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The paradox of state strength: transnational relations, domestic structures, and security policy in Russia and the Soviet Union

Matthew Evangelista

A country's domestic structure influences its degree of openness to ideas promoted by transnational actors as well as the extent to which those ideas are implemented as policy. A highly centralized, secretive, state-dominated polity will provide relatively little access to transnational actors, but if their policy proposals do get a favorable hearing from the top leadership, they can be implemented effectively. By contrast, a decentralized, open, and pluralistic polity permits a high degree of transnational activity, but the policy preferences of transnational actors may not fare well in competition with those of other strong societal actors or state institutions.

The case of the Soviet Union illustrates this general proposition. In the area of security policy, the 1980s saw a resurgence of transnational relations—here defined as “regular interactions across national boundaries when at least one actor is a non-state agent or does not operate on behalf of a national government or an intergovernmental organization.”¹ A transnational community of scientists and others involved in international discussions on disarmament

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1. Thomas Risse-Kappen, “Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Non-state Actors, Domestic Structures, and International Institutions,” introduction to Thomas Risse-Kappen, ed., *Bringing Transnational Relations Back In* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming). Some of the activity I discuss would fall within the category of “cross-level” interactions as proposed by Jeffrey W. Knopf, “Beyond Two-Level Games: Domestic–International Interaction in the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Negotiations,” *International Organization* 47 (Autumn 1993), pp. 599–628.

ment had remarkable success in influencing Soviet security policy in the mid-1980s, once it was able to gain access to the top leaders. Yet fundamental changes in the Soviet Union's domestic structure in the late 1980s had the paradoxical effect of making those transnational actors simultaneously less constrained in promoting their favored security policies and less able to see them implemented.

Changes in the domestic structure in the Soviet Union during the late 1980s were dramatic. They entailed the transformation from a secretive, authoritarian, one-party state with a command economy to an incipient democracy with an elected parliament possessing real legislative authority, an increasingly active civil society, the proliferation of informal political organizations and new political parties, the breakdown of central economic planning, and the introduction of some elements of a market economy. Before the end of 1989, when most of the major changes in Soviet domestic structure had been accomplished, a transnational community of U.S. and Soviet supporters of arms control influenced Soviet security policy in broad conceptual terms and on several specific issues, including the two I examine here—halting nuclear testing and limiting strategic defenses.²

After 1989, the traditional institutions of the Soviet military-industrial sector came close to reversing many of the prior achievements: they sought to revive interest in developing strategic defense weapons and to secure the government's commitment to a renewal of nuclear testing. Only major changes in U.S. policy, initiated under the Clinton administration, prevented the pro-military forces from gaining the upper hand on these issues of Russian security policy. My general proposition about the impact of domestic structure does not necessarily predict policy reversals after 1989, but it would anticipate a loss of the transnational actors' privileged position vis-à-vis the top leadership and a new opportunity for U.S. policy to weigh into the balance.

The theoretical basis for transnational influence

The original theorizing about transnational relations in the 1970s neglected—or assumed away—the effect of transnational actors on security policy and on states of the Soviet type. That literature, and the related work on interdependence, argued that transnational relations would predominate in issue-areas outside the realm of “high politics” and in countries where democratic polities would permit penetration of government policymaking by

2. Influence was not limited to areas with a substantial technical component for which scientists would appear to have an advantage, but include, for example, debates on reducing and restructuring conventional forces as well as broader conceptions such as “common security.” I discuss these issues in my book-in-progress, “Taming the Bear: Transnational Relations and the Demise of the Soviet Threat,” University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, 1994. I thank Valerie Bunce for bringing this point to my attention.

transnational as well as domestic actors.³ According to this perspective, the centralized, secretive, and authoritarian regime that prevailed in the Soviet Union until the end of the 1980s was the archetypical strong state and, therefore, one of the least likely candidates for transnational influence. By the same token, security policy in the Soviet Union would have been the most immune to such influence.

Some prominent recent work on linkages between domestic and international politics reiterates the conventional wisdom on transnational relations and security policy. A summary of the findings of a collaborative project on two-level games, for example, notes the “sharp contrast between the security cases and the economically oriented cases on the issue of transnational alliances” and concludes unequivocally that “issues of sovereignty and national security generate few transnational alliances.”⁴ The study’s one chapter on the Soviet Union finds little evidence of transnational influence.⁵

The theoretical reasons not to expect transnational influence on Soviet security policy are straightforward. In a political system dominated by a strong party–state apparatus, such as the Soviet system, societal forces, including transnational actors, should exert little influence on policy. Moreover, in the security realm, as Jack Snyder hypothesizes, the systemic constraints of international anarchy should hinder transnational activity because countries’ “fear of mutual exploitation will make cooperative security coalitions across international borders hard to form.” Any transnational coalitions that do form should fare poorly in competition with domestic ones because “networks that facilitate the formation of political coalitions are thicker within countries and blocs than between them.”⁶

By contrast, a number of recent studies have argued that transnational actors did play a role in Soviet security policy, especially during the 1980s, and thereby contributed significantly to the end of the cold war.⁷ More generally, several bodies of theoretical literature in international relations and comparative politics—including recent work on epistemic communities, ideas, institutions,

3. See Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., eds., *Transnational Relations and World Politics* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972); and Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “Transgovernmental Relations and International Organizations,” *World Politics* 27 (October 1974), pp. 39–62.

4. Peter B. Evans, “Building an Integrative Approach to International and Domestic Politics: Reflections and Projections,” in Peter B. Evans, Harold K. Jacobson, and Robert D. Putnam, eds., *Double-edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), pp. 418 and 424, respectively.

5. Jack Snyder, “East–West Bargaining over Germany: The Search for Synergy in a Two-Level Game,” in Evans, Jacobson, and Putnam, *Double-edged Diplomacy*.

6. Snyder, “East–West Bargaining,” pp. 115–16.

7. See David S. Meyer, “How We Helped End the Cold War (and Let Someone Else Take All the Credit),” *Nuclear Times* (Winter 1990–91), pp. 9–14; David Cortright, *Peace Works: The Citizen’s Role in Ending the Cold War* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1993); Thomas Risse-Kappen, “Ideas Do Not Float Freely: Transnational Coalitions, Domestic Structures, and the End of the Cold War,” *International Organization* 48 (Spring 1994), pp. 185–214; Risse-Kappen, “Bringing Transnational Relations Back In”; and Knopf, “Beyond Two-Level Games.”

and learning—provide a theoretical basis for casting doubt on the conventional wisdom about transnational relations, security policy, and the Soviet Union.

The starting point for all of the international relations literature relevant to transnationalism is a rejection of two assumptions: namely, that the state functions as a unitary actor and that the international system fully determines states' behavior.⁸ In much of the relevant empirical work—including the case studies I present here—these assumptions are implicitly or explicitly tested as the null hypothesis rather than rejected a priori. But to build a model of transnational influence, we make certain other assumptions: that the interpretations of the external environment and the appropriate foreign policies often are subject to dispute between rival political coalitions contending for influence⁹; that policy entrepreneurs seek to promote their preferred policies to leaders¹⁰; that ideas as well as material interests make a difference in determining which foreign policies a state pursues¹¹; and that crises and policy failures provide opportunities for policy entrepreneurs to introduce new policy ideas.¹²

8. For representative statements, see Andrew Moravcsik, "Introduction: Integrating International and Domestic Theories of International Bargaining," in Evans, Jacobson, and Putnam, *Double-edged Diplomacy*, pp. 3–42; Robert D. Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games," reprinted in the appendix to *Double-edged Diplomacy*, pp. 431–468; Peter M. Haas, "Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination," *International Organization* 46 (Winter 1992), pp. 1–35; and Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane, "Ideas and Foreign Policy: An Analytical Framework," in Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane, eds., *Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993), pp. 3–30.

9. For application to the Soviet case, see Jack Snyder, "International Leverage on Soviet Domestic Change," *World Politics* 42 (October 1989), pp. 1–30; Richard D. Anderson, Jr., *Public Politics in an Authoritarian State: Making Foreign Policy During the Brezhnev Years* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993); James Richter, *Khrushchev's Double Bind: Domestic and International Constraints on Soviet Foreign Policy, 1953–1964* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994); and Matthew Evangelista, "Internal and External Constraints on Grand Strategy: The Soviet Case," in Richard Rosecrance and Arthur Stein, eds., *The Domestic Bases of Grand Strategy* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993), pp. 154–78.

10. On policy entrepreneurs in domestic politics, see especially John W. Kingdon, *Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1984); Jack L. Walker, "The Diffusion of Knowledge, Policy Communities, and Agenda Setting: The Relationship of Knowledge and Power," in John E. Tropman, Milan J. Dluhy, and Roger M. Lind, eds., *New Strategic Perspectives on Social Policy* (New York: Pergamon, 1981), pp. 75–96. For a valuable application of this literature to Soviet foreign policy, see Jeff Checkel, "Ideas, Institutions, and the Gorbachev Foreign Policy Revolution," *World Politics* 45 (January 1993), pp. 271–300; Sarah E. Mendelson, "Internal Battles and External Wars: Politics, Learning, and the Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan," *World Politics* 45 (April 1993), pp. 327–60; and Matthew Evangelista, "Sources of Moderation in Soviet Security Policy," in P. Tetlock et al., eds., *Behavior, Society, and Nuclear War*, vol. 2 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 254–354.

