

rity required that “Europe, at least continental Europe,” should “succeed in becoming socialist, excluding in that way the very possibility of a war in this part of the world.”

Bullitt, whose views on the Soviet Union are dismissed by Cassella-Blackburn as “paranoid” (p. x), made a similar argument. But was Bullitt really paranoid to argue that the USSR’s revived popular-front strategy at the end of the war represented “the tactics of the trojan horse”? After all, just days before Bullitt issued that warning, the Soviet Union’s International Information Department (*Otdel Mezhdunarodnoi Informatsii*) had explained to the Polish Communist Party that “the correct policy for a national front requires a series of concessions and compromises that will split our opponents without fundamentally altering our aims: satisfying the major demands of the masses and creating a situation favorable to our long-term plans.” Was Bullitt paranoid to warn Roosevelt in November 1942 that Stalin had not abandoned his hostility to the capitalist West and that any suggestion to the contrary was positing a transformation “as striking as the conversion of Saul on the road to Damascus”? Stalin himself told Georgi Dimitrov on the eve of the Yalta conference that although the USSR was for the moment allied with the democratic faction of capitalism against the fascist faction, “in the future we will be against the first faction of capitalists, too.”

The Athenians might not have lost the Peloponnesian War if they had heeded Alcibiades’s warning that their fleet lay dangerously exposed at Aegospotami. Perhaps the greatest tragedy of Bullitt’s life is that he, like Alcibiades, was for reasons of his own making not heeded when he spoke most usefully.



Ross Mackenzie, *When Stars and Stripes Met Hammer and Sickle: The Chautauqua Conferences on US-Soviet Relations, 1985–1989*. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2006. 306 pp.

Reviewed by Matthew Evangelista, Cornell University

The Chautauqua Institution was founded in 1874 in the western Finger Lakes region of upstate New York as a summer camp for Sunday school teachers. Throughout its history it has combined religion, education, recreation, and the arts. According to this official account, Chautauqua made its mark on Cold War history in the second half of the 1980s by sponsoring five meetings between representatives of the Soviet Union and the United States. The events, each of about a week’s duration, included formal lectures by representatives of each government, question-and-answer sessions with members of the audience, and performances of music and dance by leading artists from each country. Ross Mackenzie, the “historian emeritus” of the Chautauqua Institution, has written a clear, well-organized account of the five Soviet-American conferences, based mainly on transcripts of the meetings and interviews with participants. Mackenzie suggests that the meetings contributed to the peaceful resolution of the Cold War by encouraging representatives of each country to appreciate the basic

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humanity of those on the other side. “In the five Chautauqua conferences,” he writes, “it became possible to see that behind the public appearance of Soviet communism or of American capitalism were human beings ‘just like us,’ to use the phrase of the woman who first met the Soviet visitors as they filed through Buffalo airport” (p. 179).

By the 1980s many other participants in U.S.-Soviet discussions—from diplomats negotiating arms control to scientists in the Pugwash movement to academics and former government officials in the Dartmouth conferences—had long since recognized that their counterparts were genuine human beings. The novelty of the Chautauqua phenomenon was that it made this insight available to larger numbers of ordinary “citizen diplomats.” The five conferences, held each year from 1985 through 1989, took place first at the Chautauqua Institution, then near Riga, Latvia, then back at Chautauqua, then in Tbilisi, Georgia, and finally at the University of Pittsburgh. The last three conferences, in particular, included “home stays” that enabled the visiting U.S. or Soviet citizens to lodge with local families. As many as a few hundred visitors during a given conference thus had the opportunity to see how people on the “other side” lived and to develop close personal bonds with them.

