The West German Peace Movement

Gert Krell; Harald Muller; Matthew Evangelista; Jeffrey Herf

Correspondence

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To the Editors:

I agree with Jeffrey Herf ("War, Peace, and the Intellectuals: The West Ger-
man Peace Movement," *IS*, Vol. 10, No. 4 [Spring 1986], pp. 172–200) that
there was strong opposition in West Germany to the deployment of Pershing
II and cruise missiles. (There was strong opposition in other West European
countries as well, even some with no peace research institutes.) However, I
regard Herf's analysis of the political process in Germany as highly mislead-
ing.

My disagreements begin first with Herf's description of the movements
and institutions that formed the core of that opposition. It is a mistake to
focus exclusively on the new left if one wants to understand the depth of
sentiment in the peace movement. I see a much broader coalition and social
basis underlying that sentiment, which included the old anti-military or pro-
peace left (very small or tiny groups: the Communists, Communist-influ-
enced and non-Communist peace groups), the new left springing from the
student movement of the 1960s, the ecological movement (which is by no
means identical to the new left although there is some overlap), the churches
or Christian groups, and the SPD and FDP left. This very heterogeneous
coalition gradually united on only one issue: preventing deployment of new
missiles in Germany. The debate in the churches in particular, which had
nothing to do with capitalism or anti-capitalism, is an important link missing
from Herf's frame of analysis.

Secondly, Herf has magnified the size and influence of the peace research
institutions in West Germany out of all proportion. His statement that these
institutes support "several hundred 'counter-experts'" is a grandiose fantasy.
About 120 to 150 people in West Germany regard themselves as peace re-
searchers; about 40 of these work in peace research institutes. About 20 to
30 deal at least to some extent with defense and arms control issues, and not

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all of them see themselves as counter-experts. Altogether, 15 to 20 peace researchers wrote books and articles about the deployment issue. Of course, many other scholars and scientists expressed opinions on these issues, but they were in no way supported by or connected with peace research money or institutions.

Furthermore, Herf oversimplifies and mischaracterizes the views and roles of the institutions and people he describes. He suggests a unity of purpose that would be something like lumping Sam Nunn, Gary Hart, Edward Kennedy, and Ronald Dellums all in the same category, just because they are Democrats. For example, Bahro and Baudissin have little more in common than the capital "B" in their names. As for the SPD, one must be careful to distinguish between arms controllers such as Karsten Voigt and unilateralists such as Oskar Lafontaine. The peace researchers, whom Herf describes as a well-organized anti-defense intelligentsia, had and still have quite different views about the INF double-track decision and about the LRTNF balance in Europe. Count Baudissin, then director of the Hamburg institute, favored the double-track decision, as did Klaus von Schubert, the new director at Heidelberg, who was previously a professor at a Bundeswehr university. Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker, the director of the Starnberg institute, opposed land-basing, but not other forms of deployment. The Frankfurt institute was divided on the issue. The most active opposition came from former colonel of the West German air force and former CSU member Alfred Mechtersheimer, who founded his own Institute of Peace Politics, which is not state-subsidized but supported by hundreds of rank-and-file members.

Herf depicted our Frankfurt institute as one of the centers of the campaign against deployment, saying that we alone wrote 170 articles, reports, etc. in the critical years. He fails to tell his readers, however, that only a mere fraction of these articles dealt with the INF decision or military affairs in general, and he does not report what these articles say. The most detailed analysis of the whole matter, which I wrote myself, included all the elements that Herf would expect to be missing in the work of a state-subsidized and politicized peace researcher: the blame for the decision was not laid upon the Americans, various rationales for the double-track decision were laid out, as were perceptions of the Soviet threat including Soviet motivation and strategy, and the military balance was not portrayed as favorable to the West.

Herf's assessment of the theoretical background and development of peace research is also inadequate. He asserts that peace research was following a

program set out by Dieter Senghaas and Johan Galtung, which guided the activities of the national research programs and of all the other institutes. Although I think highly of both Senghaas and Galtung, this gives too much credit to their ideas and not enough to the individuality and independence of other peace researchers. Senghaas and Galtung were very influential in the early 1970s, but their writings have served as stimulants *and* challenges. Galtung's concept of "structural violence" has remained controversial to this day, and I know of no one in the discipline who supports the particular version that Herf quotes. As for Senghaas's theory of the arms race and critique of deterrence, several books and articles by peace researchers have also dealt *critically* with his theories, theorems, and findings, many of them by members of the Frankfurt institute which so greatly benefitted from his personal and intellectual presence. To support his views, Herf quotes German political scientists and sociologists, but readers should be aware that these sources were carefully selected. Regarding the demise of the DGFK, the *Deutsche Gesellschaft für Friedens- und Konfliktforschung*, which fell victim to feuding *within* the CDU/CSU rather than to conservative opposition in general (the new government continues to fund peace research, although through the *Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft*, DFG, the largest national research foundation in Germany), Herf cites a report by Professor Arndt, who concluded that peace research in Germany was heavily influenced by Marxist ideas. Herf does not note that Arndt's report was regarded as unreliable by many scholars and politicians of different political convictions nor that Arndt's methodology was considered highly questionable. In addition, the DGFK was never the type of political organization that Herf alleges, and it had become virtually defunct by the early 1980s which would have left it unable to mobilize political sentiment, even if it had wanted to. It is also not true that the DGFK did not fund projects on the Soviet Union in the years of détente.

Even if Herf's analysis of the social basis of the peace movement and the size and content of peace research were correct, which it is not, that still would not explain why things happened the way they did. This brings me to my major point of criticism, Herf's theoretical framework, which sounds too much like conspiracy theory. The agents are there: Willy Brandt, the new left, the peace researchers. There is the object of manipulation: a volatile public opinion, susceptible to rapid movement. And there is the goal of the manipulation. In essence, as Herf tells it, the intellectuals made the peace

movement. This is, however, a strange view of the political process: people need agents to tell them what to think, and the agents need super-agents to tell them what to think.

