Division under the Air Force. The NRO vigorously opposed the incorporation, believing that the AFSCF should remain independent because of its critical role in the National Reconnaissance Program. Within the Air Force, the AFSCF and the Space Systems Division to whom it reported were pitted against the National Range Division. In 1964 the issue was settled, and the network remained independent of the new organization.

Arnold also does a commendable job of explaining the vital technologies of the AFSCF, enabling readers without a technical background to understand them easily. This is particularly true in the case of two important upgrades, the first of which was the Multiple Satellite Augmentation Program. Initiated in 1962, this was designed to permit the network to support operations of two or more satellites over long periods by standardizing station equipment and improving data handling and control. As a result, a truly centralized system was created for the first time from the seven stations. The second upgrade was the Space-Ground Link Subsystem, implemented in the late 1960s. This greatly improved the communications between the ground controllers and spacecraft and also eased the task of handling more than one satellite.

The book does a less thorough job in describing the other Department of Defense satellite command-and-control systems, with the exception of that of the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program. In this particular case, the AFSCF serviced the early weather satellites before the network’s technical limitations working with multiple satellites and excessive charges by Lockheed for continued AFSCF support led the Air Force (with NRO approval) to construct an independent system. Arnold mentions the separate command-and-control network for the Missile Defense Alarm System satellites but gives no details about it. He provides no discussion at all of the system that supported the Navy’s GRAB electronic intelligence satellite, of which five were launched in 1960–1962. The Navy apparently constructed and operated this network because the NRO did not assume responsibility for space-based signals intelligence programs until 1962.

Despite these omissions, Spying from Space is an important contribution to Cold War scholarship, and its readers will not be disappointed.


Reviewed by Matthew Evangelista, Cornell University

In March 1958, General Lauris Norstad, the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), sent General Nino Pasti, Italy’s representative to the Atlantic Council, on a mission to Rome. Pasti was to convey to Italy’s defense minister documents concerning the possible deployment of new intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs), known as Jupiters, on Italian soil. As Leopoldo Nuti describes in this impressively researched study of Italy’s policy toward
nuclear weapons, the deployment was supposed to proceed “as quietly as possible” (p. 175). Some two decades later, retired General Pasti, now a member of the Italian Senate, became an outspoken critic of NATO’s decision to deploy a new generation of “Euromissiles,” the Pershing II IRBMs and cruise missiles. Some of the latter were destined for the Comiso base in Sicily. Although Nuti, a professor of the history of international relations at the University of Rome, mentions Pasti only in his first incarnation as a NATO official, the story he tells of Italy’s approach to nuclear weapons follows Pasti’s trajectory. Decisions on nuclear weapons shifted from a highly secretive domain, dominated by government officials from the center-right Christian Democratic Party and its allies, to one that involved widespread public debate—in parliament and in the piazza—and included representatives from across the political spectrum. (Pasti represented the independent left, although his views on disarmament were often close to those of the Soviet Union.)

Nuti has undertaken prodigious research, drawing on extensive primary materials from Italy, the United States, Britain, France, and Germany, and logging many hours in numerous archives throughout Europe and North America. His detailed account of relations between Italy and its NATO allies is unlikely to be surpassed. He provides valuable background information on the postwar status of Italy as it sought to revive its international standing following defeat and occupation. One element of this was the question of nuclear weapons. Italy played a prominent role in the development of nuclear physics, but its own physicists—the ones who had not fled the country in the wake of the fascist regime’s anti-Jewish laws—avoided military-related research. Thus early postwar Italian nuclear policy was dominated by military officials and politicians with little understanding of the meaning of the nuclear revolution. On the one hand, the invention of nuclear weapons seemed to reinforce the views of Giulio Douhet, the Italian theorist of air power in the 1920s, who predicted that the threat of mass aerial bombardment of civilian population centers would provide a deterrent to war (pp. 30–31). On the other, military planners gave serious attention to using nuclear weapons, including weapons vastly more powerful than the bombs that flattened Hiroshima and Nagasaki, to destroy Alpine passes in the unlikely event of a Soviet invasion through Austria or Yugoslavia (pp. 83–84). It is not surprising, then, that the civilian head of the National Committee for Nuclear Research accused military commanders of “absolute incompetence” in the nuclear sphere and recommended that they consult with scientists (pp. 90–91).

In the 1950s the United States introduced into Italy and other European countries so-called tactical nuclear weapons and nuclear-armed air defense systems (Nike-Hercules), which, if used in war, would have destroyed what they were supposed to defend. Italian politicians were not so much concerned about that prospect. In Nuti’s account, they saw Italy’s embrace of nuclear weapons as a way to raise the country’s status, sometimes in cooperation but other times in competition with the country’s European allies. Italy’s defense minister worked with his French and West German counterparts in the wake of the 1956 Suez Crisis and perceptions of U.S. unreliability to plan for collaboration among the three countries on “modern” military technology—primarily missiles and nuclear weapons. Nuti quotes a French summary of a
meeting at which West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer told French Prime Minister Guy Mollet that “we must unite against the Americans” and demand what we want (p. 124); namely, in the words of the Italian defense minister, “all the secrets that the Russians already have” (p. 131). When France decided to develop an independent nuclear arsenal, Italian political leaders feared that Italy would be relegated to second-class status in the alliance because it did not possess nuclear weapons of its own. When the United States proposed to deploy the Jupiters in Italy, officials were eager to accept them. Nuti reports the views of Italian leaders that exposing their country to risk of Soviet nuclear attack against the U.S. bases had earned Italy a seat at the table for negotiations on major issues such as the “German question” and the fate of Berlin (p. 197).