11. John S. Odell, *U.S. International Monetary Policy: Markets, Power, and Ideas as Sources of Change* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1982); D. Michael Shafer, *Deadly Paradigms: The Failure of U.S. Counterinsurgency Policy* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1988); Robert B. Reich, ed., *The Power of Public Ideas* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1988), and especially the chapter by Gary R. Orren, "Beyond Self Interest," pp. 13–29; Peter A. Hall, ed., *The Political Power of Economic Ideas* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1989); and Goldstein and Keohane, *Ideas and Foreign Policy*.

12. On the role of policy failures and crises, see Odell, *U.S. International Monetary Policy*,

In this model the transnational allies of domestic political actors provide resources to influence internal debates over foreign policy. In the Soviet case these resources typically consisted of information, arguments, ideas, and a certain legitimacy conferred by association with prominent international figures. Transnational actors and their ideas may help facilitate the formation of political coalitions by identifying previously unrecognized common interests among disparate groups.¹³

Several of the literatures make useful distinctions between the ability of policy entrepreneurs to gain access to government decision makers and their ability to achieve implementation of their preferred policies.¹⁴ Variation on both dimensions appears to be associated with differences in countries' domestic structures (or what students of comparative politics more commonly call "state structures").¹⁵ Decentralized, fragmented states provide multiple points of access to policy entrepreneurs and their innovative ideas, but these states have difficulty implementing the new policies. Centralized, hierarchical, bureaucratized states may be resistant to new ideas at first but are able to implement relevant policies effectively once adopted.¹⁶ The role of the top

especially p. 371; and Peter A. Hall, "Policy Paradigms, Social Learning, and the State: The Case of Economic Policymaking in Britain," *Comparative Politics* (April 1993), pp. 275–96. In their application to foreign policy, see Jack Snyder, *Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991); Haas, "Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination," especially pp. 14–15; and Goldstein and Keohane, "Ideas and Foreign Policy," especially pp. 16–17.

13. See G. John Ikenberry, "A World Economy Restored: Expert Consensus and the Anglo-American Postwar Settlement," *International Organization* 46 (Winter 1992), pp. 289–321; Hall, *Political Power of Economic Ideas*, especially the editor's introduction and conclusion. Goldstein and Keohane also argue that ideas may serve "to alleviate coordination problems arising from the absence of unique equilibrium solutions." Less technically, they serve as coalitional "glue." See their "Ideas and Foreign Policy," pp. 17–18.

14. An anonymous reviewer and some scholars have used other terms, such as "adoption" and "consolidation." See Kingdon, *Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies*; Walker, "Diffusion of Knowledge"; and for comparative perspectives, the special issue of *Governance* 2 (January 1989), edited by John Creighton Campbell.

15. Peter A. Hall, "Policy Innovation and the Structure of the State: The Politics-Administration Nexus in France and Britain," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 466 (March 1983), pp. 43–59; Margaret Weir and Theda Skocpol, "State Structures and the Possibilities for 'Keynesian' Responses to the Great Depression in Sweden, Britain, and the United States," in Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschchemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, eds., *Bringing the State Back In* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 107–163; Hall, *Political Power of Economic Ideas*, especially the editor's introduction and conclusion and the chapter by Margaret Weir, "Ideas and Politics: The Acceptance of Keynesianism in Britain and the United States," pp. 53–86; and Kathryn Sikkink, *Ideas and Institutions: Developmentalism in Brazil and Argentina* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991). The concept of political opportunity structure also resembles my use of domestic structure. See Herbert P. Kitschelt, "Political Opportunity Structures and Political Protest: Anti-nuclear Movements in Four Democracies," *British Journal of Political Science* 16 (January 1986), pp. 57–85.

16. This argument parallels somewhat the argument made for another issue-area—technological innovation and weapons production—in Matthew Evangelista, *Innovation and the Arms Race: How the Soviet Union and the United States Develop New Military Technologies* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1988). That argument drew in turn on Zbigniew Brzezinski and Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Power: U.S.A./U.S.S.R.* (New York: Viking, 1963). The fullest

leadership in such hierarchical states is crucial.¹⁷ For some scholars, achieving a “winning coalition” in support of new policy ideas is also essential.¹⁸ Others focus on the importance of institutionalization of new policy ideas—either within the domestic institutions of foreign policymaking or within international institutions.¹⁹ Such institutionalization may extend the influence of particular ideas beyond the point where a winning coalition would support them strictly on the basis of self-interest.

Finally, theories of learning and epistemic communities may have relevance to transnational relations and Soviet/Russian security policy.²⁰ Transnational actors could serve as agents of foreign policy learning. This was certainly the goal of the scientists who first initiated transnational contacts with their Soviet counterparts in the 1950s and 1960s.²¹ If such transnational actors succeeded in influencing foreign policy as a result of their “recognized expertise and competence” and their “authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge” in the security sphere, then my cases would qualify as an example of an epistemic community, as Peter Haas and others define them.²²

application of domestic structure to transnational relations is Risse-Kappen, “Bringing Transnational Relations Back In.”

17. Nina P. Halpern, “Policy Communities in a Leninist State: The Case of the Chinese Economic Policy Community,” *Governance* 2 (January 1989), pp. 23–41; Mark A. Baskin, “The Evolution of Policy Communities in Socialist Yugoslavia: The Case of Worker Migration Abroad,” *Governance* 2 (January 1989), pp. 67–85. France as a strong state is also relevant here; see Frank R. Baumgartner, “Independent and Politicized Policy Communities: Education and Nuclear Energy in France and in the United States,” *Governance* 2 (January 1989), pp. 42–66.

18. Risse-Kappen, “Ideas Do Not Float Freely.”

19. See especially Judith Goldstein, “Ideas, Institutions, and American Trade Policy,” *International Organization* 42 (Winter 1988), pp. 179–217; Sikkink, *Ideas and Institutions*; and, for application to transnational relations, Risse-Kappen, “Bringing Transnational Relations Back In.” For a suggestive discussion of the Russian case, see Jeff Checkel, “Ideologies on the Loose: (Re-) Defining Russia’s National Interests in the Post-Soviet Era,” presented at a conference sponsored by the Social Science Research Council entitled, “Bringing Russia Back In: IR Theory, Comparative Politics and the Study of the Former U.S.S.R.,” University of Pittsburgh, February 1993.

20. See Hall, “Policy Paradigms, Social Learning, and the State”; George W. Breslauer and Philip Tetlock, eds., *Learning in U.S. and Soviet Foreign Policy* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1991); Mendelson, “Internal Battles and External Wars”; and Janice Gross Stein, “Political Learning by Doing: Gorbachev as an Uncommitted Thinker and Motivated Learner,” *International Organization* 48 (Spring 1994), pp. 155–184. For a critique of learning approaches as applied to the Soviet government, see Evangelista, “Sources of Moderation”; and Richard D. Anderson, Jr., “Why Competitive Politics Inhibits Learning in Soviet Foreign Policy,” in Breslauer and Tetlock, *Learning in U.S. and Soviet Foreign Policy*, pp. 100–131.

21. Personal interview with Paul Doty of Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass., 23 September 1993; with Jack Ruina of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Urbana, Ill., 29 October 1988; with Joseph Rotblat of Pugwash, 27 May 1990; and with Jeremy Stone, Federation of American Scientists, Washington, D.C., 10 June 1991. See also Emanuel Adler, “The Emergence of Cooperation: National Epistemic Communities and the International Evolution of the Idea of Nuclear Arms Control,” *International Organization* 46 (Winter 1992), pp. 101–145.

22. The quotations are from Haas, “Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination,” p. 3. See also Adler, “Emergence of Cooperation.”

In sum, several literatures contribute to a theoretical understanding of how transnational relations could influence Soviet security policy. Yet none of them, with the possible exception of the literature on epistemic communities, requires transnational actors as part of its explanation for policy innovation. The role of policy entrepreneur and conveyor of new ideas can be played as well by domestic actors. Indeed, at least two scholarly accounts of key aspects of the “new thinking” in Soviet foreign policy after 1985 provide persuasive explanations, consistent with the literature on ideas, learning, policy communities, and policy entrepreneurs—but without according any role to transnational actors.²³ Thus, all of these theories constitute potential alternatives to my focus on transnational relations and domestic structures. Applied to the cases of strategic defenses and nuclear testing, the challenge for these theories is whether they can account for the content of Soviet policy initiatives in these areas and, particularly, for the near reversal of policy following the major change in Soviet domestic structure after 1989.

Case selection and research design

This study focuses on two transnational campaigns dating from the early 1980s: (1) the effort to achieve a comprehensive ban on the testing of nuclear weapons and (2) the complex of activities in response to the U.S. pursuit of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), or “Star Wars,” including efforts to maintain the integrity of the Antibalistic Missile (ABM) Treaty of 1972, to prevent the development of new strategic defense systems, and to continue negotiating arms reductions despite SDI. Altogether I present four “observations” (or cases)—two from the time period before and two after the major Soviet domestic structural change, which I place at about 1989.