Herf's analysis, furthermore, does not take account of the counterweights. I mentioned above that one of the major agents, the peace researchers, were much more divided than Herf asserts. There was also continued support for the double-track decision in many newspapers, among political scientists, and in the more traditional research institutions, and the government published leaflets and brochures in enormous quantities. This raises major theoretical questions. Why did so many young people choose to believe *some* peace researchers and not others? Why did they believe the critics and not the supporters of the decision among the politicians? Why did they follow certain interpretations and not others? Furthermore, why did people not choose these interpretations when they were first offered? The first detailed critical analysis of flexible response by von Weizsäcker's group was published around 1970, as was Dieter Senghaas's critique of deterrence, and they did not create the slightest stir in the public at large. Herf's critical mass, the neo-Marxist students, were not interested in defense at all throughout the 1970s, while the environmentalists focussed their concern almost exclusively on the debate about nuclear energy. All the concerted efforts of peace research were in vain at the time. When the peace movement suddenly sprang up in the early eighties, it became very popular with the general public, a group that is not likely to follow Marxist or neo-Marxist lines of argument.

All of this leads me to look for a different interpretation. My preferred structural analysis starts with the inherent dilemmas of West German defense policy, dilemmas that have determined much of the FRG's postwar history and appear in different manifestations. The first is the dilemma between deterrence and defense. The Germans want deterrence, but they want it as pure as possible, since Germany is extremely vulnerable, for geographic, strategic, and ecological reasons. Of course, there is no such thing as pure deterrence, so the dilemma starts there. The second is the alliance dilemma, which has two sides: "will the U.S. risk Chicago in order to save Frankfurt?" and "will the U.S. risk Frankfurt to save Chicago?" This is not a particular German or even left-wing problem; France decided, for example, that it did not want to live with that dilemma. The third is the dilemma of defense versus détente. The Germans want to deter the Russians, but they do not want to provoke them either, again for obvious strategic, but also for historical reasons. Germany has a long history of confrontation with the Russians, full of mutual terror, pain, and suffering. The politics that have set these two

nations against each other in two wars of annihilation, however, no longer find favor in this country.

Even with these dilemmas, defense policy in West Germany was supported by a strong consensus which lasted from the early 1960s to the late 1970s. Any major decision on nuclear issues, however, would have put the FRG's political system under strain, even under favorable circumstances. A decision to deploy modern long-range ballistic and cruise missiles was *bound* to direct people's attention to the inherent dilemmas of our defense policy, and the circumstances under which this happened were not at all favorable to such a critical decision. Détente and arms control—which have been and remain popular in West Germany—had become a serious crisis, leading to heightened fears of war. The harsh rhetoric of the Reagan Administration contributed to a sharp decline in trust for Germany's main ally. (The polls show a strong correlation between that decline in trust in U.S. leadership and the increasing opposition against deployment.) And all this—a sudden awakening to the dilemmas of West Germany's defense policy under most unfavorable conditions—happened to a generation that had become not so much neo-Marxist (that was in the 1960s) as post-materialistic—caring for the environment, better social relations, less formality, etc.

Altogether, Herf's analysis is not convincing, either empirically or theoretically, and I have not even challenged his basic assumptions about defense and security. But I also get the impression that a need for his type of explanation exists in the United States. Conspiracy theory did play a role in the West German deployment debate, and it served an important function as an escape from the dilemmas of our defense policy, from puzzling questions about the Soviet role and about West Germany's own contribution to the decision. Conspiracy theory also serves important functions in the U.S. One of them is to repress awareness of the many ways in which the U.S. itself contributed to the demise of the defense consensus in West Germany. In a recent paper, K.-Peter Stratmann (whom Herf regards as "one of West Germany's foremost strategic thinkers"; I agree, and Stratmann is definitely not a friend of peace research in general) says that Soviet responsibility for the demise of détente was largely underestimated in the German debate, which I think is true. Stratmann continues, in considerable detail, that one should not fail to appreciate to what extent U.S. policy at the time contributed to an alarmist negative view of the Reagan Administration in West Germany.[1]

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1. K.–Peter Stratmann, "Gefährdungen westlicher Sicherheit: Entwicklungsperspektiven der NATO und Aspekte der deutsch–amerikanischen Sicherheitsbeziehung," in Uwe Nerlich and

Stratmann sees an interaction between a hypersensitivity in West Germany toward any specific discussion of problems of war-fighting and a strong insensitivity of the American political process, particularly in the early eighties, toward West Germany's defense dilemmas. If people marching in the streets had read anything about the context of deployment, it was more likely to have been Caspar Weinberger's statements about "prevailing in nuclear war" or Keith Payne and Colin Gray's article "Victory Is Possible" rather than Senghaas, Galtung, or von Weizsäcker.

In conclusion, I would like to point to another interaction in U.S.–West German relations. Parts of the German left and the U.S. right seem to have forged a strange symbiosis of mutually reinforcing conspiracy theories. It is a polarization that results from projected fears. There is no chance for dialogue until the German left takes fear of the Soviet Union more seriously (particularly since it does take Soviet fears seriously) and the American right takes fear of war more seriously (particularly since it holds on so strongly to weapons as a protection). To say that the non-Communist left in Germany (and the left in West Germany is essentially non-Communist) is against Western security is as stupid as to say that the American right is for nuclear war. This is a sterile debate, we certainly can do better.

—Gert Krell
Frankfurt, West Germany

To the Editors:

In your spring 1986 issue, Jeffrey Herf analyzed West German peace research and its influence on the peace movement. I find this article seriously flawed for several reasons: it neglects the evolution of peace research in the 1970s; it distorts the character and history of the most important funding institution, the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Friedens- und Konfliktforschung (DGFK); it has serious methodological shortcomings; it relies on a kind of conspiracy theory which has no justification in reality; and it is politically dangerous because it offers a scapegoat for a complex problem which must be addressed much more deeply. In the following remarks, I try to set the record straight on the first two flaws and to give some evidence on the other three.

James A. Thomson, eds., *Das Verhältnis zur Sowjetunion: Zur politischen Strategie der Vereinigten Staaten und der Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (Baden–Baden: Nomos, 1986), pp. 281–310.

