (*Moscow News*, 23–30 October 1988). Hypothetically there is a possibility that the Soviet Union would make dramatic reductions in its counterforce capabilities as part of a GRIT strategy. Such a move would constitute an effort by conciliatory forces in the Soviet Union to form a tacit alliance with their counterparts in the United States, a possibility that a number of Soviet analysts have advocated and that has numerous historical precedents (Kokoshin, 1988*d*; Shevardnadze, 1988).

Initially it appeared that the “doves” on each side were too busy trying to maintain existing restraints on the arms race, such as the ABM treaty and the moratoria on testing antisatellite weapons, to consider promoting radical unilateral actions (Kokoshin, 1988*c*). Thus, the December 1988 announcement of unilateral conventional-force reductions took most analysts by surprise; it appears to have stemmed from proposals by academic policy advisers whose role had been generally underestimated in the West (U.S. House of Representatives, 1988, 1989; Meyer, 1988). Several prominent Soviet academics have now put forward proposals for a unilateral Soviet shift to a minimum nuclear deterrent posture, some even going so far as to argue that the threat of retaliation by only a few nuclear weapons would be enough to deter the United States (Bogdanov and Kortunov, 1989). These *policy entrepreneurs* are aware of the barriers to implementation of such a unilateral posture—indeed

in some respect their work is inspired by the desire to make those barriers irrelevant. The difficulty of achieving deep reductions and reorientation toward a minimum deterrent via the arms-control route has, for example, spurred some analysts to advocate unilateral Soviet initiatives "without waiting for Washington to endorse our vision of the future" (Kortunov, 1989). The economic expense entailed in developing an unambiguous second-strike retaliatory force has led analysts to present imaginative proposals for working within the existing Soviet force structure to produce a comparable end. The plans focus on both the offensive and defensive components of counterforce by including reductions in the most destabilizing and redundant offensive systems (for example, MIRVed missiles), along with paring back air defenses and halting modernization of the Moscow ABM complex (Arbatov, 1988, 1989). Although proposals for a unilateral Soviet minimum deterrent have already generated strong opposition in the press (see, for example, Dvorkin and Torbin, 1989), they are now nevertheless on the agenda for further public debate. Despite the caveats raised above, we should not be surprised by future Soviet initiatives pointed in this direction. If the fact that such proposals are openly discussed in the Soviet Union today is not enough to persuade U.S. skeptics of meaningful change in Soviet security policy, the implementation of unilateral reductions of an order of magnitude might make a difference.

THE INF TREATY

For many analysts, the clearest evidence of change in Soviet security policy under Gorbachev was the INF treaty. A number of explanations have been put forward to account for Soviet acceptance of the "zero option" to eliminate U.S. and Soviet intermediate- and short-range missiles. They include military exigencies, economic stringency, and reaction to U.S. negotiation from strength. One could also imagine the Soviet signing of the INF treaty as part of a GRIT strategy to induce U.S. cooperation in other spheres, notably trade, or as part of a series of tit-for-tat gestures. In many respects, one's choice of explanation for this particular incident bears on one's interpretation of the overall degree of change in Soviet security policy.

Analysts who see Soviet acceptance of the zero option as a function of *military exigencies* attach little importance to the INF agreement as a herald of more fundamental change. They maintain that the INF treaty was in the Soviet Union's military interest and was firmly supported by the military because it removed the threat of the U.S. Pershing II missile (Larrabee, 1988:1022-1023). This analysis begs the question why the Soviets waited until Gorbachev came into office to accept the zero option, rather than doing so when West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt suggested it in 1978, when NATO decided to deploy the new missiles in 1979, when the Reagan administration

put forward the zero option in 1981, or when the first Pershing II missiles became operational in Europe in December 1983 (Risse-Kappen, 1988). The fact that the Pershing II missiles were removed made the INF treaty more palatable for the Soviet military, but it was not necessarily the most important reason for the agreement. The shift in Soviet negotiating behavior following Gorbachev's ascendancy lends particular weight to explanations that incorporate the role of new *leaders* (see, for example, Meyer, 1988).

What needs to be explained is why the Soviets were willing to accept unequal reductions in forces in 1987, whereas in the mid-1970s—long before the deployment of U.S. Pershing II and cruise missiles—they perceived a need to augment their forces by deploying the SS-20. A number of analysts have offered plausible explanations for the original deployment. They have called attention to Soviet preoccupation with U.S. forward-based systems (FBS) around Europe and the growing French and British nuclear forces (Berman and Baker, 1982; MccGwire, 1987; Gromyko, 1988, vol. 2:210). The Soviets have tried since the beginning of strategic arms negotiations to gain some compensation for these systems. Their deployment of the SS-20 as a counter to FBS can be understood in part as a consequence of their inability to eliminate the threat through arms control (Garthoff, 1983). While not every analyst agreed with this rationale for the SS-20 deployment, virtually no one predicted that the Soviets would be willing to do away with the missiles altogether.

Even though they did not predict Soviet acceptance of the zero option, some analysts maintain that the INF treaty and Gorbachev's overall arms control strategy are consistent with Soviet military requirements, but that the requirements themselves have changed. Thus, they downplay the importance of Gorbachev's leadership and doubt that he is pursuing a security agenda incompatible with military preferences. They argue that "Gorbachev's call for radical arms control can be justified within current Soviet military doctrine," owing to a new Soviet emphasis on conventional operations (FitzGerald, 1987:16). They maintain that "Gorbachev and the Soviet military are now in agreement on an arms control and nuclear weapons development program" (Weickhardt, 1987:24). A number of writers have called particular attention to the statements by Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov, former chief of the General Staff, denigrating the role of nuclear weapons and stressing the importance of advanced-technology conventional systems (Ogarkov, 1985:88–89). Yet Gorbachev's unilateral conventional-force reductions, military budget cuts, and disparaging remarks about Ogarkov's favored high-technology weapons (Gorbachev, 1987) would appear to call this interpretation into question.

Moreover, the argument that the Soviet elimination of the SS-20 and

shorter-range missiles makes obvious strategic sense fails to account for the apparent uneasiness within the Soviet military and the public about the treaty. At the treaty ratification hearings, for example, General V.M. Arkipov, commander of the Moscow Military District, reported that some in the military "think we are weakening the country's defense capacity by the unequal reduction of those missiles," although he maintained that the majority supported the treaty (*Izvestiia*, 16 March 1988). Defense Minister Iazov also spoke at the hearings in support of the treaty, but he mentioned that "letters from the Soviet people are reaching the Ministry of Defense which express concern either directly or indirectly: will not harm be done to the security of the Soviet Union and the countries of the socialist community through the Soviet Union's destruction of more missiles under the treaty than are to be destroyed by the United States?" (*Krasnaia zvezda*, 10 February 1988; see also Utkin, 1988:6). It would not be surprising if much of this "opposition" to the treaty were intended primarily for foreign audiences, in order to exaggerate the extent of Soviet concessions. On the other hand, public opinion surveys conducted by foreign and Soviet polling organizations have also found considerable unhappiness with the treaty among the Soviet public (Carrère d'Encausse, 1987:48; Ivanov, 1987). Soviet citizens apparently expressed concern about the extensive verification of the agreement (Hardenbergh, 1988:403.B.622-623). One would expect members of the military to feel even more strongly about these issues. Furthermore, there was evidence of opposition to the treaty at the highest political levels, including from the head of the KGB and conservative Politburo members (Parrott, 1988:22-23).