Choosing the campaigns over ballistic missile defense and nuclear testing as cases for comparison provides some degree of control, despite the major structural changes in the international system that coincided with the domestic structural changes in the Soviet Union. Certainly the demise of “bipolarity”—the loss of the East European buffer zone and the breakup of the Soviet Union itself—transformed the international environment. But for the issues of concern here—strategic defenses and nuclear testing—the signals that Russian policymakers read to interpret the international environment, namely, the behavior of the relevant international actors, stayed remarkably constant. In particular, as late as January 1993 the objectives of both the U.S. government and the transnational groups vis-à-vis the ABM and nuclear testing issues remained the same, even as the Soviet Union changed dramatically and then

23. See Mendelson, “Internal Battles and External Wars”; and Checkel, “Ideas, Institutions, and the Gorbachev Foreign Policy Revolution.”

disintegrated: the U.S. government wanted to abolish or at least amend the ABM treaty and wanted to pursue a new generation of ballistic missile defenses. The transnational organizations wanted to preserve and strengthen the treaty and prevent the development of new weapons. The United States rejected any halt in nuclear testing, even though both France and Russia had ceased their tests by the spring of 1992 and had called on other countries to join their moratoriums. The transnational groups continued to pursue a comprehensive test ban treaty and supported unilateral moratoriums as well. Changes in the external environment came only in 1993, when the Clinton administration revised several of its predecessors' policies.

Domestic structure serves in my analysis as an intervening variable. My dependent variable, what I seek to explain, is the behavior of Russia and the Soviet Union on issues of nuclear testing and strategic defenses and, particularly, how the policies promoted by the transnational supporters of arms control fared. My independent variable is somewhat unusual in that it is in one respect virtually a constant: the specific pressures on Russia/the Soviet Union from the U.S. government and from transnational actors regarding strategic defenses and nuclear testing remained about the same.²⁴ In another respect, however, I do vary my independent variable. In the case studies I consider the counterfactual possibility of the *absence* of transnational actors and their ideas and pose the question, would Russian/Soviet policy have differed under those conditions?²⁵

Even though the external "inputs" to the Soviet policy process regarding strategic defenses and nuclear testing remained similar as the international system underwent profound changes in the late 1980s and early 1990s, one might argue that this broader transformation nonetheless affected Russian/Soviet behavior toward transnational relations. If so, however, the international changes should, according to the conventional wisdom, have influenced behavior in the opposite direction from what a domestic-structure approach anticipates. The end of the cold war and the rapprochement between Russia and the United States alleviated the security dilemma for both countries and diminished the "fear of mutual exploitation" that Snyder identifies as a barrier to the formation of transnational security coalitions. Thus, skeptics of transnationalism expect the prospects for transnational influence to improve after 1989, whereas the domestic-structure approach expects them to decline. The case studies provide a test of the competing expectations.

24. For clarification of this point I am grateful to fellow participants in workshops on transnational relations organized by Thomas Risse-Kappen at Yale and Cornell Universities, and especially to Robert Keohane and Stephen Krasner.

25. In *Taming the Bear*, I explore the impact of transnational relations in Soviet security policy since the 1950s, controlling for the presence and absence of transnational actors across issues, controlling for the presence and absence of windows of opportunity, and including variation in outcome between moderation in security policy and lack of it.

TABLE 1. *Change in Soviet domestic structure*

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Pre-1989</i>	<i>Post-1989</i>
Political institutions	Centralized	Incipient separation of powers
Society	Weak, passive	Strong, assertive
Policy networks	Party-state dominated	Quasi-corporatist

Transformation of the Soviet domestic structure

During the 1980s the domestic structure of the Soviet Union changed dramatically. Thanks mainly to the reforms initiated by Mikhail Gorbachev, Russia was transformed from a highly centralized, authoritarian state dominated by the Communist party into a state with weakened central control, quasi-corporatist policy networks, and an active civil society (see Table 1). Although the changes were less abrupt than a pre- versus post-1989 dichotomization suggests, a comparison of Soviet policymaking in, for example, 1986 compared with 1990 reveals substantial differences that underscore the magnitude of the transformation that had occurred. I associate the changes primarily with the election of a functioning parliament in 1989 and the steady weakening of the Communist party from that point on.

Describing the Soviet transformation in terms of a specific definition of domestic structure illustrates the concept's value for comparative political inquiry. Although there are many definitions of domestic structure, the one advanced by Thomas Risse-Kappen is probably the most widely applicable.²⁶ It focuses on three components: (1) political institutions, particularly their degree of centralization and the relationship between legislative and executive power; (2) the structure of society, its degree of polarization, the strength of social organization, and the extent to which societal pressure can be mobilized; and (3) the nature of the coalition-building processes in the policy networks linking state and society, particularly whether they exhibit state domination, societal control, or corporatist bargaining between actors of relatively equal power. This framework has proved quite useful in accounting for differences in the foreign policies of France, Germany, Japan, and the United States and—in the

26. Thomas Risse-Kappen, "Public Opinion, Domestic Structure, and Foreign Policy in Liberal Democracies," *World Politics* 43 (July 1991), pp. 479–512, especially pp. 485–486. His definition draws on Peter Katzenstein, ed., *Between Power and Plenty: The Foreign Economic Policies of Advanced Industrial States* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978). Within the comparative-politics literature, several similar definitions of state structure have been proposed, but their use tends to be limited to specific issue-areas, usually related to economic policy. See, for example, Hall, "Policy Innovation and the Structure of the State"; Weir and Skocpol, "State Structures and the Possibilities for 'Keynesian' Responses"; Weir, "Ideas and Politics"; and Sikkink, *Ideas and Institutions*.

realm of transnational relations—for the different degrees of receptivity to transnational influence among a number of very different types of states.²⁷ How well does it describe the Soviet domestic changes?

Political institutions

The old Soviet system was highly centralized, with power concentrated in the hands of the Communist party and in particular its Politburo and General Secretary. Legislation was enacted mainly by decree—typically joint decrees of the Council of Ministers and the party's Central Committee.²⁸

In 1989 competitive elections were held to fill a majority of the seats in a new Congress of People's Deputies.²⁹ The Congress was enjoined to elect a Supreme Soviet to function as a genuine legislature. During the same time, Gorbachev managed to remove most of his conservative opponents from the Politburo, while simultaneously reducing the role of that body and its leader, the General Secretary (himself). He introduced the role of President and was elected to that office by more than 95 percent of the delegates to the Congress of People's Deputies. Over the course of the next year, the Congress and the Supreme Soviet came to eclipse the Communist party's Central Committee as the country's most important deliberative and legislative bodies. Meanwhile Gorbachev succeeded in shifting policymaking authority from the party to the new government, establishing a presidential council to fulfill many of the policymaking functions previously reserved for the Politburo. Gorbachev's desire for a strong presidency in the French mold often conflicted with the preference on the part of many Supreme Soviet deputies for a strong parliamentary system with reliable checks and balances. The new competition between the executive and legislative branches fatally weakened the centralized, party-dominated state and left a legacy of policy fragmentation and incoherence that outlived the Soviet Union itself.

A key turning point in the transition from the old domestic structure to the new one came with the repeal of Article 6 of the Soviet Constitution in February 1990. That article had provided the legal guarantee for the Communist party's monopoly on political power. Although the party remained a powerful institution, it now had to face increasingly organized opposition and eventually alternative political parties. The party was discredited by the failed

27. See Risse-Kappen, "Ideas Do Not Float Freely"; and Risse-Kappen, *Bringing Transnational Relations Back In*.

28. For a thorough discussion of the old system, see Jerry Hough and Merle Fainsod, *How the Soviet Union is Governed* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1979).

29. The events discussed in this section are summarized in the useful "Chronology of Noteworthy Events, March 11, 1985–July 11, 1991," in Ed A. Hewett and Victor H. Winston, eds., *Milestones in Glasnost and Perestroika: Politics and People* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1991), pp. 499–536. For a valuable insider account, see the memoir of Gorbachev's top foreign policy aide, A. S. Cherniaev, *Shest' let s Gorbachevym: po dnevnikovym zapisiam* (Six years with Gorbachev: From diary entries) (Moscow: Progress, 1993).

coup of August 1991 and outlawed shortly thereafter—leaving, as Georgii Arbatov points out, “a power vacuum and a completely disorganized political process.”³⁰ With the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the emerging political system in Russia was characterized by chaos and uncertainty. Some of its elements resembled systems of interest-group pluralism, others suggested a variant of corporatism, and dominating all aspects of politics was the legacy of Soviet bureaucratic inertia.

Structure of society

Under the old Soviet system, society played a limited and indirect role in policymaking. Censorship, control of information, and the repressive apparatus of the security agencies ensured passivity and conformity, even though beneath the surface Soviet society reflected the widest possible divergence of views. Independent social organizations were weak or nonexistent, although official policy-oriented research institutes sometimes appeared to exert significant influence, especially at early stages of policymaking.