When peace research began on a broad scale in my country in the late 1960s and early 1970s, research on security issues was in itself, except for some eminent personalities, a virgin area. As a consequence, most people engaging in peace research and joining the recently founded institutes were fairly young. Their university education occurred during a period that was characterized by four major events: the Vietnam War which, to a certain extent, destroyed the image of the United States as a completely benign protector; the buildup of the Minuteman and Polaris/Poseidon fleets which created the impression that the arms race was fueled mainly by the U.S. (an impression supported by many American writers on security affairs); the deadlock in German Ostpolitik in the 1960s, which made détente a viable and necessary policy option; and the Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia, which reinforced the strong anti-Soviet undercurrent among Germans. Due to this fourfold experience, young peace researchers found the hypotheses of critical peace research somewhat appealing. But far from adopting them at face value, many started, in the early and mid-1970s, to test them against reality, to modify and refute them. (This description applies to, among others, Gert Krell and myself, and, indeed, to Dieter Senghaas himself.) As a result, by the end of the 1970s, West German peace research was a highly pluralistic community with a large variety of approaches, methods, and views—a far cry from the kind of cadre party with an anti-NATO program suggested by Herf.

The Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF), the German name of which is the Hessische Stiftung Friedens- und Konfliktforschung (throughout his paper, Herf never succeeds in understanding that both names mean the same institution), was and is a mirror of this pluralism. Some PRIF researchers hold to the ideas of critical peace research; some do not. Consequently, the 170 pieces done by PRIF between 1980 and 1983 (which Herf, in an attempt to conduct quantitative content analysis without reading contents, quotes as evidence of his conspiracy theory) contain vastly different approaches. These include, among others, a lengthy article by E.O. Czempel and others, in which the idea, widespread in the West German peace movement, that the U.S. administration had a master plan for making war in Europe, was thoroughly refuted; a careful study by G. Krell on the pros and cons of the INF double-track decision; and a study by H.-J. Schmidt and myself disproving the allegation, again popular among peace movement followers, that the new third runway for the Frankfurt airport was forced upon the government of Hesse by the U.S. military. I could go on with this list, but suffice it to state

that quoting a number from a publication list is not sound social science. The contents of our work were not what Herf believes it to be.

The evolution of peace research was paralleled by the evolution of the DGFK. As the 1970s came to a close, the DGFK was practicing a highly pluralistic policy of research support. The Frankfurt and Hamburg institutes were among the receivers, as well as Karl Kaiser's institute of the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik at Bonn and the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik at Ebenhausen. Indeed, when Bavaria started its campaign of withdrawal from the DGFK in the late 1970s, other CDU state governments showed some indignation, because it was felt that earlier misgivings about the DGFK had been dealt with and that the institution was in good shape. Considerable arm-twisting on the side of Strauss and his government was required to bring the Saarland or Berlin into line.

This point brings me to Herf's main source, the review of West German peace research by Hans–Joachim Arndt, which Herf quotes extensively and also uses as a source for secondhand quotes. The story is as follows. When the Bavarian government, in 1979, had decided to withdraw from the DGFK and when the announcement of this decision had drawn criticism from its own sister party, it looked for some ex post facto justification. Several prominent West German academicians were offered a decent honorarium to conduct a review study of the DGFK that would support the Bavarian decision. To their credit, the best minds among West German conservative political scientists turned down the offer; they found no merit in doing a study whose results were predetermined by a state government. Eventually, Munich found a Professor Arndt in Heidelberg, whose work in the security field was known to virtually no one. Arndt, while failing to meet academic standards, at least satisfied the wishes of his customer by producing a devastating account of the DGFK's history. There is not enough space here to quote, in extenso, the many criticisms of Arndt's study, at least some of which one would have expected Herf to have read. Let me give just one example. Arndt discovered that a majority of DGFK projects followed Marxist, neo-Marxist, and "autismus"-theory approaches in analyzing Western foreign and security policy. In this number, he included at least three projects in Frankfurt that concluded that these approaches were basically wrong and had not explained the foreign policy phenomena studied.

Likewise, Arndt's allegation, repeated by Herf, that the DGFK never supported research on the Soviet Union was simply wrong. For example, the DGFK supported, with more than a million Deutschmarks, a study at PRIF on the Soviet economy and military, which resulted, among other things, in

one of the finest studies ever done on the Soviet offensive military strategy in central Europe (done by the late Stephan Tiedtke). The reason for this discrepancy is that Arndt used the same deficient "methodology" as Herf: counting from publication lists rather than reading through the publications.

In 1983, the Federal Ministry for Research and Technology entrusted a review of the DGFK to Germany's most respected academic body, the Wissenschaftsrat. Its commission on the DGFK, while being mildly critical of some of the early practices of DGFK funding policy, implicitly refuted Arndt's conclusions. The Wissenschaftsrat recommended the transfer of DGFK's task to the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, but strongly supported the continued funding of peace research. The recommendation for the transfer was based on the assessment that, given the present political cleavage in West Germany, the necessary political consensus for the DGFK no longer existed; it was not based on any misgivings about DGFK activities over the last years. Indeed, the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, with the support of the federal government, now commands a fund explicitly devoted to peace research, which is equal in size to the amount formerly distributed by the DGFK. Characteristically, neither the Wissenschaftsrat document nor the charter of the new peace research fund in the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft are quoted by Herf.

This is, I admit, a polemical letter. The reason for my sharp tone is that Herf's article with its political denunciation makes it harder for those of us who have, during the difficult early 1980s, fought against anti-Americanism in the peace movement and who strive for better mutual understanding between Americans and Germans and for an intensified transatlantic dialogue among security experts. Herf's article will create distrust, among those readers who take him seriously, against people connected with German peace research, and will thereby make a badly needed dialogue more difficult to achieve. Moreover, by grossly overstating the influence of a minority of German academicians on a movement counting, at its height, some millions of mainly young people, Herf has ingeniously devised an easy way out of the "successor generation" problem: just close some institutes and relegate some maverick professors from universities. The fabrication of this cheap scapegoat could tempt some people to forget about NATO's continuing complex and difficult task: to strive for the development of a more convincing and supportable defense posture and doctrine and to justify and explain NATO strategy and policy to the general public. There is even greater danger that those in the U.S. administration, who in the early 1980s contributed considerably to public anxiety by ill-advised statements on Western strategy,

could find justification for repeating this exercise once they convince themselves that all the harm was done by the manipulator of the German masses: the peace researcher.