The INF treaty provides a good case for illustrating how popular and academic explanations for moderation in Soviet security policy overlap. Implicit in some of the military arguments focusing on the Pershing II deployment is the argument that Soviet acceptance of the zero option was a product of U.S. *negotiation from strength*. A comparable argument in the academic literature on *cooperation theory* uses the notion of tit-for-tat to account for Soviet behavior. In this interpretation, the United States responded to a Soviet defection (deployment of SS-20) with a reciprocal defection (deployment of U.S. missiles). The low payoff from mutual defection induced the Soviets to try a cooperative move next time, by accepting the zero option. The United States reciprocated and the INF treaty resulted (Zimmerman and Jacobson, 1987). One problem with these arguments is that they fail to account for the timing of the Soviet decision. The first Pershing II missiles were deployed in December 1983 and the Soviets' initial reaction to this U.S. "defection" was another defection: they broke off the arms talks in Geneva. It was only during the summer of 1985, after Gorbachev came into office, that the Soviets began to make concessions leading to the final agreement (Evangelista, 1986). An-

other problem is the suggestion that the U.S. pursuit of a tit-for-tat strategy worked. Tit-for-tat cannot account for the Soviet concessions that brought about the treaty. On the basis of strict reciprocity, it would have predicted an endless spiral of mutual defections. We need an explanation that helps us understand why the Soviets abandoned tit-for-tat in order to secure the INF treaty.

One such explanation would view Gorbachev's initiatives as an example of GRIT. In this interpretation, Gorbachev sought to induce U.S. cooperation through a number of unilateral concessions, such as the 19-month test moratorium and the willingness to exclude French, British, and U.S. forward-based nuclear systems from an INF accord (Evangelista, 1988:275; Zimmerman and Jacobson, 1987). Zimmerman and Jacobson (1987) have argued that the INF treaty resulted from a U.S. strategy of tit-for-tat combined with a Soviet strategy of GRIT. They also draw the normative conclusion that the appropriate strategy for the United States as a status quo power is strict reciprocity, whereas the Soviet Union as an expansionist power must bear the burden of convincing its adversary of its good intentions through a series of multiple concessions.

Of course, status quo is in the eye of the beholder. That is the main insight of the literature on the security dilemma. In the case of INF, for example, the Soviet Union maintained that it was the Americans who upset the status quo; they violated the spirit of SALT II by deploying new "strategic" missiles in Europe that undercut the treaty's limitations. The SS-20s, according to this argument, were fully in keeping with the spirit of the treaty, even though they were not in any case formally limited by it: they were simply modernized versions of existing systems, the SS-4 and SS-5 (Garthoff, 1983; Garner, 1983). One also hears from the Soviet side the argument that the INF accord resulted from *Soviet strength*, that the SS-20s were bargaining chips intended to be cashed in to get an agreement on European systems (Haslam, 1989). A Soviet engineer who works at the Votkinsk plant that produced the SS-20 argued, for example, that "if we did not have these missiles, the West would not be talking with us on equal terms." Although he harbored some doubts about the INF treaty, he reassured himself "that we have sufficient strength left to make anyone see reason" (*Pravda*, 27 January 1988). The problem with the argument about Soviet strength and the use of SS-20 as a bargaining chip is that, even cashing in all their chips, the Soviets never achieved what they wanted: there are still no restrictions on FBS or British and French systems.

The popular arguments about negotiation from strength, U.S. or Soviet, as well as the academic arguments about tit-for-tat versus GRIT all fail to account for Gorbachev's INF initiatives. Why did he make the cooperative moves at all? Why did he not continue to respond with further defections, as

his predecessors did by deploying "countermeasures" to the new U.S. systems (in the form of more missiles in Eastern Europe and submarines off the U.S. coast)? One argument, not inconsistent with negotiation from strength, is that Soviet concessions were a response to the threat of the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative and an attempt to avoid a costly new arms race in space (McConnell, 1988; Zimmerman and Jacobson, 1987). This explanation would appear to account for the Soviets' decision to return to the negotiating table in 1984, even before Gorbachev came in, and for the fact that their willingness to return hinged on U.S. agreement to negotiate space weapons along with INF and strategic forces.

SDI undoubtedly figured prominently in Soviet calculations. Moreover, the Soviet Union's willingness to make concessions in its areas of strength (for example, land-based intermediate and strategic missiles) in return for curbing a new round of the technological arms race (in this case, SDI) has ample precedent (Evangelista, 1988; Bloomfield, Clemens, and Griffiths, 1966). Yet there is also precedent for the Soviets to respond to U.S. initiatives by developing their own analogous systems. Why have the Soviets under Gorbachev put so much rhetorical emphasis on asymmetrical responses to U.S. initiatives? Why have they stressed the need to meet military challenges by improving the economy rather than wasting resources on matching every U.S. weapon (Zhurkin, Karaganov, and Kortunov, 1987; Shevardnadze, 1988; Evangelista, 1989, 1990b)? It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the "new political thinking" on security played some role in a number of Soviet decisions, including the acceptance of unequal cuts in intermediate-range nuclear forces and the rejection of a Soviet "Star Wars" system.

NEW THINKING

The closest academic counterpart to the popular notion of "new thinking" as an explanation for the changes in Soviet policy is the literature on *learning*. Indeed, much of the Soviet commentary about the new thinking refers explicitly to the failures of the Brezhnev policy and suggests that the new policies are a product of having learned from those difficult lessons (Primakov, 1987; Shevardnadze, 1988). The very language of the reformers appears to reinforce the inclination of some analysts to describe learning as a reaction and accommodation to "reality," in defiance of outmoded ideological preconceptions: an important Party document from 1988 reported that previous Soviet foreign policy "did not escape dogmatic and subjective attitudes. It trailed behind fundamental changes that occurred in the world" (Lynch, 1989:1). Gorbachev has argued that "life has corrected our notions of the laws and rates of transition to socialism, our understanding of the role of socialism on the world scale" (Lynch, 1989:36).