The reemergence of Soviet civil society became evident in 1985, the first year of Gorbachev’s tenure in office, and a growing movement of informal groups was quite active by 1987.³¹ By the end of the decade, hundreds of self-defined political parties were in existence and were competing for influence in a functioning legislature.³² Vibrant print and broadcast media raised the quality and diversity of political discourse and contributed to an informed and attentive citizenry.³³ All of these developments stemmed from Gorbachev’s policy of glasnost, which gave voice to the range of political views encompassed by Soviet society and allowed groups access to information as a tool for organizing their political activity. Glasnost gradually diminished the degree of secrecy enshrouding all aspects of Soviet life, including security policy, as indeed its architects intended.³⁴

30. Georgii Arbatov, *The System: An Insider’s Life in Soviet Politics* (New York: Random House, 1992), p. 351.

31. See A. V. Gromov and O. S. Kuzin, *Neformaly: Kto est’ kto?* (Informals: Who’s who?) (Moscow: Mysl’, 1990); Vyacheslav Igrunov, “Public Movements: From Protest to Political Self-consciousness,” and Andrei Fadin, “Emerging Political Institutions: From Informals to Multiparty Democracy,” both in Brad Roberts and Nina Belyaeva, eds., *After Perestroika: Democracy in the Soviet Union* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1991); and Vera Tolz, *The U.S.S.R.’s Emerging Multiparty System* (New York: Praeger, 1990).

32. See Vladimir Pribylovskii, *Dictionary of Political Parties and Organizations in Russia* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1992); and Tolz, *The U.S.S.R.’s Emerging Multiparty System*.

33. For a useful overview, see Jamey Gambrell, “Moscow: The Front Page,” *New York Review of Books*, 8 October 1992.

34. See Aleksandr N. Iakovlev, “Dostizhenie kachestvenno novogo sostoiianiia Sovetskogo obshchestva i obshchestvennye nauki” (The attainment of a qualitatively new state of Soviet society and the social sciences) *Kommunist* 8 (1987), pp. 3–22; Eduard Shevardnadze, “Doklad E. A. Shevardnadze” (The report of E. A. Shevardnadze), *Vestnik Ministerstva Inostrannykh Del SSSR* (The Herald of the U.S.S.R. Foreign Ministry), no. 15, 15 August 1988, pp. 27–46; and

Policy networks

The correspondence that Thomas Risse-Kappen identified between weak social organizations and state-dominated policy networks fits the Soviet case, although here one should speak of party–state domination rather than simply state domination. Under the Soviet system, coalition building by and large excluded societal actors.

Characterizing the postreform policy networks in the Soviet Union and post–Soviet Russia is somewhat difficult. The party–state-dominated policy network is certainly a thing of the past, but it is not clear what has replaced it. The Soviet Communist party was abolished, but many state institutions (or their successors) remained strong, including several economic ministries, the defense and foreign ministries, and the KGB. At the same time many social organizations remained active, and some of them acquired considerable political influence. Economic interest groups, led by managers of large enterprises, began to organize themselves into “lobbies,” as the Russians call them (e.g., the energy lobby or the defense–industrial lobby). These organizations have been engaged in a bargaining process with state institutions, such that one can probably speak of the post-Soviet system of policy networks as it evolved during the last years of Gorbachev’s tenure as a form of corporatism. One must qualify such a characterization, however, in two respects: first, by acknowledging that most “corporate” entities were still in the process of trying to determine where their interests lay and were far from homogeneous and, second, by recognizing the presence of grassroots social movements—active especially on nationalist and ecological issues—that resisted corporatist forms of representation in favor of direct appeals to the government.

Transnational efforts under the old structure

Prior to the structural change, efforts of the transnational community of arms control advocates helped limit the Soviet response to SDI and helped initiate a unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing and acceptance of on-site verification.

Soviet domestic structure and transnational contacts

Ever since the first East–West transnational discussions of arms control in the 1950s under the auspices of the Pugwash movement, the Communist party of the Soviet Union has played a central role in approving and sometimes instructing the Soviet delegations. Documents from the party’s Central Committee archives in Moscow provide considerable detail about how the

Shevardnadze, *Moi vybor: v zashchitu demokratii i svobody* (My choice: in defense of democracy and freedom) (Moscow: Novosti, 1991).

process worked.³⁵ Scientists seeking to travel abroad to attend conferences (not only political but purely academic conferences as well) were obliged to obtain high-level permission before doing so, sometimes from the Politburo itself. Thus, the Communist party could influence to a considerable degree which transnational contacts Soviet citizens could pursue.

The other side of Communist party supervision of transnational contacts was access to the top Soviet leadership by the Soviet participants in international meetings. Because the number of contacts with Americans, for example, was limited, those who were allowed to pursue them were naturally more knowledgeable than most about the United States and became a valuable resource for the Soviet leaders. This was true of several leading figures active in transnational relations with Western colleagues. They in turn could make use of their access to press for policies they favored.³⁶

Transnational policy entrepreneurs

The main actors on the Soviet side were scientists affiliated with various institutes of the Soviet Academy of Sciences who formally organized themselves into the Committee of Soviet Scientists for Peace, Against the Nuclear Threat (hereafter the Committee of Soviet Scientists or CSS) in 1983 and the Soviet chapter of the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW), founded in 1980. Among the many Western organizations active in transnational efforts, the most important for my cases were IPPNW, the Federation of American Scientists (FAS), the Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS) and the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC).

The story of Soviet–U.S. transnational collaboration is as much a story of individuals as of organizations. Among the key figures on the Soviet side, four stand out. Evgenii Chazov was a cofounder of the IPPNW movement and the

35. Information for this paragraph comes from the following documents located at the Center for the Storage of Contemporary Documentation, the former Central Committee archive, Moscow: Letter from Joseph Rotblat to A. N. Topchiev, proposing a Pugwash meeting in Geneva to help resolve technical disagreements in the official three-power discussions on a test ban, 5 January 1960; letter from Eugene Rabinowitch, editor of the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, requesting to publish a statement from Soviet scientists at the official conference on nuclear testing, 12 January 1960; letter from A. N. Nesmeianov, president of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, and E. K. Fedorov to Central Committee proposing to send a delegation to the Geneva Pugwash meeting, 26 January 1960; “On the participation of Soviet scientists in the International Pugwash conference on the question of the cessation of nuclear tests,” all in 20th convocation of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, from protocol no. 138, Secretariat session, 23 February 1960, item 16; and “On the calling of an international conference of scientists on the cessation of nuclear tests,” from protocol no. 45, Secretariat session, 2 August 1957, item 24. Information on procedures in the 1980s comes from a conversation with Roald Sagdeev, College Park, Md., April 1994.

36. See Georgii A. Arbatov, *Zatianuvsheesia vyzdorovlenie (1953–1985 gg.): Svidetel'stvo sovremenika* (Extended recovery [1953–1985]: Witness of a contemporary) (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1991); personal interview with Evgenii Velikhov, Moscow, 29 July 1992; and Evgenii Chazov, *Zdorov'e i vlast': Vospominaniia “kremlevskogo vracha”* (Health and power: Memoirs of the “Kremlin doctor”) (Moscow: Novosti, 1992), especially pp. 90–96.

“Kremlin doctor”—the personal physician to Leonid Brezhnev, Yuri Andropov, and Konstantin Chernenko. Andrei Kokoshin trained as an engineer at the Bauman Institute in Moscow before pursuing a career in politics and history. He became deputy director of Arbatov’s Institute of the U.S.A. and Canada. Much of his collaborative work with Western colleagues has focused on strategic defenses and conventional-force restructuring. Academicians Evgenii Velikhov and Roald Sagdeev were prominent physicists, both students of Lev Artsimovich, a leading figure in the Soviet Academy of Sciences and a longtime Pugwash participant. Sagdeev served as director of the Space Research Institute, and Velikhov headed the Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Energy.

Velikhov, who was elected a vice president of the Academy of Sciences in 1977, began his involvement in international arms control discussions in 1982 when Brezhnev decided to send him to Rome to represent the Soviet Union at a meeting called by the Papal Academy of Sciences to discuss the threat of nuclear war.³⁷ In early 1983 Velikhov and Sagdeev went to Washington as members of a Soviet delegation meeting with the U.S. National Academy of Sciences Committee on International Security and Arms Control. Their discussions produced three main policy goals: (1) defend the ABM treaty, (2) prevent deployment of weapons in space, including antisatellite (ASAT) weapons, and (3) negotiate a comprehensive nuclear test ban.³⁸ These became high-priority objectives of the CSS when Velikhov founded it that same year, with Sagdeev and Kokoshin as his deputies.³⁹

The Soviet response to SDI

The main achievement of the transnational disarmament community in the realm of ABM systems was to shape the Soviet Union’s response to SDI and to strengthen the ABM treaty by making the Soviet government more forthcoming on questions of its own adherence to the treaty. To argue that the transnational community influenced Soviet policies, one must argue counterfactually that the decisions of the policymakers would have been different were it not for the transnational community’s activities.

The position adopted by the Soviet government—not to respond in kind to SDI but to develop relatively inexpensive countermeasures—cannot be understood without considering the role of transnational actors. Their advocacy of an asymmetric response was a genuinely new policy idea. The Soviet reaction to

37. See Evgenii Velikhov, “Chernobyl Remains on Our Mind,” in Stephen F. Cohen and Katrina vanden Heuvel, eds., *Voices of Glasnost: Interviews with Gorbachev’s Reformers* (New York: Norton, 1989), p. 160; and personal interview with Velikhov, Moscow, 29 July 1992.

38. Personal interview with Velikhov, Moscow, 29 July 1992; and Jeremy Stone, “FAS Visit to Moscow Initiates Star Wars Dialogue,” *F.A.S. Public Interest Report* 36 (December 1983), p. 1.