Was this trade—risk of nuclear destruction for higher diplomatic standing—one that ordinary Italians were willing to make? Here Nuti’s book is mainly silent, but he implies that revealing the thinking of the top leaders to the broader public would have put their plans at some risk. Nuti alludes to a debate in the Italian Senate about the Jupiter deployment (p. 174) and to a desire on the part of the government to keep the agreement secret for as long as possible (p. 178) and to deploy the systems far away from the predominantly “Red” regions, where Communist opposition would be strongest. Nuti provides little detail on Italy’s highly polarized domestic political scene, and when he does, it normally comes from U.S. documents, such as reports from the ambassador in Rome. This shortcoming becomes more serious in his discussion of Italy’s attitude toward attempts to negotiate a Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). Italian leaders, being preoccupied with the status they believed nuclear weapons conveyed, were reluctant to give up on the possibility of a nuclear Multilateral Force (MLF) under the joint control of several European countries—Italy and Germany included. Their attitude to the treaty verged on the openly hostile. Italy eventually signed the treaty in January 1969, appending twelve reservations, but ratification was delayed until 1975.

In this case, as in others, Nuti’s emphasis on diplomatic documents and the foreign-policy implications of Italian nuclear policy leads him to neglect an important internal dimension of the story. He hints, for example, at the role of Ugo La Malfa and the centrist Italian Republican Party, and he mentions an anonymous article endorsing the treaty in the party’s newspaper. But he does not say why La Malfa felt so strongly about the NPT that he threatened in October 1967 to bring down the government if it did not ease its opposition (p. 329). Later Nuti refers to the intervention of 142 Italian scientists, “led by Edoardo Amaldi, Guido sic: Francesco] Calogero, and Carlo Schaefer,” who wrote an open letter to the Foreign Ministry demanding that it allow ratification to go forward (p. 341). Calogero, son of the philosopher Guido Calogero, was a prominent nuclear physicist who later became Secretary General of the Pugwash Conferences on Science and International Affairs and accepted the Nobel Peace Prize on behalf of the organization in 1995. He also happened to be La Malfa’s son-in-law. An interesting story is waiting to be uncovered here—about the role of civil society and personal connections in influencing government policy. Both Calogero and Schaefer are still alive and actively working on issues related to nuclear
disarmament. They would have been well worth interviewing to get a fuller picture of the sources of Italian nuclear weapons policy.

In the book’s final chapter on NATO’s 1979 Euromissile decision and in the epilogue, Nuti brings in many of the elements missing from his earlier cases—particularly domestic politics. He describes the role of popular opinion and peace activists, mentions the scientists, and explains the difficult position of the Italian Communist Party in its reluctance to criticize NATO and appear to undermine its suitability to enter into the government. Ultimately the story emerges of a major transformation in Italian nuclear policy: from a country in which elites held an “atomic monopoly” and treated weapons of mass destruction as status symbols to one in which popular anti-nuclear sentiments were so pervasive that Italians voted in effect to shut down the entire civilian nuclear energy program in the wake of the 1986 Chornobyl disaster. In conveying this transformation, La sfida nucleare makes an indispensable contribution to the history of nuclear weapons and transatlantic relations.


Reviewed by Martin Ceadel, New College, University of Oxford

This is a magnificent book—intelligent, informative, lucid, and witty. It surveys a critical half-century of British imperial withdrawal on the basis both of deep knowledge of Colonial Office and other government records and of long thought about the idiosyncrasies of the colonization and decolonization processes. The book shows, among many other things, how white settlers were introduced into East Africa to make the Uganda railway pay, how Kwame Nkrumah advanced independence for the Gold Coast (as Ghana) by helping to save the cocoa industry from the cacao swollen-shoot virus, and how Malcolm MacDonald’s expert conciliation of the United Malays National Organization (the Malay nationalist party) was linked to his intense appreciation of Malay female beauty.

Ronald Hyam does not pull his punches, describing Ernest Bevin’s 1948 proposal of an all-embracing Western Union as a “noble, crazy, cosmoplastically hallucinatory scheme” (p. 137) and noting that Winston Churchill’s biographer, Sir Martin Gilbert, “has little interest in the world outside Europe (defined—as by the Eurovision Song Contest—to include Israel)” (p. 169n). Hyam emphasizes personal agency, and his capsule portraits of key figures are sharply memorable: A. V. Alexander, Clement Attlee’s defence minister, was “a supporter of Chelsea F.C. and a wizard at billiards” (p. 107); Alan Lennox-Boyd, Macmillan’s first colonial secretary, “had a vigorous, masterful manner, which stood him in good stead in his dealings with all kinds of people, from colonial governors to rent boys” (p. 175); and the white prime minister of the Central African Federation, Sir Roy Welensky, “was less well educated than his African opponents; if he had been an African, his educational attainments would not