In some respects the academic debate about learning as an explanation for Gorbachev's security policy has fallen into the pattern of distinguishing changes in tactics from changes in long-term goals. Analysts who focus on *military exigencies*—for example, the signing of the INF treaty to eliminate the threat of Pershing II missiles—find only tactical adjustments in Soviet policy. Others stress the external function of new thinking in influencing *public opinion*. Given the extent to which the Soviets oriented their propaganda activities to prevent deployment of U.S. INF systems in the early 1980s (Haslam, 1989), it is not surprising that analysts interpreted acceptance of the zero option in the same light. With this background in mind, Joseph Nye made the case that only simple learning had taken place in Soviet policy. He understood Gorbachev's initiatives, including signing the INF treaty, as attempts to overcome the legacy of insensitivity to the impact of Soviet actions on the perceptions of adversaries. As Nye (1988:389–390) put it, “one need only compare the heavy-handed Soviet handling of the INF issue that united NATO in 1983 with the subtle dilemmas Gorbachev's agreement to remove nuclear weapons posed for NATO in 1987 to see the significant change that has occurred in tactical sophistication.” This argument appears to assume that the Soviet Union's main goal, both in 1983 and in 1987, was to disrupt NATO. By Nye's definitions only simple learning (about tactics) had occurred. Complex learning had not taken place because the long-term objective of damaging NATO remained the same.

Some analysts do perceive more fundamental forms of learning in Gorbachev's security policy. Robert Legvold, for example, uses Nye's definitions, but comes to different conclusions, arguing that Gorbachev, in pursuit of arms control, has demonstrated “the beginning of complex learning. When he subordinates military values in choosing an arms control posture, as he apparently has in negotiating the INF agreement and in discussing strategic arms cuts at Reykjavik, he is altering basic Soviet *priorities*” (Legvold, 1988b:123, original emphasis). Using Tetlock's (1988) definitional distinctions, Blacker (1989) maintains that the Gorbachev changes represent both cognitive-content learning and efficiency learning; Weber (1989:49) finds evidence of cognitive structural learning in Gorbachev's acceptance of asymmetric and unilateral reductions and of intrusive verification of arms control treaties, and especially in his decision to “de-emphasize military force as a source of power in world politics”—all elements that contradict the “strategic model” that Weber believes guided previous Soviet security policy.

The debates about a learning *explanation* would be relatively easy to resolve if proving that learning had occurred required only that one demonstrate that changes in goals rather than merely tactics had taken place. As many analysts point out, the discussions in the Soviet press about Brezhnev's for-

eign policy and, in particular, the SS-20 decision do suggest a redefinition of Soviet goals and of the meaning of security itself (Blacker, 1989; Weber, 1989; Holloway, 1989; Evangelista, 1990b). As Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze put it in criticizing the Soviet deployment of SS-20 and the reaction it triggered, "a second strategic front against us was created in Europe, not without our help. Its appearance could have been avoided if our genuine national interests at the time had been correctly evaluated" (Shevardnadze, 1988:37). The Brezhnev leadership had a conception of Soviet interests—and, by extension, goals—different from that of the reformers. Gorbachev understands what Brezhnev could not be made to understand: that by striving to achieve military gains, the Soviet Union can incur high political costs that ultimately undermine the putative security benefits of the original action. Gorbachev recognizes the corollary as well: there may be political benefits to be gained by sacrificing some military capability.

Many of the aspects of learning definitions that focus on individual cognition seem to apply to people such as Gorbachev and Shevardnadze, given how radically their world views and conceptions of Soviet national interests differ from those of their predecessors. Yet it is really appropriate to say that they learned? Neither man was responsible for Soviet foreign policy before 1985, and we have little evidence of their views about the subject before that time. They began implementing aspects of the new political thinking almost as soon as they assumed office. The thinking—in particular, the critique of the Brezhnev-era policy—may not have been new to them at all. If they were skeptical of the policy, but merely kept silent, then one cannot say that they learned. Nor did the policymakers who formulated Soviet foreign policy under Brezhnev learn. Rather, they were removed from office, they died, or—as in the case of former Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko—both. In fact, Gromyko is a particularly important test of a learning explanation for the changes since 1985. In his memoirs published in 1988, he continued to defend the policies of the Brezhnev era (and the Stalin era, for that matter)—including, for example, the invasion of Afghanistan and Soviet arms control positions on the SS-18 and SS-20 missiles—policies that Gorbachev and Shevardnadze have criticized and reversed. Even after his retirement from the Foreign Ministry in 1985, Gromyko continued to express reservations about the new course from his position on the Politburo (Parrott, 1988).

The massive replacement of personnel in the foreign and security policy-making apparatus, combined with a long-awaited generational turnover (Parrott, 1988; Hough, 1988), make it difficult to sustain arguments that learning as an individual cognitive process accounts for change toward moderation in Soviet security policy since 1985. Recognizing the importance of these developments, proponents of the learning metaphor have tended to speak of learn-

ing at the level of the Soviet *government*, rather than in terms of individuals. If there were general agreement within the Soviet foreign policy community about the failures of Brezhnev's security policy, and if Gorbachev and his advisers were recruited for their alternative views, one might justifiably speak of governmental learning. Yet on both counts the evidence appears to point in the opposite direction. As Blacker (1989:48) argues, the pre-Gorbachev foreign policymakers did not acknowledge their mistakes:

Given their own roles in the development of Soviet policy over the course of the preceding 10 or in some cases 20 years, as well as their identification with and commitment to the goals these policies had been designed to serve, it would have taken an extraordinary set of circumstances to induce these Brezhnev-era policymakers to abandon their handiwork. In their own view, no such set of circumstances had arisen, despite the admittedly troubled state of the Soviet economic, political, and social system.

It is not only retired policymakers who reject the criticism of the Brezhnev era and doubt the wisdom of the new thinking. The public debate on security policy in the Soviet Union since the advent of Gorbachev has continued to expand, providing ample evidence of the persistence of the "old thinking." Divergence in views between civilian reformers and military traditionalists is particularly striking (Phillips and Sands, 1988; Evangelista, 1989; Wallander, 1989). Even Politburo members openly express their disagreements about fundamental issues such as the relevance of class versus "all-human" values in international relations; whether there is any tension between the preservation of peace and the pursuit of socialism, and, if so, which should take precedence; and the relative merits of unilateral arms reductions versus negotiated ones versus none at all (Parrott, 1988; Holloway, 1989; Shenfield, 1987; Lynch, 1989). One careful analysis goes so far as to conclude that "the dedicated exponents of the new *thinking*, as opposed to just new language, appear to be limited to a very few politicians and advisors, judging by the analytical rather than the rhetorical content of what the Soviet leadership has been saying" (Lynch, 1989:53 original emphasis). One finds little evidence of a new, widely held "consensual knowledge" (Haas, 1980) about security affairs that would support notions of governmental learning as a source of the new thinking.