To summarize, by exposing this piece of insufficient scholarship to a broader public, the editors of *International Security* have rendered a disservice to four different parties: to its readers, who, expecting the usual high quality of *IS* contributions, end up misled and misinformed by this one; to West German peace researchers committed to serious research, who might now have to fight uphill battles in order to regain the confidence of their U.S. partners; to Herf himself, whose reputation among my compatriots will decline sharply; and to the reputation of *International Security* for being an impartial and high-quality source of security research.

—Harald Müller
Brussels, Belgium

To the Editors:

During the past several years that I've been reading *International Security*, I have been impressed by the high standards its editors maintain. Although the articles represent a wide range of views, they generally share a commitment to intellectual integrity and scholarly standards of evidence. The publication of Jeffrey Herf's article, "War, Peace, and the Intellectuals: The West German Peace Movement," in my view constitutes a breach of those standards.

Not that an article on West German peace research is unwelcome. On the contrary, because such a small portion of the work of these authors is available in English translation, a critical discussion of their main findings would be quite useful. Herf's article, however, presents a distorted view of peace research, by substituting insinuation for evidence and by a serious disregard for facts. I will confine my comments to three examples: Herf's attempt to portray Johan Galtung as a proponent of violence; his contention that peace research institutes served as centers for organizing the popular campaign against the NATO two-track decision; and his claim that West German peace researchers enforce a "taboo" on scholarly discussion of the Soviet Union's role in world politics.

I am not an expert on European peace research. One needs only, however, an appreciation of the basic criteria of scholarly argumentation to recognize the extent to which Herf has ignored them. Consider, for example, his

treatment of Johan Galtung. Herf begins a paragraph with the statement that "In the late 1960s, Galtung gave critical peace research some of its key words: 'negative' vs. 'positive peace,' 'structural violence' and 'counter-violence.'" In a footnote, Herf refers to Galtung's book, *Struckturelle Gewalt* (p. 181). This is the last time Herf cites Galtung, although the next two paragraphs purport to discuss his work. The next paragraph begins "Galtung greatly expanded the concept of what should be called violence." It then summarizes a number of views that the reader supposes to be Galtung's, ending with the quotation that "the short term losses due to personal violence appear very small in relation to the permanent losses that result from structural violence" (p. 182). The reader looks to the footnote to find out where Galtung made this claim. The footnote says "Ibid.," with no page reference. The reader looks to the previous footnote and finds four works cited, none of which is by Galtung. Where do all this paragraph's quotations, implying Galtung's support for violence, come from? The reader has no way of knowing.

In the following paragraph as well, Herf implicitly attributes a number of views to Galtung, by arguing that "'counter-violence' (Gegengewalt), especially by the Vietnamese, Cuban, and other communist states and movements in the Third World, was legitimated as a reasonable response to previously existing violence" (p. 182). The source for this claim? The same "Ibid.," again with no page reference or citation of a specific work. The paragraph clearly implies that this statement represents Galtung's view, as the next sentence concludes: "The combination of de-legitimation of Western defense efforts with rationalizations for military preparations and activities of the adversaries of Western democracies remained an enduring focus of interest among critical peace researchers, though it was not always expressed with Galtung's pristine, moralistic radicalism" (p. 182). But how does the reader know what views Galtung actually expressed, if Herf only paraphrases him at second and third-hand? One would never learn from the text of Herf's article what he only admits in a footnote—that in fact "Galtung himself did not advocate revolutionary violence" (p. 182, fn. 16).

A more obvious abuse of evidence comes when Herf attempts to blame West German peace research institutes for popular European opposition to the NATO two-track decision: "Peace research institutes were centers for the campaign directed against the decision. From 1980 to 1983, associates of the Hessische Stiftung für Friedens und Konfliktforschung [sic] alone wrote over 170 essays, research reports, longer studies, and short comments for a periodical report dealing with current political issues published by the institute" (p. 193). The implication of this statement is that associates of HSFK wrote

170 pieces that had something to do with the missile decision, presumably in organizing opposition to it. What is Herf's evidence? Two lists of HSFK publications. The first, issued in February 1984, was evidently not available to the editors or referees of Herf's article. If so, they would have seen that the institute's publications cover a spectrum of topics, including the oil crisis, the war in Afghanistan, U.S. foreign trade policy, the ecology movement, and nuclear nonproliferation. Only a fraction of the publications have anything to do with the two-track missile decision. Those that do—such as Gert Krell's "The Debate About LRTNF Modernization—A Case for Arms Control"—are hardly the stuff of street-demonstration slogans. The reader can find no support for Herf's claim in this list. Much less so in the second list, which covers the institute's publications from 1971 to 1979 and was issued in 1979. This list can obviously not support a claim about institute activities "[f]rom 1980 to 1983," as any reader or editor should recognize.

Even a cursory look at the index to the 1979 publication list from the Hessische Stiftung Friedens- und Konfliktforschung demonstrates that another central contention of Herf's article is completely false. He maintains that peace researcher Dieter Senghaas, in his book *Abschreckung und Frieden* [Deterrence and Peace], "set the pattern for subsequent 'critical peace research' in containing no substantial discussion of the 'institutions, strategies and social order' of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact." "Senghaas," Herf repeats, "set a pattern for 'critical peace research' by providing a theoretically elaborated taboo on scholarly engagement with the Soviet Union as an autonomous actor in world politics" (p. 184). This is nonsense, as Herf's own reference in footnote 38 reveals. The HSFK *Publikationen 1971–1979, Gesamtverzeichnis* lists over thirty publications having to do with the USSR and Eastern Europe. It also reveals that throughout that period, and to the present, the institute has sponsored a working group on "socialist countries." The group's publications address questions of Soviet bureaucracy, human-rights policy, militarism, arms control, military strategy, and economics, among others. Its books include the late Stephan Tiedtke's studies of the Warsaw Pact and Soviet arms control policy.