39. Frank von Hippel, “The Committee of Soviet Scientists Against the Nuclear Threat,” *F.A.S. Public Interest Report* 37 (January 1984), p. 1.

the U.S. pursuit of strategic defenses should, by historical precedent, have included an attempt to develop analogous systems, and most Western observers anticipated that response.⁴⁰ Andropov, the Soviet leader at the time of Reagan's Star Wars speech in March 1983, had argued precisely in those terms just a few months earlier. He maintained that the Reagan administration's arms buildup would not force the Soviet Union to make unilateral concessions and that the Soviet Union would match every U.S. development.⁴¹ His first reaction to Reagan's speech was consistent with the longstanding Soviet approach: "Should this conception be converted into reality, this would actually open the floodgates of a runaway arms race of all types of strategic arms, both offensive and defensive."⁴²

The ASAT moratorium. Despite Andropov's commitment not to make unilateral concessions, the Soviet Union did precisely that within months of Reagan's Star Wars speech. On 18 August 1983, Andropov met with nine U.S. senators in the Kremlin and pledged a unilateral Soviet moratorium on the testing of ASAT weapons. Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives had been working on legislation calling for a joint Soviet-U.S. moratorium, and Andropov's action strengthened their case considerably.⁴³

Velikhov and his transnational allies in the United States deserve credit for persuading the Soviet leadership to impose the unilateral ASAT moratorium. In March 1983, upon his return from the National Academy of Sciences meeting in Washington, Velikhov proposed the idea to Marshal Sergei Akhromeev, then deputy chief of the general staff, and later to Defense Minister Dmitrii Ustinov.⁴⁴ In May 1983, the UCS presented a draft treaty—the work mainly of Kurt Gottfried of Cornell University and Richard Garwin of IBM—limiting ASAT weapons.⁴⁵ Velikhov had met Garwin at the Washington

40. See Stephen M. Meyer, "Soviet Strategic Programmes and the U.S. SDI," *Survival* 27 (November–December 1985), pp. 274–92; David Holloway, "The Strategic Defense Initiative and the Soviet Union," *Daedalus* 114 (Summer 1985), pp. 257–78; and Evangelista, *Innovation and the Arms Race*, pp. 258–61.

41. "Doklad tovarishcha Iu. V. Andropova" (Report of Comrade Iu. V. Andropov), *Pravda*, 22 December 1982.

42. "Replies of Iu. V. Andropov to Questions from a Correspondent of Pravda," *Pravda*, 27 March 1983.

43. Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies, *Arms Control Reporter* (Cambridge, Mass.: Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies, monthly compendium, 1982–1992), pp. 573.B.15–18 (hereafter cited by title only).

44. Personal interview with Velikov, Moscow, 29 July 1992; and E. P. Velikhov, "Science and Scientists for a Nuclear-weapon-free World," *Physics Today* (November 1989), pp. 32–36. This article is an expanded version of a speech Velikhov delivered at the Scientific-Practical Conference of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, the original of which was published as "Nauka rabotaet na bez'iadernyi mir," *Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn'*, no. 10, October 1988, pp. 49–53. See also Marshal Akhromeev's discussion of Defense Minister Ustinov's reaction to SDI, in S. F. Akhromeev and G. M. Kornienko, *Glazami marshala i diplomata* (Through the eyes of a marshal and a diplomat) (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1992), pp. 19–20.

45. *Arms Control Reporter*, pp. 573.C.3–6.

meeting and had discussed proposals for ASAT limitations with him. He supported the UCS proposals, many of which ultimately became incorporated in a draft treaty the Soviet Union submitted to the United Nations in early 1984.⁴⁶

A Soviet "Star Wars?" Despite the restraint that the Soviet Union exercised in the related field of ASAT weapons, the initial Soviet response to SDI was of a very different character. It suggested that the Soviet Union would respond vigorously with development of defensive as well as offensive systems, including space-based defenses. Senior military leaders made numerous warnings along those lines.⁴⁷ In particular, one constituency within the Soviet scientific–military–industrial sector favored pursuit of strategic defenses and had promoted such programs at various points—notably in the mid-1970s and again in the early 1980s, before Reagan’s Star Wars speech.⁴⁸

Velikhov and Sagdeev were the first to argue against copying the U.S. initiative, just months after Reagan’s speech—and they did so in direct contradiction to the impression that top Soviet military and political officials were trying to convey. The scientists argued on the basis of their understanding of the dangerous implications of mutual strategic defense as they were worked out by a transnational community of Soviet and Western scientists during the 1960s.⁴⁹ And they did so well before Gorbachev came into office and began articulating his “new thinking” in foreign policy. In 1983 Velikhov, Sagdeev, and Kokoshin were already presenting some of the key ideas to Soviet and Western audiences. They suggested that rather than copy SDI, the Soviet Union should pursue arms control and, if necessary, build cheap countermeasures to SDI.⁵⁰ These recommendations were incorporated in a report issued by

46. Excerpts of a statement by Igor Iakovlev at the United Nations symposium on preventing the arms race in outer space, 26 January 1984, quoted in the *Arms Control Reporter*, p. 574.D.5. For the text of the Soviet draft treaty, see pp. 574.D.1–3.

47. See, for example, the remarks by the chief of the general staff, Marshal Sergei Akhromeev, “Dogovor po PRO—pregrada na puti ronki strategicheskikh vooruzhenii” (The ABM treaty—a barrier on the path to an arms race in strategic weapons), *Pravda*, 4 June 1985; and the discussion in Mary C. Fitzgerald, “Soviet Views on SDI,” Carl Beck Papers No. 601, Center for Russian and East European Studies, University of Pittsburgh, May 1987, pp. 39–40. See also Don Oberdorfer, “Military Response Planned to ‘Star Wars,’ Soviet Says,” *Washington Post*, 8 March 1985, p. 1.

48. See Roald Sagdeev, *The Making of a Soviet Scientist* (New York: John Wiley, 1994); Bruce Parrott, *The Soviet Union and Ballistic Missile Defense* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1987), pp. 28–35; and Velikhov, “Science and Scientists for a Nuclear-weapon-free World.”

49. See Matthew Evangelista, “Soviet Scientists as Arms Control Advisers: The Case of ABM,” paper prepared for the fourth world congress for Soviet and East European Studies, Harrogate, England, 21–26 July 1990; Evangelista, *Taming the Bear*; and Adler, “Emergence of Cooperation.”

50. See, for example, the following published interviews: with Evgenii Velikhov, *Los Angeles Times*, 24 July 1983, reprinted in Robert Scheer, *With Enough Shovels: Reagan, Bush, and Nuclear War* (New York: Vintage, 1983), pp. 298–304; with Evgenii Velikhov, *Sovetskaia Rossiia*, 21 April 1985; and with Roald Sagdeev, *Soitsialisticheskaiia industriia*, 9 February 1986. Also see Stone, “FAS Visit to Moscow Initiates Star Wars Dialogue,” p. 3; and Frank von Hippel, “Arms Control Physics: The New Soviet Connection,” *Physics Today* (November 1989), pp. 39–46 and p. 40 in particular.

the newly created Committee on Soviet Scientists and distributed internally and abroad.⁵¹

At the time, the writings of Velikhov and his colleagues were interpreted by some in the West as part of a government-orchestrated propaganda campaign to defeat the American SDI program while the Soviet Union continued its own military programs unhindered.⁵² The Soviet scientists' campaign was, however, directed primarily at the Soviet military and political leaders to persuade them not to fall for American attempts to undermine the Soviet economy through an expensive and counterproductive arms race.⁵³ That goal would be served by bolstering the efforts of American opponents of SDI, but that was not an end in itself. In addition to reducing the risk of nuclear war, the Soviet scientists were keenly interested in the demilitarization and democratization of their own society—goals they saw as closely linked.⁵⁴

The Krasnoiarsk gambit. The second major achievement of the transnational actors regarding the ABM treaty was in helping to convince the Soviet leadership to acknowledge that the giant phased-array radar near Krasnoiarsk in Siberia constituted a treaty violation (because of its inland location and the direction it faced). Evidently, the Soviet military had developed plans to build the radar to comply with the treaty but found that it would cost several times as

51. *Strategicheskii i mezhdunarodno-politicheskie posledstviia sozdaniia kosmicheskoi protivoraketnoi sistemy s ispol'zovaniem oruzhiia napravlennoi peredachi energii* (Strategic and international-political consequences of the creation of a space antimissile system using directed-energy weaponry) (Moscow: Institut kosmicheskikh issledovaniï AN SSSR, 1984). In 1986 a revised version of the report was published in several languages and attracted considerable attention abroad. See Evgenii P. Velikhov, Roald Z. Sagdeev, and Andrei A. Kokoshin, eds., *Kosmicheskoe oruzhie: Dilemma bezopasnosti*, English translation published as *Weaponry in Space: The Dilemma of Security* (Moscow: Mir, 1986).

52. For example, see Benjamin S. Lambeth, "Soviet Perspectives on the SDI," in Samuel F. Wells, Jr., and Robert S. Litwak, eds., *Strategic Defenses and Soviet-American Relations* (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1987). For a similar interpretation of another initiative of the transnational scientists' organizations, see Leon Gouré, "'Nuclear Winter' in Soviet Mirrors," *Strategic Review* (Summer 1985), especially pp. 35–36.