Nor can one speak of recruitment of new thinkers to replace the unsuccessful policymakers of the previous era, as a natural-selection version of learning might suggest. Foreign policy issues are rarely salient in any country for the selection of new leaders. Moreover, in the Soviet Union new leaders are not chosen on the basis of public opinion as expressed at the ballot box. The Communist Party Politburo and Central Committee members recruit their successors from within; they would not knowingly choose people who dis-

agreed with their approach. Even if Gorbachev were chosen in anticipation that he would undertake major changes, his background—and the most pressing Soviet problems—was in domestic economic administration and agriculture. His ability to cope with those issues probably figured most prominently in his selection. To the extent that Gorbachev's colleagues took into consideration his views on Soviet security policy, they probably assumed that he would pursue what Bruce Parrott (1988) calls the "dual-track" approach of the Brezhnev era: expansion of Soviet military power as the ultimate guarantor of security, combined with efforts at arms-control negotiations to moderate the superpower competition. According to Parrott, the approach came under attack from Soviet hardliners in response to the worsening of relations with the United States that began during the Carter administration and intensified under Reagan. Gorbachev was expected to reestablish the consensus on a dual-track policy that had prevailed during the 1970s.

Another problem with a learning explanation for changes in Soviet security policy concerns the fact that a number of policy analysts appear to have held for a long time the views now associated with the new thinking. The works of Shenfield (1987) and Lynch (1987, 1989) persuasively demonstrate that many of the ideas associated with the new thinking appeared in academic studies dating back to the 1970s and earlier: the devaluation of the class factor in international relations, and the irrelevance of superiority and the meaninglessness of victory in nuclear war, for example. Zimmerman's (1969) work finds antecedents to these ideas even during the Khrushchev period—indeed many of the personalities associated with the ideas at that time cut a high profile in the Gorbachev administration today. Ideas about the long-term viability of capitalism and the nature of change in the Third-World—important components of the new thinking on security—also have a demonstrably long pedigree (Hough, 1986). Some Soviet analysts even claim to have warned the Brezhnev leadership about the deleterious effect of Soviet activity in the Third World on détente and arms control both long before and immediately after the invasion of Afghanistan (Bogomolov, 1988a, 1988b). This sensitivity to linkage between issue-areas in East–West relations is often identified as one of the characteristics of the new thinking. Recognition of the security dilemma and the need to abandon zero-sum thinking in favor of international cooperation, devaluation of the military instrument in foreign policy, and stress on economic interdependence—all of these ideas were expressed in somewhat muted form before Gorbachev came into office (see, for example, Burlatskii, 1982; Gromyko and Lomeiko, 1984; Arbatov, 1984).

The point is not to argue that academic policy analysts have not changed their views or "learned" anything since the 1970s. On the contrary, their job, by definition, is to develop an increasingly sophisticated and "realistic" inter-

pretation of international politics. The fact is, however, that their "lessons"—about intervention in the Third World, and about insensitivity to the adversary's security concerns—were rejected by policymakers and continue to be rejected by prominent elements of the security-policy community today. Even so seemingly obvious a lesson as the unwinnability of nuclear war is subject to sharp, polemical disputes about its implications. The policy prescriptions that emerge from such competing interpretations are diametrically opposed (Grachev, 1988; Proektor, 1988; Grachev et al., 1989). Many Soviet political and military figures reject the basic lesson of the new thinkers that Soviet military policy under Brezhnev failed because it provoked a U.S. response. Arguing that "imperialism" is inherently militaristic, these analysts reject Soviet responsibility for the deterioration of détente, the acceptance of which is fundamental to Gorbachev's new approach (Grachev et al., 1989). Even the "lessons" of Afghanistan have not been learned by all: in 1989, a group of veterans of the war called for the Soviet government to send "volunteers" to help defeat the rebel forces still receiving U.S. military aid (Kondrashov, 1989).

Learning metaphors obscure what is fundamentally a political process of change toward moderation—one that is in no way irreversible. "Lessons" of the Brezhnev era have become instruments of Gorbachev's *coalition-building* strategy (Snyder, 1987/1988). The new thinkers are those *policy entrepreneurs* who have been promoting their ideas, albeit somewhat cautiously, since before Gorbachev's tenure began. Gorbachev has latched onto these ideas, which are probably compatible with his own instincts in any case, in order to redistribute the relative power of the institutions involved in formulating and carrying out Soviet security policy. In Meyer's (1988:129) words, "Gorbachev's agitation for new political thinking on security is more a product of instrumental necessity than of military-strategic enlightenment." As he himself has made clear on many occasions, Gorbachev views changes in Soviet security policy as a prerequisite for the successful implementation of his domestic reforms.

Thus, as Lynch (1989:3) argues, the new thinking "is first of all a political rather than an intellectual or conceptual act. It reflects preestablished political priorities of the Gorbachev leadership, which in turn has assiduously coopted strains of thinking—some of it actually new, much of it developed quietly by specialists during the Brezhnev period—which suits its purposes and long-term goals." These purposes and goals differ markedly from those of the Brezhnev leadership, except in the most abstract sense that all Soviet leaders seek to ensure the "security" and "well-being" of the Soviet Union, as they understand those notions. To argue that the Gorbachev changes constitute learning in the "efficiency" sense, one would have to make normative assump-

tions in favor of Gorbachev's goals over Brezhnev's—in particular, that it is “better” to emphasize economic, diplomatic, and political instruments in foreign policy, rather than military ones; that economic integration into the world capitalist system can achieve security and well-being more effectively than pursuit of military parity or superiority; and even that a détente relationship with the West is preferable to ideological, political, and military competition. Given that there is sharp disagreement on these issues among Soviet foreign policy influentials, it would be rash for an outside observer to stake the case for the validity of concepts such as learning on normative assumptions.

In this context, the various factors to which the Soviet changes have been attributed take on new meaning. The Reagan military buildup, the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative, the costly Afghanistan war, the economic crisis in Poland, and the domestic situation in the Soviet Union, all could be seen as *policy windows* that allowed proponents of restraint in Soviet security policy to come to the fore. Their arrival was in no sense preordained, however, as use of the learning metaphor as well as the popular negotiation-from-strength arguments often imply. Here the focus on *leaders* is appropriate: “there is no reason to believe that Andropov or Chernenko (had they lived), or Romanov (had he been selected instead of Gorbachev) would have chosen to travel Gorbachev's path of doctrinal reform” (Meyer, 1988:128). In this sense, new leaders are a form of policy window as well.