Rather than treat the Soviet Union as "an afterthought," as Herf charges, or as an object "responding to the active and dominant subject, the United States" (p. 184), German peace researchers devoted a great deal of attention to the nature of Soviet society and to the sources of Soviet military policy and what some of them call "red militarism." Contrary to Herf's contention, Senghaas himself encouraged this study. In his own work, he argued not that the USSR responded to U.S. initiatives, but the opposite. The "qualitative

arms race," Senghaas maintained, "is in no way forced upon the socialist societies." Rather, they "engage in it autonomously, [with] consequences for the political power apparatus as well as for technological progress that are comparable to those in capitalist countries."[1] In order to evaluate this contention, Senghaas, who was not himself a specialist on the USSR, invited foreign scholars to spend time at HSFK to try to assess the applicability of the "autism" model to the USSR. Some of them found, contrary to Senghaas's expectations, that the Soviet Union exhibited greater sensitivity to Western initiatives than Senghaas's explanation implied.[2] Such work was translated into German and became part of a wide-ranging debate during the 1970s on the nature of Soviet military power. Many of the key contributions were published in the collection *Die Rüstung der Sowjetunion*,[3] edited by Dieter Lutz, another peace researcher who comes under attack from Herf for paying insufficient attention to the Soviet menace. Much of the German work on the USSR is historical in approach (contrary to another of Herf's unfounded claims), seeking the sources of militarism in the early years of the Soviet regime, and often presenting critiques derived from a Marxist perspective.[4] Other researchers, including those at Frankfurt's HSFK, adopt approaches more familiar to American scholars, including "bean-counting."[5] The variety of approaches and points of view provides for lively debate, even within the bounds of a fairly small peace research community. Until Herf learns more about the work of these researchers, he should confine his remarks to what he does know, and say nothing.

Jeffrey Herf has a right to argue that Europeans who support arms control constitute an "anti-defense intelligentsia" (p. 192) and that peace researchers support violence, inspire anti-missile demonstrations, and ignore the Soviet Union. But he should provide evidence in an honest fashion that conforms to scholarly standards, so that his readers can assess for themselves the validity of his claims. Without such evidence, a number of journals would

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1. *Rüstung und Militarismus* (Armament and Militarism) (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 1972), p. 18.
2. See, for example, David Holloway, "Technology and Political Decision in Soviet Armaments Policy," *Journal of Peace Research*, No. 4 (1974).
3. Dieter Lutz, ed., *Die Rüstung der Sowjetunion* (The Armament of the Soviet Union) (Baden–Baden: Nomos, 1979).
4. See, for example, Ulrich Albrecht, "Red Militarism," *Journal of Peace Research*, No. 2 (1980).
5. See, for example, Hans–Joachim Schmidt, *The Conventional Arms Race in Europe*, a joint occasional paper of the Cornell Peace Studies Program and the HSFK, June 1985, a translation of part of Schmidt and Krell, *Der Rüstungswettlauf in Europa*.

nevertheless publish his article. I was surprised to see the present editors of *International Security* do so, and I hope that in the future they will adhere to the standards that have made their journal the best of its kind.

—Matthew Evangelista
Ann Arbor, Michigan

The Author Replies:

In "War, Peace, and the Intellectuals," I presented the thesis that ideas and institutions that had developed over the previous decade and a half in West Germany were an indispensable cause of the opposition to the NATO double-track decision of 1979 and then to missile deployments in fall 1983. Peace research and peace research institutes were an important component of this network of ideas and institutions, which also included the two most widely read weekly news magazines, some leading publishers, leading national literary figures, some of the most powerful leaders of the Social Democratic Party, and a host of less well-known institutions whose audience was primarily university graduates or those still in school. Notwithstanding the critics' objections, I stand by my original conviction that it is a valid and well-documented thesis that properly draws our attention to those with the ability and the power to interpret and give meaning to events and to diffuse such interpretations into public discussion.

The article does have several minor errors. From the criticisms made by Krell, Müller, and Evangelista, I will focus on four separate but overlapping issues. They are: first, Galtung's views on structural violence; second, the boundaries around and pluralism within peace research and its contribution to the opposition to the NATO 1979 decision and subsequent deployments; third, the work of "critical peace research" on the Soviet Union; and fourth, the difference between conspiracy theories and studies of the role of ideas and intellectuals in political life.

First, Matthew Evangelista complains that "[t]he reader has no way of knowing" the source of the quotations I cite from Galtung concerning "structural violence" and related concepts. Note 16 on p. 182 should refer to Galtung's *Strukturelle Gewalt*, p. 30. Notes 17 and 18 refer to the same essay, "Violence, Peace and Peace Research," in *Strukturelle Gewalt* but should include specific references to pages 30–31 in the same essay. An "ibid." was left out of note 16. I apologize to any readers who may have been confused by this error, but my source does indeed exist and properly supports my argument.

I also regret to note that in translation and summary of Galtung's expansion of the concept of violence, I erroneously placed quotation marks around the statement attributed as a direct quotation of Galtung that "the short term losses due to personal violence appear very small in relation to the permanent losses that result from structural violence" (p. 182). However, in my view, this statement accurately summarizes Galtung's views on the calculations of gains and losses entailed in the preservation of social orders which he considers to rest on structural violence.[1]

I should also clarify the ambiguity surrounding note 18 concerning the term "counter-violence." I placed the term "counter-violence" in quotation marks because it is not my term. Neither did Galtung use it in the essay I referred to. It entered into the public domain of radical political language in the late 1960s and early 1970s. In the "hot fall" of 1983, Galtung referred to "*struktureller Gegen–Gewalt*" or "structural counter-violence" to describe nonviolent forms of passive resistance to the NATO deployments in fall 1983, a usage of political language that, at the very least, has fostered great confusion concerning the distinction between violence and nonviolence, war and peace. The delegitimation of Western defense efforts most certainly did remain an "an enduring focus of interest among critical peace researchers" and was evident in Galtung's assertion in his fall 1983 essay on direct and structural resistance that "the illegitimacy of a government leads to the legitimacy of the resistance."[2]

Second, Harald Müller and Gert Krell stress the pluralism of peace research, and criticize my treatment. However, I pointed out that pluralism exists within a distinct range of opinion ranging from the SPD to its left and the Greens. Gert Krell can bring into the fold the left wing of the liberal