53. This is also a point that Arbatov emphasized. He criticized the Soviet propaganda campaign against SDI—after the fact—as having played into the Americans' hands by encouraging the Soviet side to develop costly and unnecessary responses. See Arbatov, *Zatianuvsheesia vyzdorovlenie (1953–1985 gg.)*, pp. 206 and 348. Sagdeev's views were similar. Based on personal interviews with Roald Sagdeev, Moscow, November 1990; Ann Arbor, Mich., May 1991; and College Park, Md., April 1994; and Sagdeev, *The Making of a Soviet Scientist*. See also Strobe Talbott, *The Master of the Game: Paul Nitze and the Nuclear Peace* (New York: Knopf, 1988), pp. 360–361.

54. Andrei Sakharov is, of course, the most famous proponent of these views, but they were evident in the statements and actions of other Soviet scientists, including prominent members of the Committee on Soviet Scientists, such as Sagdeev. See, for example, Irwin Goodwin, "Soviet Scientists Tell It Like It Is, Urging Reforms of Research Institutes," *Physics Today* (September 1988), pp. 97–98; "Perestroika and the Scientific Intellegentsia," summary of talk by Roald Sagdeev, Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies, Washington, D.C., 16 November 1988; Roald Sagdeev, "Science Is a Party to Political Decisions," transcript of a speech delivered to a conference of the Soviet foreign ministry, published in *International Affairs* (Moscow) 11 (November 1988), pp. 26–28.

much money to do so.⁵⁵ Knowing that the radar would be in technical violation of the treaty, the defense ministry, foreign ministry, KGB, and ultimately the Politburo nevertheless advocated building it near Krasnoïarsk.⁵⁶

When the United States first noticed construction of the complex in 1983, it accused the Soviets not only of violating the treaty but also of planning to break out of the treaty's restraints and deploy a full-fledged strategic defense system with the Krasnoïarsk radar as part of a "battle management" system.⁵⁷ Rather than admit that the radar was intended to provide early warning of possible launches of new U.S. Trident missiles, Soviet leaders claimed that it was intended for the purely civilian purpose of tracking objects in space.

The contribution of the Soviet scientists to resolving the Krasnoïarsk issue entailed lifting the veil of secrecy on the complex itself. Velikhov was persuaded of the deleterious effects of Soviet secrecy mainly by his American colleague Bernard Lown, cochair of IPPNW. Lown, said Velikhov, used to speak of the U.S. military buildup and Russian secrecy as "two sides of the same coin," and eventually Velikhov came to agree.⁵⁸ When a U.S. congressional delegation visited the Soviet Union in September 1987, Velikhov managed to convince Gorbachev to let the group visit the Krasnoïarsk site (and also the site of laser research at Sary Shagan). The Americans were allowed to photograph the complex extensively.⁵⁹

Not until October 1989 did the Soviet Union, at Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze's insistence, admit that construction of the Krasnoïarsk radar violated the ABM treaty.⁶⁰ Shevardnadze claimed that he had been deceived about the true nature of the radar and that it had taken four years to learn the truth. One of Shevardnadze's more prominent former colleagues in the foreign ministry charges, however, that the foreign minister was informed of the status of Krasnoïarsk as a likely violation as early as September 1985.⁶¹ If the charge is true, then we should not understand the transnational actors involved in exposing the Krasnoïarsk violation as agents of learning (e.g., about the value

55. Raymond L. Garthoff, "Case of the Wandering Radar," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 47 (July/August 1991), pp. 7-9. Also based on personal interviews with former first deputy Foreign Minister Georgii Kornienko, Moscow, 28 July 1992; and with Aleksei Arbatov, Cambridge, Mass., 18 August 1993.

56. Personal interview with Kornienko, Moscow, 28 July 1992.

57. *Arms Control Reporter*, p. 603.B.17.

58. Personal interviews with Bernard Lown, Brookline, Mass., 6 April 1994; and with Velikhov, Moscow, 29 July 1992.

59. Experts in the delegation dismissed the Pentagon's claim that the system would be useful for "battle management" as part of a nationwide ballistic missile defense system, but they also found Soviet claims of a space-tracking role for the radar implausible. In their view the radar was best suited for early warning of a missile attack—which, as we now know, was its original intention—although they were not particularly impressed with its capabilities even in this area. See William J. Broad, "Inside a Key Russian Radar Site: Tour Raises Questions on Treaty," *New York Times*, 7 September 1987, p. 1.

60. *Arms Control Reporter*, p. 603.B.182.

61. Akhromeev and Kornienko, *Glazami marshala i diplomata*, pp. 255-56. Kornienko claims to have briefed Shevardnadze himself.

of openness). Indeed, Shevardnadze himself had long argued eloquently about the pernicious effects of secrecy and deception on international security.⁶² Instead, the transnational actors should be seen as part of a clever political gambit to embarrass and discredit the “old thinkers” in the Soviet security establishment and pave the way for more progress on disarmament and verification.

Eventually the Soviets agreed to dismantle the Krasnoiarsk facility, marking an important turning point in U.S. perceptions of Soviet intentions. Moreover, the efforts of the transnational actors in arranging the Krasnoiarsk visit set a precedent for considering inspections of suspected treaty violations an acceptable means of resolving disputes, rather than an infringement on national sovereignty, as the previous Soviet view held.

Unlinking SDI. The ultimate accomplishment of the transnational actors consisted of “unlinking” SDI from arms control. Previously the Soviet government had tenaciously insisted that no arms treaty could be signed without a U.S. commitment to abide by its existing treaty obligations, to maintain limitations on ABM systems, and to forswear SDI. Gorbachev put forward this position most forcefully at the Reykjavik summit in October 1986, when he presented a package of arms control concessions, all contingent on U.S. restraint on SDI.⁶³ The intercession of prominent Soviet scientists such as Sagdeev, Velikhov, and Andrei Sakharov, working with their American colleagues and sympathetic aides to Gorbachev and Shevardnadze, helped convince the Soviet leadership to sign two major arms accords without insisting on any U.S. commitments regarding the ABM treaty or SDI. The timing of the transnational actors’ policy advocacy and the fact that major figures in the Soviet security establishment opposed any Soviet concessions on SDI suggest an important role for the transnational efforts.

Sakharov was the first and most outspoken internal Soviet critic of the linkage between SDI and arms control. He addressed the issue at his first impromptu press conference at the Yaroslavl train station in Moscow, on his return from internal exile in Gorky in December 1986. He repeated his argument at an international disarmament forum in Moscow in mid-February 1987, to which Velikhov had invited him and which Gorbachev also attended. Before the opening of the forum, Sakharov met with Frank von Hippel and Jeremy Stone from the FAS, who shared his criticism of the SDI linkage. All three spoke at the forum, and their speeches were widely disseminated in the Soviet media. Moreover, Stone and von Hippel sat at Gorbachev’s table at the forum’s concluding banquet, where they had further opportunity to advocate their positions.⁶⁴

62. See for example, Shevardnadze, “Doklad E. A. Shevardnadze.”

63. Michael Mandelbaum and Strobe Talbott, *Reagan and Gorbachev* (New York: Vintage, 1987), chap. 5.

64. See Sakharov, *Moscow and Beyond*, pp. 21–24; and Talbott, *Master of the Game*, pp. 360–61.

Less than two weeks after the Moscow forum, Gorbachev announced the unlinking of SDI from the negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) in Europe, and the INF treaty was signed by the end of the year.⁶⁵ As he later explained, his discussions with foreign and Soviet intellectuals at the forum “made a big impression. I discussed the results of the congress with my colleagues in the Politburo. And we decided to make a major new compromise—to untie the Reykjavik package, detaching from it the problem of intermediate-range missiles in Europe.”⁶⁶ Even as he paved the way for an INF treaty, Gorbachev reiterated Soviet opposition to unlinking SDI from the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START).⁶⁷ Finally, after a vigorous campaign by the Soviet scientists and their U.S. counterparts, working in tandem with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, Gorbachev relented in late 1989. As Michael Beschloss and Strobe Talbott describe, now “the Soviet Union would be willing to sign and implement a START treaty without a separate accord limiting space-based defenses.”⁶⁸ The details of the treaty took another year and a half to negotiate, but the main stumbling block was removed by December 1989, in accordance with the prescription of the transnational disarmament community.

Alternative explanations. Several explanations typically are offered to counter arguments about the influence of transnational actors on Soviet security policy.⁶⁹ They tend to rely on the notion that the Soviet government, primarily for military or economic reasons, already intended to pursue the policies advocated by transnational actors; therefore transnational relations were irrelevant or transnational actors merely served as instruments of Soviet policy.

There is no denying that economic concerns motivated much of the change in Soviet security policy, including Soviet opposition to SDI, especially after Gorbachev came into office.⁷⁰ As theorists of policy change would term it, the Soviet economic crisis constituted a “policy window” through which transnational policy entrepreneurs could promote their solutions. But the content of those solutions often depended on the transnational actors themselves. Even if Gorbachev and his predecessors were convinced of the economic necessity of avoiding an arms race in strategic defenses, they needed the arguments and expertise of the transnational scientists. In private conversations with the

65. *Arms Control Reporter*, p. 403.B.426.