Unlike explanations keyed to specific external factors—such as the Reagan administration policies or declining Soviet fortunes in the Third World—a focus on policy windows emphasizes the indeterminacy of outcomes. The case of the Strategic Defense Initiative provides a good example of how *policy entrepreneurs* try to take advantage of such factors. According to most technical assessments, SDI poses at most a long-term threat to the Soviet Union, mainly in the form of possible technological spin-offs to other weapons systems. Yet Soviet proponents of moderation could see how sectors of the Soviet military might demand an immediate response. Already in the mid-1970s, some military officers and scientists tried to reopen the debate on strategic defenses that was ostensibly settled by the 1972 ABM treaty (Parrott, 1987:32–35; Velikhov, 1988). In the wake of the Reagan administration's strong anti-Soviet rhetoric, military demands for more resources became increasingly strident—even before Reagan's announcement of SDI in March 1983 (Parrott, 1987:45–52). Soviet reformers portrayed SDI as a U.S. plan to bankrupt the Soviet Union by forcing it into a futile and wasteful technological arms race. For them this was a familiar pattern of past U.S.–Soviet competition. But this time they were able to put forward their alternatives, thanks to a new, sympathetic general secretary.

Proponents of Soviet moderation used SDI as a window in two respects—

first, they made the case for asymmetrical responses as a cheaper alternative to emulation of the U.S. program, and second, they argued that economic modernization was necessary now in order to compete with U.S. advanced military technology in the future (Evangelista, 1986). Emboldened by their apparent success in convincing Gorbachev to embrace their alternatives, the reformers opened the window wider. Now they advocated asymmetrical responses to a broad range of military threats, in effect enshrining a new general principle of Soviet security policy; they criticized strict adherence to parity in favor of "reasonable sufficiency;" and they promoted unilateral gestures of restraint explicitly modeled on the Khrushchev troop reductions (Zhurkin, Karaganov, and Kortunov, 1987). Instead of hinting that economic reform would favor a future high-technology Soviet military machine, they began to downplay the value of the military instrument altogether and to stress that economic strength in itself makes the biggest contribution to security (Evangelista, 1989). They began to imply that if the U.S. goal were to bankrupt the Soviet Union with an arms race, then the less the Soviets spent on the military the better. As Shevardnadze put it (1988:36), "we have agreed that war cannot be a rational means of politics. But couldn't the arms race be such a means? However paradoxical it seems—it can. Yes, the arms race can exhaust and bleed the opponent dry, with the goal of undermining its very economic and social base."

Economic stringency clearly plays a role in the efforts of Gorbachev and his supporters. If the Soviet economy were growing at a robust rate, proponents of moderation would have a more difficult time denying the military the chance to compete with the United States in strategic defensive systems. The state of the economy gave the proponents of moderation an effective argument for not even trying to imitate SDI and for embracing more radical conceptions of security. Evidently, in addition to the political and diplomatic benefits, Gorbachev and his allies do hope to reap economic dividends from the new Soviet security policy. Major conventional reductions benefit the economy, at least in the sense of reducing the opportunity cost of keeping young men out of the civilian labor force. In the nuclear and strategic area, Gorbachev's proposals would also entail some economic benefit by foregoing emulation of SDI and putting limits on the development of future strategic systems.

But economic problems did not dictate the change in the Soviet approach to security. As Parrott points out, the initial Soviet response to the increased U.S. hostility of the early 1980s was to adopt a more confrontational policy to replace the dual-track approach of the 1970s, despite the economic sacrifice that such policies would entail: "Largely hidden from view, the breakdown of the Brezhnevian security consensus under hard-line criticism created intellectual uncertainty within the elite and provided an opening for the liberal alter-

natives that had been quietly developing in academic think-tanks" (Parrott, 1988:35). Gorbachev and his allies were able to make the case that future economic welfare depended on radical reform in both foreign and domestic policy. To make the arguments appeal to a new generation of Soviet citizens, they were aided by long-term secular trends in Soviet society, such as urbanization, increasing education, and the rise of the *intelligentsiia* as the fastest-growing segment of society (Lewin, 1988). Yet there were (and are) alternative arguments based on more sanguine assessments of the prospects of the Soviet political-economic system or more pessimistic analyses of the consequences of reform. If these views had prevailed, the Soviet reaction to external and internal pressures could have been very different from the Gorbachev approach.

Although we do not understand the precise means by which Gorbachev, rather than his more conservative rivals, came to power, we do have good insight into how the new Soviet leader set about institutionalizing his changes. Basically, he has sought to give civilian reformers a greater role in the determination of military policy. A number of U.S. political scientists have called attention to the importance of civilian control of security policy as a means of countering the military's usual preference for ambitious, offensively oriented strategies (Van Evera, 1983; Snyder, 1984; Posen, 1984). Gorbachev appears to be following the logic of these arguments precisely. He has attempted to institutionalize his new thinking by putting people with military expertise into the Central Committee staff; by relying on civilian scientists as an alternative source of advice on military-technical matters; and by borrowing many ideas from the scholarly community (Litherland, 1986; Parrott, 1988; Lynch, 1989; Evangelista, 1989).

Gorbachev's ambitious disarmament diplomacy has not only seized the initiative from the United States, but also from the Soviet military. As Raymond Garthoff (1985:186) has pointed out, during the SALT period "the initiative in proposing direct limitations on weaponry was reserved in Moscow to the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff, reporting to the Defense Council." Civilians in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Central Committee apparatus were more successful at exerting their influence when responding to U.S. proposals (Garthoff, 1985:186). Now it seems evident that a number of major initiatives are being proposed by Gorbachev's civilian advisers, who are becoming increasingly bold in treading on territory formerly reserved for military specialists—particularly on the topic of conventional-force reductions and restructuring (Kokoshin, 1988*b*; Kokoshin and Larionov, 1988; Legvold, 1988*a*; Snyder, 1988*a*).

The civilians have sought to challenge military expertise by taking advantage of *transnational alliances*. Soviet academic specialists have adopted a

number of ideas concerning "nonprovocative defense" or "defensive defense," mainly, it seems, from West European scholars and peace researchers (Tiedtke, 1986; Zhurkin, Karaganov, and Kortunov, 1987; Kokoshin, 1988a, 1988b; Kokoshin and Larionov, 1988; Dragsdahl, 1988). The alliances have become quite explicit, leading in one case to a joint proposal for a conventional arms control regime—the product of an unlikely collaboration between a Polish and a West German scholar (von Müller and Karkoszka, 1988a, 1988b). Legvold (1988b:121) would probably term such activity "interactive" learning. The important point is not only that Soviet academics learned from their Western counterparts, but that they were able to forge transnational alliances to affect the outcome of domestic political debates (Putnam, 1988).

The links between international relations and domestic politics evident in the Gorbachev period reinforce the emphasis on the interaction between levels of analysis highlighted in the theoretical discussion in the first half of this chapter. In the Soviet Union, we observe a process by which policy entrepreneurs can take advantage of policy windows in the form of economic and military pressure to influence new leaders and contribute to formation of domestic political coalitions in favor of moderation. They appeal to "lessons" of past policy failures and sometimes join transnational alliances to gain further influence in domestic political debates. Proponents of moderation often seek to establish international security regimes in order to constrain the actions of domestic political opponents of moderation. The following section proposes some hypotheses for indicating under what conditions such a course of events is likely to take place.