The personal dimension of the Chautauqua meetings was probably more meaningful than the formal political lectures. The lectures evinced a certain set-piece quality, as the representatives presented the familiar and time-worn arguments of their respective governments. The result often was mutual recriminations about the origins of the Cold War. The Soviet representatives would complain about the Western allies’ delay in opening a second front, thereby obliging the Red Army to bear the brunt of fighting against Hitler’s forces. The U.S. representatives, for their part, blamed the Soviet side for using the presence of its occupation troops to install Communist regimes throughout Eastern Europe. The frequent direct quotations from the conference transcripts reveal historical inaccuracies in many of the responses during the question-and-answer sessions as well as in the formal presentations of both sides—as when Paul Nitze, one of the chief arms-control officials during the Reagan administration, made rather disingenuous arguments about the extent of Soviet defenses against U.S. nuclear attack in order to justify pursuit of the administration’s Strategic Defense Initiative. Soviet officials (at least in the first couple of meetings, before Mikhail Gorbachev’s policy of glasnost allowed them to speak somewhat more candidly) glossed over their country’s human rights violations and restrictions on information, claiming falsely, for example, that copies of *The New York Times* “were easily accessible in libraries” (pp. 59–60). These polemical exchanges hardly make for compelling reading. But readers who are too young to remember being bombarded by such arguments on a regular basis may find it useful to have these exchanges reproduced here.

Far more interesting is Mackenzie’s discussion of the political context of each meeting, during a time of rapid change in East-West relations. The first meeting was held in the United States, and the main challenge was simply to persuade the Soviet side to participate—no easy task considering that the invitation from Chautauqua representatives arrived in December 1984, a low point in Soviet-American relations. The second meeting, in Jurmala near Riga, Latvia, was put in jeopardy twice—first

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when the Soviet State Security Committee (KGB) arrested a U.S. journalist, Nicholas Daniloff, and later when the American Latvian Association protested the meeting out of concern that official U.S. participation would imply acceptance of the illegal Soviet incorporation of Latvia into the USSR during World War II. But as it turned out, the Latvian nationalist cause was helped rather than harmed by the meeting. Local Latvians, bolstered by the support of their kin in the U.S. delegation, turned the event to their advantage. The Americans criticized the restrictive attendance policy of the Soviet hosts and convinced them to open up the events to ordinary Latvian citizens. Latvian-speaking Americans passed out lapel pins with U.S. and Latvian flags, the latter of which had been banned by the Soviet authorities since 1940. The 1987 conference at Chautauqua received wide media coverage in the United States and helped expose Americans to the changes under way in the Soviet Union. The 1988 meeting in Tbilisi bore the fruit of Gorbachev's policy of glasnost, as the Georgian participants expressed sharp public criticism of the Soviet army and government.

The Chautauqua organizers always accorded importance to the cultural dimension of their programs, and the U.S.-Soviet meetings were no exception. The poets Andrei Voznesenskii and Evgenii Evtushenko, the violinist Eugene Fodor, the jazz saxophonist Grover Washington Jr., and members of prominent U.S. and Soviet ballet troupes were typical of the high quality of the performers.

Mackenzie concludes his informative study with an assessment of the impact of the U.S.-Soviet meetings: "Chautauqua confirmed that the people-to-people track of diplomacy is a force to be reckoned with in political life" (p. 192). He gives due credit to the leaders of both countries for encouraging the exchanges and particularly acknowledges Gorbachev. Considering that the meetings were held in public and that the official U.S. representatives usually offered harsh assessments of Soviet policy, Gorbachev, Mackenzie writes, deserves praise "for taking the risk and for his courage in determining that the government and the nation were willing to face this kind of criticism" (p. 192). Mackenzie speculates about the Soviet leader's motives, but he could have provided a more convincing discussion of this matter if he had delved into the voluminous archival and memoir sources to ascertain Gorbachev's views on Chautauqua and similar "dual-track" initiatives. Despite this shortcoming, Mackenzie's book is a valuable study of one aspect of a crucial period in the history of the Cold War.



Francis Gary Powers with Curt Gentry, *Operation Overflight: A Memoir of the U-2 Incident*. Washington, DC: Brassey's, 2004. 327 pp. \$24.95.

Reviewed by John Prados, National Security Archive

May Day in 1960 became a turning point for many things. The Cold War seemed to spin out of control; a summit conference broke up; and new crises followed within weeks, first in Berlin and then in Laos (which the Eisenhower administration attrib-

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