66. M. S. Gorbachev, *Perestroika i novoe myshlenie dlia nashei strany i dlia vsego mira* (Perestroika and new thinking for our country and the world) (Moscow: Politizdat, 1987), pp. 157–58.

67. *Arms Control Reporter*, p. 403.B.434.

68. Michael Beschloss and Strobe Talbott, *At the Highest Levels: The Inside Story of the End of the Cold War* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1993), pp. 117–19. Sagdeev at this point served as an informal adviser reporting directly to Shevardnadze. Based on personal interview with Sagdeev, College Park, Md., April 1994.

69. For a review, see Evangelista, “Sources of Moderation in Soviet Security Policy.”

70. For an early assessment, see Matthew Evangelista, “The New Soviet Approach to Security,” *World Policy Journal* 3 (Fall 1986), pp. 561–99.

military high command, Gorbachev stressed both the economic constraints on Soviet security policy and the need for military officials to take into account the views of the scientists.⁷¹

The argument that the Soviet armed forces, for their own military reasons, supported an asymmetric or even no response to SDI is less persuasive. Even during Gorbachev's tenure, while the Soviet leader was arguing against imitating SDI, his military leaders, like Marshal Sergei Akhromeev, were threatening "to adopt retaliatory measures in both offensive and other spheres, not excluding defensive arms, and including space-based ones."⁷² Some members of the military-industrial establishment were genuinely enthusiastic about building defenses.⁷³ Certainly many Soviet military leaders appreciated the strategic benefits of constraining a race in defensive systems and therefore supported the ABM treaty. Yet the top military leadership as well as prominent foreign ministry officials were adamantly opposed to concluding arms agreements with the United States in the absence of a U.S. commitment not to go forward with SDI. Marshal Akhromeev contemplated resigning over the way Gorbachev and Shevardnadze handled the INF negotiations. He and Deputy Foreign Minister Kornienko were certainly not alone in the foreign and defense ministries in steadfastly opposing the decision to sign the START treaty without securing limitations on SDI.⁷⁴

The role of transnational actors in opening up Soviet military facilities (Krasnoarsk and the laser research laboratories) to inspection is apparent from the public activities of members of the IPPNW movement, NRDC, FAS, and the Soviet Committee of Scientists. Certainly the goal of fostering trust in order to broaden the possibilities for arms control was not held exclusively by the transnational disarmament community, but its members promoted concrete initiatives within the Soviet government calculated to make the biggest impression on the United States.⁷⁵

71. Akhromeev and Kornienko, *Glazami marshala i diplomata*, especially pp. 71–73.

72. Marshal Sergei Akhromeev, chief of the general staff, in *Pravda*, 19 October 1985. See also the remarks of Defense Minister Marshal Sergei Sokolov in *Krasnaia zvezda*, 5 May 1985, and numerous other quotations cited in Fitzgerald, *Soviet Views on SDI*.

73. An unpublished report by four Russian ABM scientists is particularly revealing in this regard. See O. V. Golubev, Ia.A. Kamenskii, M. G. Minasian, and B. D. Pupkov, "Proshloe i nastoiashchee Rossiiskikh sistem protivoraketnoi oborony (vzgliad iznutri)" [The past and present of Russian antimissile defense systems (a view from within)] (Moscow: 1992). I am grateful to David Holloway for providing me a copy of this report. See also Cherniaev, *Shest' let s Gorbachevym*, p. 121; and Sagdeev, *The Making of a Soviet Scientist*, p. 273.

74. Akhromeev and Kornienko, *Glazami marshala i diplomata*, p. 109. Akhromeev claimed that Shevardnadze was prepared to unlink START from SDI as early as December 1987, whereas he and First Deputy Foreign Minister Kornienko insisted that the U.S. forswear pursuit of defenses. See *ibid.*, pp. 142 and 192.

75. The only alternative explanation for Soviet behavior of which I am aware is Paul Nitze's argument that the change in Soviet policy came about because the "Soviet Union apparently had decided it had more to learn from on-site inspection than we did." His only evidence for this argument is his observation that U.S. military officials evinced considerable reluctance to allow Soviet inspectors into U.S. facilities once the Soviets had accepted the principle of on-site inspection. See Paul N. Nitze, *From Hiroshima to Glasnost* (New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1989),

Soviet policy on nuclear testing

The main achievement of the transnational actors in the realm of nuclear testing was to eliminate the central U.S. objection to a comprehensive nuclear test ban—namely, that it could not be reliably verified—and to promote unilateral restraint as a means of arms control.

The test ban. One of the first foreign policy initiatives that Gorbachev undertook when he became General Secretary in 1985 was to announce a unilateral moratorium on Soviet nuclear testing to take effect on 6 August 1985, the fortieth anniversary of the U.S. atomic bombing of Hiroshima. A number of U.S. arms control groups—including the Washington-based Center for Defense Information and the U.S. chapter of IPPNW—sought to convince the Soviet Union to take the initiative in achieving a comprehensive test ban in the early 1980s.⁷⁶ Their efforts bore fruit only after Gorbachev came into office—reinforcing insights from the theoretical literature on the importance of leadership in highly centralized systems,⁷⁷ as well as the role that events such as leadership succession and elections can play in opening windows for policy innovation.⁷⁸

Among the transnational actors who seized the opportunity of a new leader to promote the test ban, the scientists and physicians were probably the most influential. Velikhov, who had been discussing the need for a test ban with American colleagues for over two years, played a key role in convincing Gorbachev to initiate the unilateral moratorium and in organizing an impressive array of international scientists to lobby the Soviet leader on several occasions to extend the ban, despite a consistently negative U.S. response.⁷⁹

p. 442. In fact, Soviet military officials—and, indeed, members of the public at large—remained extremely wary of allowing the West access to Soviet military sites even as part of agreed measures for implementing arms accords such as the INF treaty, regardless of what Soviet inspectors got to see on the other side. But in the most significant initiatives—the inspection of Krasnoïarsk and the laser research facilities—Nitze’s argument does not even apply. The Soviet concessions were unilateral and unconditional. They entailed no Soviet inspection of U.S. facilities. For some evidence, see Matthew Evangelista, “Soviet Policy Toward Strategic Arms Control,” in Bruce Parrott, ed., *The Dynamics of Soviet Defense Policy* (Washington, D.C.: Wilson Center Press, 1990), especially pp. 293–96.

76. See Bernard Lown, “The Urgency of a Unique Initiative,” speech to the 4th world congress of the IPPNW, 4 June 1984; personal interview with Lown, 6 April 1994, Brookline, Mass.; Cortright, *Peace Works*, pp. 209–10; *Defense Monitor*, vol. 13, no. 5, 1984; and *Arms Control Reporter*, pp. 608.B.50–51. This account also draws on Frank M. Castillo, “The International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War: Transnational Midwife of World Peace,” Institute of International Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame, Indiana, 1990. I am grateful to Dr. Castillo for providing me a copy.

77. See Halpern, “Policy Communities in a Leninist State”; and Evangelista, *Innovation and the Arms Race*.

78. See Kingdon, *Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies*; and Valerie Bunce, *Do New Leaders Make a Difference? Executive Succession and Public Policy Under Capitalism and Socialism* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1981).

79. “Vstrecha M. S. Gorbacheva s predstaviteliami mezhdunarodnogo foruma uchenykh za prekrashchenie iadernykh ispytaniy” (Meeting of M. S. Gorbachev with representatives of the

Gorbachev himself wrote that the many extensions of the moratorium were “the result of a serious study of numerous appeals to the Soviet leadership from various circles of foreign intellectuals,” and he called particular attention to a meeting in November 1985, which Velikhov organized, where a delegation of Nobel laureates stressed “the significance of banning nuclear tests and the danger of militarizing space.”⁸⁰ Internal advocates of the test ban cited the support of Lown and the IPPNW for extending the moratorium. Using such arguments Gorbachev was able, in the fall of 1985, to reverse a previous Politburo decision to end it.⁸¹

The seismic-monitoring agreement. For more than a year and a half the United States refused to go along with the Soviet moratorium, and the Soviet Union finally resumed nuclear testing in February 1987. Thus, the transnational disarmament community failed at that point to achieve its primary goal of a comprehensive test ban treaty. Nevertheless, the group’s other accomplishments probably outweigh that failure.⁸² In particular, it was the transnational community of American and Soviet scientists that successfully conducted the first on-site verification of arms control measures, when the NRDC, in cooperation with the FAS, pursued a joint project with the Soviet Academy of Sciences to install seismic-monitoring equipment to verify the unilateral Soviet test moratorium.⁸³ That effort set a precedent for cooperative verification measures and eliminated the most potent U.S. criticism of a comprehensive test ban—the supposed impossibility of achieving reliable verification.