Hypotheses and Methodology for Future Research

Unlike some areas of social science, the study of Soviet security policy has yielded little in the way of cumulative knowledge. Few scholars have attempted systematically to identify the sources of moderation in Soviet policy. The preceding discussion has not, therefore, been able to present the "findings" of the Soviet studies field on this important topic. Rather, it has suggested on the basis of the historical record how particular theoretical approaches might be applied. This section assembles some of the more promising approaches into a series of hypotheses and suggests how they might be tested.

Simple Tests of Straightforward Hypotheses

The hypotheses that seem most easily tested by quantitative, statistical methods are those that posit a simple relationship between two variables. In

studying negotiations, for example, one can evaluate the extent to which concessions from one side induced concessions from the other side, one can determine the effectiveness of bargaining chips, tit-for-tat strategies, negotiation from strength, and so forth (Jensen, 1962, 1968, 1984, 1988). Assuming that one can develop convincing coding rules for distinguishing and rating concessions and retractions—no mean feat, in any case—this method seems preferable to those that review the negotiating record in a descriptive, un-systematic fashion (Einhorn, 1985; Skinner, 1987).

Some of the assumptions of coalition theory might benefit from rigorous testing by statistical methods. Is it true, for example, as Snyder (1987/1988) has suggested, that a domestic coalition between the military, the heavy industrialists, and the party ideologues is likely to produce an aggressive, expansionist foreign policy, whereas an alliance of the *intelligentsia* and the consumer-industry sector will produce a more moderate, conciliatory policy? If it were possible to determine the nature of the domestic coalition, one could use "event data" to establish correlations between internal and foreign policy, along the lines of Roeder's (1984) study of a related question. The main problem would be in specifying the independent variable—the nature of the domestic coalition. One might, for example, count the number of representatives from a given group (the military, the heavy industrialists, and so on) who are members of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party at a particular time, or the number of articles in the most influential Soviet newspapers and journals that represent the views of a certain institutional interest. Methods that rely on content analysis of the Soviet press or speeches might provide information about attitudes of coalition partners and their likely prominence (Holsti, 1969; Zimmerman and Axelrod, 1981; Phillips and Sands, 1988). Unfortunately, one could never come up with a completely uncontroversial specification of the independent variable, especially given the disagreement in the Soviet studies field about the very applicability of the notion of "interest group" to Soviet politics (Skilling and Griffiths, 1971; Skilling, 1983; Odom, 1976; Hough, 1977). The dependent variable would be more straightforward, in that event data sets have been compiled that specifically identify cooperative and conflictual behavior (see, for example, Azar, 1980), although these have not been above criticism (Howell, 1983; McClelland, 1983).

Some of the popular explanations about the effects of military and economic pressure on Soviet policy could be tested statistically. One could, for instance, relate some indicator of Soviet economic performance (for example, change in growth rate) to an indicator of Soviet behavior in arms negotiations (for example, patterns of concessions and retractions, as in Jensen [1962, 1963, 1968, 1984]); one could compare U.S. force levels to Soviet negotiat-

ing behavior, and so forth. A review of the history of changes in Soviet security policy suggests, however, that such tests might not be particularly revealing (see also Bennett, 1989). The Soviets rarely exhibit consistently conciliatory or conflictual behavior in all aspects of their security policy at the same time, so it seems evident that a gross indicator such as economic growth does not influence each aspect in the same fashion. The same holds true in regard to the relationship between U.S. military programs and Soviet security policy. During the same historical period, the Soviets might respond to some programs by imitation, others by countermeasures, and yet others by ignoring them. The Khrushchev period, with its development of tactical nuclear weapons, its pursuit of missiles and ballistic missile defenses, and its unilateral troop reductions and test moratoria constitutes an especially good example (Evangelista, 1988). Another would be the Brezhnev period, with its limitations on strategic nuclear forces and buildup of conventional forces. For studying the influence of economic stringency as well, one would need a more fine-grained analysis that examined, for example, the effect of troop reductions on the labor force (Tiedtke, 1985), or the trade-offs between production of machine tools and military equipment.

Some aspects of theories that focus on policy entrepreneurs and transnational alliances could be evaluated using quantitative methods. For identifying the issues promoted by policy entrepreneurs, for example, one could code answers to interviews, as Kingdon (1984) did for U.S. health and transportation policy, or, more likely for the Soviet case, one could code published articles. Interviews with Western participants in transnational alliances—members of Pugwash, arms negotiators, or international peace activists, for example—would identify the issues that they pursued with their Soviet counterparts. One could then try systematically to assess the influence of these transnational contacts on the Soviet debate.

If the policy of *glasnost* continues to provide information about the Soviet past and present, a number of explanations for Soviet moderation could be subject to fairly rigorous evaluation. Access to former policymakers would be useful, particularly if archival material becomes available to confirm their recollections. Interviews with former and current policymakers are also more likely than in the past. Understanding Soviet motivations will be further facilitated if foreign policy debates are conducted publicly, for example, in committees of the Supreme Soviet. Opinion surveys of elite-level policy influentials (see, for example, Melville and Nikitin, 1988) as well as the general populace (Carrère d'Encausse, 1987; Ivanov, 1987) could be employed to test explanations that incorporate coalition-building and leaders' perceptions of public opinion, military exigencies, economic stringency, the adversary's behavior, and so forth. Greater availability of information would

benefit pursuit of nonquantitative methods as well. Opening up of historical archives, already beginning for Soviet scholars, would be especially welcome.

Testing Policy-Relevant Hypotheses

It appears unlikely that most of the theoretical approaches that hold implications for U.S. policy could satisfactorily be evaluated by quantitative, statistical methods alone. The actions of policy entrepreneurs, the nature of learning, and the perceptions of conciliatory and conflictual behavior do not seem easily quantifiable. Focused, comparative case studies would be useful here, especially if they identify variables of policy relevance that are subject to influence by actors outside the Soviet Union (Snyder, 1984/1985, 1988*b*).

In order to undertake such studies, one would need hypotheses that link the most promising approaches and focus on policy-relevant variables. The following hypotheses are intended only to be suggestive of the kind that might be useful for such an exercise. They try to link military and economic factors, policy entrepreneurship, domestic Soviet coalitions, learning, bargaining, and regimes.

DETERMINANTS OF SUCCESSFUL POLICY ENTREPRENEURSHIP

The first hypothesis begins with three assumptions: that the definition of the national interest is a political matter; that foreign policy "learning" can be used as a political tool in internal debates over the appropriate policy; and that, in principle, transnational alliances can operate in such a way that the actors on each side influence "domestic interests [to] pressure their respective governments to adopt mutually supportive policies" (Putnam, 1988:444).