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1. See Johann Galtung, *Strukturelle Gewalt* (Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1975), pp. 30–31, where he wrote, "a significant feature of such calculations [of the losses to human well being due to the presence of violence of a "structural" or "personal" kind, J.H.], which undoubtedly should have a high priority in the research program of peace research institutes, is the fact that the path would be open to answering such questions as: Are the losses due to personal violence higher or lower than the gains from the reduction of structural violence, for example, as in the Cuban Revolution? The author would say that they are doubtless lower, insofar as one looks at comparable Latin American countries as a basis for assessment of the losses caused by structural violence under Batista, but one must also naturally compare the personal violence under Batista and the structural violence under Castro, for example in the form of the almost total political dethronement of the bourgeoisie."
2. Johann Galtung, "Direkter und struktureller Widerstand gegen Illegitmität," *Sicherheit und Frieden*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1983), p. 12.

party, the FDP, a renegade from the CSU, Alfred Mechtersheimer, and a few conservative politicians agonizing over nuclear deterrence, but it is undeniable that the primary intellectual and institutional links of the peace research institutes led toward the SPD, and somewhat less so toward the Greens.

On page 186 of my article, I presented the dichotomy between "critical" and "classical" peace research and note that the first currents came out of the new left and that the second sprang from more moderate social democratic impulses. Ironically, one of the important points of the report by Hans–Joachim Arndt, which Müller and Krell criticize, was precisely that peace research was badly shaken by the ongoing conflicts between its "critical" and "moderate" wings.

While Müller's efforts to calm fears surrounding the construction of a new airport runway in Frankfurt are welcome, the fact remains that the principle audience for peace research remains the moderate and radical left. In 1982, Müller stressed common interests of the ecology and peace movements, their shared concern "with a comparable problem, the concrete, visible threat to the life-space (*Lebensraum*) through the consequences of large scale technological development," evident in the arms race and ecological destruction due to economic growth processes. Müller wrote that the "commonalities have become clearer. A public sensitive to these questions could quickly take up the new military type of threat, discuss it and move on to political activity."[3] I interpret his essay as both an empirical statement and one of hope—that is, one that seeks to bring about precisely the commonality of interests evident in the ecology and peace movements, and to encourage political activity based on such shared convictions.[4] He confirms the primarily political origins and intentions of peace research when he writes that West German academics concluded that political cleavages undermined support for the German Society for Peace and Conflict Resolution (DGFK). The fact

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3. Harald Müller, "Ökologiebewegung und Friedensbewegung: Zur gefährdung des Lebensraums" (Ecology Movement and Peace Movement: On the Threat to the Life-Space), in *Die neue Friedensbewegung: Analyseb ays der Friedensforschung* (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 1982), pp. 182–183.
4. Müller's statement that the study of security was a virgin land in West Germany in the late 1960s cannot be allowed to go unchallenged. Aside from the important contributions by Helmut Schmidt and Franz Josef–Strauss, West German political scientists and students of international relations were very much in existence, as readers of work by Karl Dietrich Bracher, Karl Kaiser, Uwe Nerlich, Richard Lowenthal, and Hans–Peter Schwarz, among others, know very well. Schwarz has recently presented an interesting analysis of the revulsion against anything related to realism and power politics in postwar Germany in *Die gezähmten Deutschen: Von der Machtbessessenheit zur Macthvergessenheit* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlag Anstalt, 1985).

that support for peace research in general was at all affected by political cleavages, that government support for it is stronger in states controlled by Social Democrats than in those controlled by Conservatives, underscores its highly politicized nature.

Gert Krell's complaint about overemphasis on the new left overlooks my remarks on pages 197–199 discussing the important role played by the SPD leadership and by leading news magazines. Further, I do not refer to several hundred but to a "critical mass of researchers" and a "small number of writers and publicists" (p. 189). I am well aware of the heterogenous nature of the peace movement and have written about it elsewhere.[5]

I have read Krell's testimony on alternative strategies to the West German parliamentary hearings in December 1983. His support for nuclear deterrence and his understanding of the dilemmas of the Atlantic Alliance are not representative of the literature coming from the bulk of peace researchers seeking to influence public opinion during the Euromissile controversy. As for support for the decision, a large majority in the SPD combined support for the double-track decision as they understood it in their party congress in Berlin in 1979 with opposition to actual deployments in 1983 in Cologne in 1983.

Third, I am familiar with the criticisms made of the report by Hans–Joachim Arndt. Arndt has written extensively on the epistemological and philosophical foundations of West German social and political science, especially on the impact of American social science on its West German counterpart. Thus he was very well qualified to assess the philosophical foundations of peace research in its moderate and critical variants, which he did very well. Seven of 51 footnotes in my essay refer to Arndt, while others dealing with the scope of peace research refer to Karl Heinz Koppe, for some time the director of the German Society for Peace and Conflict Research in Bonn, and Hans–Günter Brauch, also sympathetic to peace research. One can quibble about the exact proportion of "critical" to "traditional" peace research, but Arndt's report rested on extensive reading of many major works by peace researchers, which he accurately analyzed.

My assertions about the role of the institutes in the effort to prevent deployment rest only partly on reference to the sheer amount of publication

5. Jeffrey Herf, "Neutralism and the Moral Order in West Germany," in Walter Laqueur and Robert Hunter, eds., *European Peace Movements and the Future of the Atlantic Alliance* (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1985).

activity directed at an interested public—hence the reference to 170 publications of the Peace Research Institute in Frankfurt in the period from 1980 to 1983. I cited that figure to indicate that one of the major activities of one of several important peace research institutes is the dissemination of ideas to an interested and committed public, in this case ideas that dealt partly with the Euromissiles. My assertions rest on analysis of a host of other books and essays cited in the text and footnotes to the article.

Fourth, Evangelista is particularly critical of my analysis of the treatment of the Soviet Union in this literature. He cites a number of works, which he wrongly assumes I did not examine and which he claims disprove my assertion concerning the neglect of the Soviet Union as an autonomous actor in world politics. Saying that he is not an expert on European peace research, Evangelista charges that my analysis of the peace research literature on the Soviet Union is "completely false . . . nonsense" and that I should confine my remarks to what I do know, "say nothing" of other subjects, and "provide evidence in an honest fashion that conforms to scholarly standards." His charge is wrong. If the literature to which he refers amounts to an extensive analysis of the Soviet Union in world politics, then words mean very different things to us. I will comment on three of the authors and works he mentions as they affected public discussion of the Euromissile controversy.