1. Policy entrepreneurs who favor moderation in security policy will enhance their chances of implementing their conception of the national interest if, other things being equal, they are able: (a) to form successful transnational alliances with likeminded groups in the adversary's country; (b) to associate hardline policies with past foreign policy failures and make the case that learning from those failures means adopting a more moderate approach; (c) to take advantage of a policy window in the form of a foreign threat that will impose unacceptably high costs if addressed in the usual manner; (d) to identify important trade-offs between military spending and the health of the economy; and (e) to gain the support of a new leader who is open to the possibility of new thinking and new coalition partners.

It would be useful to evaluate this hypothesis through a series of comparative, historical case studies in order to ascertain, for example, whether any or all of these factors must be present in order for moderation in Soviet security

policy to occur. Such a study would help answer some of the key questions about recent changes in Soviet security policy. Was the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative necessary to induce Soviet moderation? Was Gorbachev or someone like him necessary? How poor must Soviet economic performance be before policy entrepreneurs can use it as a justification for restraining military demands? It would also help identify conditions under which transnational alliances succeed (as with scientists who advocated an atmospheric test ban to prevent fallout) or fail (as with the Soviet Union's attempt to pressure Eisenhower to adopt a test ban by siding with Stevenson in 1956). Finally, it would shed light on how Soviet policy entrepreneurs successfully invoke the "lessons" of foreign policy failures to promote change.

DETERMINANTS OF COOPERATIVE AGREEMENTS

The second hypothesis assumes that once a reformist coalition gains enough power to put forward policy initiatives, it will probably seek to solicit cooperative behavior from its adversary because, according to 1.a earlier, reciprocation enhances its chances to pursue a moderate policy.

2. The coalition's choice of bargaining strategy for securing the adversary's cooperation depends on the degree of change it desires and its perception of the constellation of domestic forces in the adversary's country: (a) the coalition is more likely to pursue a tit-for-tat strategy if it favors only modest change toward cooperative arrangements and believes that it can get agreement from the adversary's government without dispelling the adversary's "enemy image" or inducing any change in its balance of domestic interests; (b) it is more likely to pursue a GRIT strategy if it desires radical change and believes that, in order for its initiative to be accepted, it has to dispel the enemy image by appealing to the public or the government's opposition or by shifting the weight of bureaucratic influences within the adversary's government; and (c) if the coalition is unstable and divided over its perception of the adversary, it will not be able to pursue any consistent strategy of reciprocity.

I refer here to tit-for-tat and GRIT as "bargaining strategies" not in terms of formal negotiation, but in the sense that policymakers can use one of the two approaches to induce a certain response by the other side that they can in turn use to influence the character of their domestic coalition. The basic argument is that tit-for-tat reciprocity often leads to agreements based on the "least common denominator," because governments that are uncertain about their preferences between competitive and cooperative strategies, or favor an uneasy mixture, will hesitate to commit themselves to agreements that entail significant cooperation at the expense of short-term interest, especially if obtaining the agreement entails unreciprocated concessions (see Bunn and Payne [1988;223-224] for a related argument). The safer approach is to adopt

tit-for-tat reciprocity. In effect, however, such strict reciprocity can produce tacit collusion between the status quo-oriented factions within the superpowers to avoid meaningful change. In this regard, Axelrod (1984:180–181) has warned that the tit-for-tat strategy, while enhancing beneficial cooperation in some cases, can also be used to promote collusive practices, such as oligopolies. (Keohane [1984:73] has made a similar point in regard to certain types of regimes that result from reciprocity.)

GRIT strategies, by contrast, are deliberately designed to produce outcomes that transform the status quo by reorienting internal coalitions on each side or by transforming the cognitive frameworks of decision makers. Finally, unstable coalitions are likely to be characterized by yet another constellation of images of the adversary and a different bargaining strategy. Here I assume that Alexander George's observations about the United States apply as well to the Soviet Union: that internal Soviet "disagreements over the correct image of the [United States] can call into question the scope as well as the desirability of cooperative arrangements with the [Americans] and reinforce a preference for relying on unilateral policies for assuring [Soviet] security interests" (George, Farley, and Dallin, 1988:660). In other words, an unstable coalition will prefer defection to tit-for-tat reciprocity or GRIT.

Notions of a "least common denominator" appear to underlie criticism that the United States and Soviet Union use the "game of disarmament" as a cover for continuing the arms race (Myrdal, 1978). They seem, as well, to have some empirical support—for example, the Limited Test Ban Treaty that was followed by an accelerated program of underground testing on both sides; the SALT I interim agreements that allowed a proliferation of multiple-warhead (MIRVed) missiles; and the unratified SALT II accord that appeared to endorse the next generation of weapons that each side planned to deploy.

Perhaps understandably, we have fewer examples of successful GRIT strategies to enable us to evaluate their domestic causes and consequences. The conclusion of the Austrian State Treaty in 1955 would, however, appear to support the hypothesis (Larson, 1987). Khrushchev evidently believed that the Soviet Union needed to make significant concessions in order to get the U.S. government to agree to a cooperative settlement. In the event, Soviet concessions contributed to a reordering of bureaucratic influence in the U.S. government, diminishing the objections of the U.S. military that had often constituted a veto over proposals for cooperation, for example, on disarmament (Evangelista, 1990a). Khrushchev's ability to make concessions in turn depended on a reshuffling of his own domestic coalition and the defeat of his rivals (Larson, 1987:40–46). The outcome of the treaty was certainly a profound change: it entailed, among other things, the end of four-power military occupation of Austria and a guarantee of its neutrality. The value of testing

this hypothesis would lie in further specifying the conditions under which GRIT could lead to meaningful U.S.–Soviet security cooperation, perhaps, if necessary, by counterfactual analyses of failed attempts.

PROSPECTS FOR A SECURITY REGIME

The third hypothesis assumes that cooperation that is institutionalized in the form of an international regime is likely to be more enduring than ad hoc agreements.

3. The type of bargaining strategy that a state employs in attempting to establish a regime helps determine the character and longevity of the regime: (a) a regime that results from a tit-for-tat strategy is more likely to codify the status quo than to produce significant change; it will tend to be limited and relatively fragile because, according to 2a above, the coalition that sponsored it has not abandoned competitive policies in its pursuit of modest cooperative measures, and has not had to generate consensus beyond the government itself; and (b) a regime that results from a GRIT strategy will produce more significant change and will prove more durable because, according to 2b above, it was formed by altering the enemy image of the adversary and changing the structure of the domestic coalitions on both sides.

These hypotheses appear to find support in the legacy of the SALT treaties. As Rice (1988) points out, the main objective of establishing a “limited security regime” was the desire of both sides to codify mutual deterrence and nuclear parity. Yet owing to the ambiguous nature of parity, they also tacitly agreed to continue pursuit of new weapons that could raise the specter of an attempt to achieve a military advantage. In game theoretic terms, the situation seemed to reflect the generalization that “the key conditions for the successful operation of reciprocity are that mutual cooperation can yield better results than mutual defection, but that temptations for defection also exist” (Axelrod and Keohane, 1985:244). The demise of the regime, and of U.S.–Soviet détente in general, came about “because each side concluded that the other was not practicing reciprocity, but was, on the contrary, taking unilateral advantage of its own restraint” (Axelrod and Keohane, 1985:245). This conclusion is not surprising for a regime that imposed so few concrete or meaningful restraints in any case. As for the domestic aspect, the consensus on the U.S. side was so fragile that even arms negotiators such as Edward Rowney (and earlier Paul Nitze) broke ranks before SALT II was signed (Talbot, 1979). In the end the treaty was never ratified.

The Austrian State Treaty again provides the clearest example of an agreement that established an enduring regime. Neither side has sought to challenge Austria’s neutrality, and a country that seemed so contentious in the Cold War atmosphere of the mid-1950s was hardly noticed during the subse-

quent ups and downs of the U.S.–Soviet relationship. Another possible candidate to support the second part of the hypothesis is the INF treaty. It entailed significant concessions on the Soviet side that resembled a GRIT strategy, and it probably required the advent of a leader who, in assembling a new political coalition, could reduce the influence of the Soviet military as an institution (Evangelista, 1989; Snyder, 1987/1988). The structure of the U.S. domestic coalition changed as well with the departure of inveterate hardliners such as Richard Perle; and President Reagan, at least, abandoned his enemy image of the Soviet Union as the evil empire. Finally, the treaty's terms are unambiguous, in that they entail the complete destruction of two classes of weapons worldwide.

It is premature to speak of the INF treaty as establishing a new security regime. Some of its provisions—particularly on-site verification—do, however imply a convergence of expectations and norms concerning the positive relationship between openness and security, as a number of Soviet analysts have suggested (Zhurkin, Karaganov, and Kortunov, 1987; Zubok, 1988; Shevardnadze, 1988). One could also argue that the INF treaty has begun to constrain unilateral decision making in ways that a regime would do: NATO finds it difficult to agree on “modernization” of nuclear weapons that are not limited by the treaty, because such action would appear to undercut the spirit if not the letter of the document. The Soviet Union, in turn, finds it increasingly necessary to address concerns about its offensively oriented conventional forces, because the INF treaty has raised the specter of “denuclearization” of Europe and called attention to disparities at the conventional level.

None of the three sets of hypotheses proposed here needs to be restricted to the U.S.–Soviet security relationship. It is reasonable to assume that factors such as the influence of new leaders, the ability of actors to forge transnational alliances, and the way entrepreneurs invoke “lessons” in support of preferred policies will differ from country to country, based on divergent political cultures and domestic structures (presumably they differ between the United States and the Soviet Union). All the same, however, the plausibility of these hypotheses would be strengthened if they found support for other sets of countries, and—with some modifications—even in other issue-areas.

Conclusions

The paucity of systematic research on the sources of change in Soviet security policy rules out neat prescriptions for U.S. policymakers. There are, however, a number of observations that follow from this review of the existing evidence that may be of value. The first is that many of the most straightfor-

ward policy prescriptions, such as "negotiate from strength," do not find empirical support across a range of cases over time. If both sides pursue negotiation from strength, they are unlikely to find much to negotiate about. Indeed, many U.S. proponents of the policy appear skeptical of negotiations with the Soviet Union and believe that U.S. strength in itself will yield the desired outcome. Yet there is no body of evidence to support the notion that an unrelentingly hostile U.S. posture will induce Soviet moderation. A more narrowly defined conception of negotiation from strength that focuses on the role of bargaining chips in achieving arms treaties may be useful, but more systematic research is necessary to assess its real value. More often than not, one would expect bargaining chips to take on a life of their own and develop constituencies in both countries that resist cashing them in (Lynn-Jones, 1988). Negotiation from strength is not an automatic mechanism that functions independently from the internal politics on each side.

Beliefs that deterioration of the Soviet economy will inevitably produce moderation in Soviet security policy reflect an equally mechanistic view of the Soviet Union and a neglect of the political dimension of Soviet economic decisions. In a similar sense, explanations for Soviet security policy that focus on changing Soviet military requirements narrowly defined also miss the fundamentally political nature of debates over resource allocation and "how much is enough." Trade-offs between guns and butter—or, more accurately, among investment, consumption, and military spending—are a permanent fixture of the Soviet economy. The ability of the economy to sustain high military spending is not an objective judgment, but rather a matter of internal political debate. The willingness of society to put up with a large military burden is influenced, no doubt, by levels of education, urbanization, and material expectations. Yet even democracies with large, educated, and relatively affluent middle classes (for example, Chile) have succumbed to authoritarian rule, sometimes with dangerous consequences for foreign policy (for example, Argentina in the Falklands/Malvinas War). Regardless of the state of the Soviet economy, one should never rule out the possibility of an authoritarian leadership pursuing a militaristic course at home and abroad.

Perhaps the most definite conclusion one can draw from this review is that U.S. policymakers should be sensitive to the potential diversity of opinion on security matters in the Soviet Union (Payne, 1980; Schwartz, 1978; Melville and Nikitin, 1988; Utkin, 1988). U.S. actions are not unambiguously interpreted by the other side. They become "evidence" for debates between opponents and proponents of cooperation. Soviet actions are subject to debate at home as well. They are interpreted as successes or failures, depending in part on how they are received abroad; they become the "lessons" that are learned and promoted by actual or prospective members of domestic political coalitions.

At any given point in time, it is not easy for an outside observer to assess the balance of political forces in the Soviet Union. Perhaps in retrospect it is possible to recognize lost opportunities for supporting moderates, such as Malenkov or, at times, Khrushchev. Given the ambiguities and uncertainties about links between U.S. behavior and the fortunes of those promoting Soviet restraint, however, it is unclear how much U.S. policy can influence the Soviet Union in the direction of moderation. It is probably more certain that the West could inhibit Soviet changes if, in Snyder's (1987/1988:131) words, it "creates an environment that is inhospitable to their survival." As David Holloway (1979:31) put it, "if the West seeks restraint, co-operation and effective arms control from the Soviet Union, then it must adopt these policies itself and at least provide for the possibility that the Soviet Union may pursue them too."

As our information about the internal politics of Soviet security policy increases—through historical research as well as the growing openness of the Soviet system—we may be able to recognize more clearly the possibilities for establishing transnational alliances in support of cooperation and moderation. If these alliances are based on shared norms and expectations, they may help to establish enduring regimes and institutions to promote mutual security. Whether or not these opportunities are pursued, however, depends as much on how Americans define their own national interests as on changes in the Soviet Union.

Notes

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