In 1980 and 1982, Stephan Tiedtke wrote essays in the series published by Suhrkamp. The first is a defense of arms control and notes that "the North Americans, on the other hand, see in the [NATO double-track decision] a possibility to divert a nuclear attack on their own territory in the event of a European military conflict."[6] The 1982 essay urges the peace movement to think beyond its opposition to the Euromissiles, and to critically assess the alternative security policies present in the movement.[7] Neither essay discusses the Soviet Union and its armaments as they affect the Euromissile controversy in any detail.

In 1982, Ulrich Albrecht, a professor of peace and conflict research at the Free University in Berlin and at the time of publication chairman of the DGFK

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6. Peter Schlotter/Stephan Tiedtke, "Gibt es noch eine Alternative zur Aufrüstung in Europa? Der gegenwärtige Rüstungswettlauf in Europa und die Bedingungen militärischer Entspannung" (Is there still an alternative to rearmament in Europe? The contemporary arms race in Europe and the conditions of military detente), in Reiner Steinweg, ed., *Das kontrollierte Chaos: Der Krise der Abrüstung* (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 1980), p. 49.
7. Stephan Tiedtke, "Wider den kurzen Atem: Thesen zur sicherheitspolitische Strategie der Friedensbewegung," in Reiner Steinweg, ed., *Die neue Friedensbewegung: Analysen aus der Friedensforschung* (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 1982), pp. 34–53.

(German Society for Peace and Conflict Research) in Bonn, published a paperback calling for revocation of the NATO double-track decision.[8] There is no talk about "red militarism" in this book. One would expect in a book about the Euromissiles an extensive dicussion about the SS-20. In 182 pages including notes, Albrecht devoted less than ten pages to Soviet armament in general and provided no substantial account of the development and consequences of the SS-20s. Instead the book is like others I described in my article in that it contains a great deal of material on the technological developments of American arms decisions and technological advances, economic interests, and American interservice rivalries that, in his view, contributed to the development of the cruise and Pershing II missiles and the NATO double-track decision. Concerning the Soviet Union, Albrecht wrote that the "core problem" was its need for security, the satisfaction of which would also solve the security problem of the West. Satisfaction of the Soviet need for security, in turn, would require continuation and deepening of Brandt's *Ostpolitik*, revoking the NATO decision, which was blocking paths to a political settlement in Europe, and a renunciation of the demand for German reunification, all of which would contribute to a new orientation in Europe culminating in the withdrawal of all American and Soviet soldiers to positions inside their own borders.[9] Albrecht had very little to say about "red militarism" in his effort to influence West German public opinion during the Euromissile controversy.

If Evangelista views *Die Rüstung der Sowjetunion* (The Armament of the Soviet Union), the 1979 collection edited by Dieter Lutz, as an extensive analysis of the Soviet Union as an autonomous actor in world politics, he again understands words differently than I do. First, the essays are not primarily inspired by "critical peace research" as I defined the term, and some are not specific to peace research in West Germany at all. Second, a volume on Soviet armament published in 1979 (two years after Helmut Schmidt's speech at the IISS in London during which time the SS-20s had become a major concern in the West German security community), which contains no extensive discussion of the SS-20 buildup, is not, in my view, indicative of a concern for the Soviet Union as an autonomous actor in world politics. Third, even those essays that are deeply critical of Soviet militarism,

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8. Ulrich Albrecht, *Kündigt den Nachrustungsbeschluss: Argumente für die Friedensbewegung* (Revoke the Rearmament Decision!: Arguments for the Peace Movement) (Frankfurt/Main: Fischer Taschenbuch, 1982).
9. Ibid., p. 140.

such as the one by Professor Egbert Jahn of the University of Frankfurt, describe it as primarily defensive and oriented to the status quo. Fourth, both of Dieter Lutz's essays in that volume make the same fundamental arguments about the military balance in Europe, which I discussed in "War, Peace, and the Intellectuals" when presented in *Weltkrieg wider Willen*, a paperback published for a broader public. I did not describe that work as "critical peace research" in Senghaas's sense but "the first of what became a genre of peace movement literature: books that combined great technical detail with vivid descriptions of nuclear war" (p. 194). As in the subsequent popularization and dissemination of his arguments to a broader public, Lutz argued that there was no dangerous military superiority of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact over NATO in Europe that required greater Western defense efforts, that arbitrariness, manipulation, illusory objectivity, and obfuscation characterized many of the official assessments of the military balance, that NATO had technological advantages that more than compensated for its numerical inferiorities, and that it was the arms race itself more "than the capabilities and intentions of the Soviet Union" that posed the greatest danger of war in Europe."[10]

History and time may prove Dieter Lutz correct and the Western governments and military wrong. But the reader of his essays would certainly not come to the conclusion that the Soviet Union as an autonomous actor was the primary threat to peace in Europe. Indeed, Lutz was doing his best to criticize those who suggested this was the case. If one seeks, as I did, to account for a causal link between ideas and political action, then one must consider arguments by "counter-experts" asserting that the Soviet threat to Western Europe was being exaggerated by Western—including the West German—governments. It was "the arms race" itself, not the Soviet Union, that preoccupied the peace researchers. Analyses of the Soviet Union as an autonomous actor are not what has made peace research distinctive. Even if

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10. Dieter Lutz, *Die Rüstung der Sowjetunion* (Baden–Baden: Nomos Verlag, 1979). The full quotation is: "As long as the ideas about the threat in the public are defined and manipulated by schematic presentations and numerical comparisons, which indicated great disparities, which in truth do not exist, instability and the danger of war will stem more from the almost unimaginable assemblage of destructive potential in Central Europe as such, than from the capabilities and intentions of the Soviet Union" (p. 121). Or in a second essay in that volume, Lutz wrote that "the danger of war [in the 1980s] will stem less from the supposed drive for expansion of the Soviet Union, as the Western military would like to believe, than in the mutual mistrust resting on the foundations of the doctrine of deterrence and its 'worst case' imperatives as well as in the autonomous dynamics of weapons technology of an anti-human armaments merry-go-round in East and West" (pp. 158–159).

some peace researchers have begun to devote more attention to these problems, a focus on the Soviet Union was *not* primary in their efforts to influence West German public opinion during the Euromissile controversy.

A conspiracy theory amounts to a paranoid construction which focuses on a small number of evil groups possessed of astounding, almost inexplicable powers to influence world history. The myth of the world Jewish–Bolshevik conspiracy, McCarthy's attacks on the State Department and the Ivy League in the 1950s, and the accusations in the early 1980s in Western Europe that a small group of arch-conservative strategists and Reaganites wanted to deploy missiles in Western Europe to launch first strikes against the Soviet Union and facilitate limiting a nuclear war to Europe are examples of conspiracy theories. Analyses of the impact of intellectuals on politics, such as "War, Peace, and the Intellectuals," on the other hand, address elusive questions such as why intellectuals are drawn to certain kinds of ideas, and then why and under what circumstances their ideas make a difference in politics. In the language of contemporary political sociology, this interest in the connection between ideas and institutions examines the accumulation and then mobilization of resources. It is not a total explanation, but it is, in my view, an indispensable part of a thorough causal analysis.

In spring and summer 1981, before the large peace demonstrations brought the peace movement into public attention, public statements opposing the NATO decision were published in newspapers by writers, (mostly Protestant) clergy, doctors, scientists, trade unionists, and groupings of the political left. On June 13, 1981, following a conference in Bonn called by the "Gustav Heinemann Initiative," a group comprised of peace researchers, professors, and leading figures of the left wing of the SPD, issued a public statement concerning the NATO double-track decision of 1979. In addition to Gert Krell, peace researchers among the signers included Ulrich Albrecht, Dieter Lutz, Dieter Senghaas, Peter Schlotter, and Stephan Tiedtke.[11] The statement asserted that since the beginning of the 1980s the danger of war had grown.

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11. Other authors of the statement included Professor Wolf Dieter Narr, a political scientist at the Free University of Berlin; Andreas Buro, of the Socialist Bureau, an organization of independent socialist intellectuals; Johanno Strasser, a left-wing Social Democrat interested in blending socialism and ecology; and two leading political figures in the SPD left, Erhard Eppler, member of the party's executive committee, and Oskar Lafontaine, then mayor of Saarbrucken who subsequently called for West German exit for NATO's integrated military command. See *Gustav–Heinemann–Initiative*, "Erklarung der Gustav–Heinemann–Initiative vom 13. Juni 1981," reprinted in Anton–Andreas Guha, *Die Nachrustung: Der Holocaust Europas* (The Rearmament Decision: Europe's Holocaust) (Freiburg im Br.: Dreisam Verlag, 1981), pp. 129–132.

Disturbing technological and political trends had led to speculation on lim-
iting, fighting, and winning nuclear wars. The fragility of the "deterrence
system" and the danger to West Germany had grown. Consequently a "fun-
damental reorientation" of security policy was necessary. Minimum deter-
rence should replace efforts to preserve a technocratically understood concept
of an ever-elusive equilibrium. As for the NATO decision, the statement said:

No region of the world is more threatened by a limited nuclear war than
Europe. Nowhere else today are more nuclear weapons concentrated than
here. This danger will be increased by the NATO decision of December 12,
1979. The threat to Soviet centers from German territory can also lead to a
preventive strike by the Soviet Union leading to the extinction of West
Germany. This development makes clear the security-political contradictions
beween the USA and Europe.
   Land based medium range missiles on German soil are militarily, politically
and morally indefensible. We call on the West German government to use
its influence to overcome and retract the so-called *Nachrustung* decision of
December 12, 1979.
   We call on the Soviet Union not to modernize its medium range missiles
over the numerical level of the already existing warheads on the SS-4 and
SS-5.[12]

The statement went on to call for an armed forces designed exclusively for
defensive purposes, as well as for public discussion of proposals for a nuclear
free zone in Europe. It asserted that the NATO decision rested on question-
able, partly manipulated assessments of the military balance. Deployments
would change the balance to the disadvantage of the Soviet Union because
the SS-20, unlike the Pershing II, could not reach the other superpower.
Warning times would be drastically cut. The four-year negotiation period
was too short. "Nuclear first strike and decapitation weapons systems" were
destabilizing and required a search for alternative security and peace policies
to the deterrence system.[13]

   One can agree or disagree with one or all of these assertions. But in view
of the arguments and the relative political homogeneity of the authors, it is
clear that such a statement reflects long-held views that it was an effort to
influence public policy based on these views and that, as I argued in my
article, it reflects a range of opinion focused in the SPD left. The political
significance of such statements is, of course, subject to dispute and interpre-

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12. Ibid., p. 130.
13. Ibid., p. 132.

tation. But the least that can be said is that by spring 1981, these intellectuals and political figures had taken a position of public opposition to deployments of American missiles in West Germany before the bulk of the SPD did so in the face of the controversies over particular negotiating proposals in the INF talks in Geneva.

Krell stresses the "inherent dilemmas" of West Germany's grim geostrategic situation. Yes, but they must be interpreted. The political power of intellectuals lies above all in interpreting society, shaping political language, and giving meaning to events. It was the pervasiveness and institutionalization of particular interpretations among socially distinct and politically active groups that, in the context of the crisis surrounding the NATO double-track decision, led so many young people and many not so young people to oppose the NATO decision and deployment. One can applaud or deplore these ideas concerning world politics in the SPD, the most widely read West German weekly news magazines, Protestant churches, publishing houses, and peace research institutes, but the evidence of their existence is overwhelming. It was not a climate that emerged from the immediate context of the Euromissile controversy, nor was it caused by the latest twist and turn of policy and utterance in Washington and Moscow. As my article suggests, the Euromissile controversy demonstrated the importance of local circumstances in interpreting world politics and brought to the surface already existing attitudes rooted in Germany's turbulent modern history. The basic argument raised in "War, Peace, and the Intellectuals" remains intact: a whole complex of ideas and institutions established before the Euromissile controversy began, one part of which was comprised by peace research institutes, was crucial for the incubation and mobilization of ideas that supported opposition to the NATO decision of 1979 and/or missile deployments in 1983.

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