The success of the transnational actors in obtaining Soviet acceptance of on-site monitoring should be attributed both to the individuals involved and to the structure of the Soviet political system that allowed them access to the top leadership. The collaboration between Velikhov and von Hippel, a Princeton University professor and chair of the FAS, was particularly valuable.⁸⁴ In September 1985, Velikhov met von Hippel at a meeting in Copenhagen and suggested that the Soviet Union might be willing to allow an outside group to establish a seismic-monitoring system in the country. Although initially skeptical of the merits of such a venture, von Hippel was persuaded by the NRDC’s Thomas Cochran, the initiator and most tireless promoter of the seismic-monitoring project. In April 1986 von Hippel accompanied a delega-

international forum of scientists for the cessation of nuclear tests), *Pravda*, 15 July 1986; and personal interviews with Velikhov, Moscow, 29 July 1992, and with Sagdeev, College Park, Md., April 1994.

80. Gorbachev, *Perestroika*, pp. 157–58.

81. Cherniaev, *Shest’ let s Gorbachevym*, p. 62.

82. Jeffrey W. Knopf, “Soviet Public Diplomacy and U.S. Policymaking on Arms Control: The Case of Gorbachev’s Nuclear Testing Moratorium,” paper presented at the International Studies Association annual meeting, London, 28 March–1 April 1989.

83. NRDC, *Natural Resources Defense Council Annual Report 1986–87*, pp. 29–30.

84. The following account draws on von Hippel, “Arms Control Physics,” and on discussions with Christopher Paine, Arlington, Va., 2 April 1994.

tion to meet with Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze in Moscow to urge the Soviet government to maintain its moratorium on testing in order to give Western activists time to influence their own governments to go along. The foreign minister received the delegation politely. But von Hippel was not sure that anything had been accomplished, so he proposed meeting with Velikhov. From that point on the seismic-monitoring project took off. Velikhov made good use of his personal relationship with Gorbachev, his influential position as vice president of the Academy of Sciences, and his familiarity with the United States to promote the project within the Soviet leadership.⁸⁵ The hierarchical, centralized nature of the Soviet system meant that once the top leadership was on board, implementation of the project with all of the necessary resources was almost guaranteed.⁸⁶

Alternative explanations. When the Soviet unilateral moratorium was announced in 1985, U.S. government officials argued that it was merely a propaganda ploy, that the Soviet Union had conducted an accelerated number of tests already that year and could refrain from testing without harming its nuclear weapons modernization. The implication was that the Soviet military was at least neutral but perhaps supported the moratorium in the hope that the United States would follow suit and that a U.S. test moratorium would hinder the development of new U.S. weapons, particularly nuclear-powered lasers related to SDI. In fact, the Soviet military's position ranged from skepticism to outright opposition to the moratorium.

Marshal Akhromeev reports in his memoirs on his doubts about Gorbachev's rationale for the unilateral test ban: "It was assumed that a full cessation of nuclear-weapons testing could serve as a powerful impulse to halting the race in nuclear—and indirectly—space weapons. However, this noble intention didn't have a chance of success in view of the simple, firm, negative position of the USA regarding the full cessation of nuclear explosions." The Reagan administration, in Akhromeev's (accurate) view, "considered nuclear tests necessary to improve and create new types of nuclear weaponry and for

85. The explosion at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant in April 1986 probably influenced Gorbachev's decision to extend the nuclear testing moratorium and support other efforts, such as the joint seismic experiment, to boost the prospects for a test-ban treaty.

86. The U.S. case provides a striking contrast. The cooperation required of the U.S. government in the monitoring scheme was fairly modest—the granting of export licenses, visas for visiting Soviet scientists, and permission for setting up seismic stations on U.S. territory. Although at the highest levels most U.S. officials were unenthusiastic about the NRDC-SAS project, their views seemed to have little effect on how the various aspects of the project were handled. The decentralization of the U.S. system meant that many decisions were taken by middle- or low-level bureaucrats following standard operating procedures and adhering to statutory regulations. The result was that some potentially controversial questions—on the export of sensitive technologies needed for seismic monitoring—went rather smoothly, whereas other seemingly routine matters—issuing visas—ran into trouble. The contrast between the domestic structures of the United States and Soviet Union seems to account for the differences. See Philip G. Schrag, *Listening for the Bomb: A Study in Nuclear Arms Control Verification Policy* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1989).

developing some components of a space-based ABM system.”⁸⁷ A senior foreign ministry official and close friend of Akhromeev later reported that Soviet military officials had warned the political leaders that a unilateral moratorium would give the United States an advantage in SDI-related research, but that their warning came too late to influence the decision.⁸⁸ A year into the moratorium, Akhromeev publicly complained that the Soviet initiative had harmed the country’s security but was nevertheless still “tolerable.”⁸⁹ Military opposition and U.S. intransigence led Gorbachev reluctantly to end the moratorium.

The seismic-monitoring program was clearly a civilian, transnational initiative. No one has credited the military with the idea or offered an alternative account of how the Soviet Union came to accept for the first time on-site verification of an arms control initiative.

From the new Soviet Union to the former Soviet Union

The domestic structural transformation of the Soviet Union allowed a broad range of institutional and societal actors to exert influence on security policy and permitted unprecedented contacts between Russian and U.S. opponents of arms control. Their actions threatened to reverse the policies advocated by the transnational disarmament community, whose influence waned under the new conditions. The introduction of a functioning legislature in 1989 provided a new forum for discussion of security issues and legitimated the role of new actors in Soviet foreign policy. The transition to a market economy made enterprises, including those in the military sector, more dependent on their own resources and eager to find international partners and customers. These structural attributes of the new Soviet system that gradually emerged out of Gorbachev’s reforms had a noticeable impact on transnational activity.

The SDI seduction

Soviet star warriors. As glasnost flourished and the Communist party’s monopoly on truth diminished, new voices were heard in the Soviet discussions about strategic defenses. Gorbachev was no longer able to impose the party line opposing SDI. One of the first to speak out in favor of developing Soviet ballistic missile defenses was not a military official but a senior scientist at the Institute for Space Research. The institute’s former director, Sagdeev, was a prominent opponent of Star Wars, yet he was not inclined to impose his views on his subordinates, particularly in the new atmosphere. Viktor Etkin, chief of

87. Akhromeev and Kornienko, *Glazami marshala i diplomata*, p. 56.

88. *Ibid.*, pp. 95–96.

89. Press conference broadcast on Moscow television, 25 August 1986, reported in *Arms Control Reporter*, p. 608.B.107.

applied space physics at the institute, argued in *Pravda* in favor of limited defenses against accidental nuclear launches and terrorist attacks: "Such a limited system including ground- and space-based positions for combating non-massed missile launches is within the bounds of feasible technical solutions."⁹⁰

Conducted in parallel with, and reinforcing, the efforts of some Soviet scientists to promote strategic defenses was an official U.S. government campaign to persuade the Soviets of the merits of SDI. The United States invited Soviet officials to visit the Los Alamos nuclear weapons laboratory to inspect a project intended to demonstrate the feasibility of creating a weapon employing neutral particle beams.⁹¹ The United States also arranged a visit to a facility of the private military corporation TRW, in San Juan Capistrano, California, to observe the company's alpha laser project. The U.S. government evidently "hoped the visit would lead to Soviet understanding and eventual acceptance of U.S. proposals in the Defense and Space Talks" in Geneva to weaken the ABM treaty and allow development of space-based defenses.⁹²

The U.S. invitations were in some sense offered in reciprocation for the visits of U.S. citizens to secret Soviet military sites to investigate Soviet progress in laser and particle beam technology.⁹³ The initial precedent for such visits, of course, was the NRDC-SAS seismic-monitoring project, which paved the way for contacts between representatives of the Soviet military research community and its U.S. counterpart. In effect, these visits by military officers to the research facilities of "the enemy" helped forge an alternative transnational linkage—one that little by little came to play an active role in thwarting the efforts of the original transnational community of disarmament proponents.⁹⁴

U.S. officials and other proponents of SDI took every opportunity to promote the views of Soviet supporters of strategic defenses, often calling attention to articles in the Soviet military press that would otherwise have gone

90. *Pravda*, 20 July 1989, quoted in *Arms Control Reporter*, p. 575.B.370.

91. Ironically, the project—called Bear—had evidently benefited considerably from published Soviet research on laser technology in the late 1960s. Soviet research, according to Colonel Thomas Meyer, head of SDI Office's directed energy program, "enabled the U.S. to shrink the machinery enough to loft it into space." See *Arms Control Reporter*, pp. 575.B.369, 375, and 392.

92. *Ibid.*, p. 575.B.375.

93. In August 1989, for example, a U.S. congressional delegation visited a laser research facility in Sary Shagan, which was affiliated with Velikhov's Kurchatov Institute. See Michael R. Gordon, "U.S. Visitors See Soviet Laser Firing," *New York Times*, 17 August 1989; Frank von Hippel, "Visit to a Laser Facility at the Soviet ABM Test Site," *Physics Today* (November 1989), pp. 34–35; Frank von Hippel and Thomas B. Cochran, "The Myth of the Soviet 'Killer' Laser," *New York Times*, 19 August 1989; and *Arms Control Reporter*, p. 575.B.373.

94. The prospects for such transnational antidisarmament coalitions were, of course, enhanced not only by the Soviet domestic structural transformation but also by the changes in the international environment. Even under the previous cold war system, however, hawkish politicians on both sides of the Iron Curtain "could form what amounted to a de facto coalition in favor of hostility and arms-racing just by giving belligerent speeches." See Snyder, "East–West Bargaining," p. 116.

unremarked.⁹⁵ The use of the U.S. Patriot air defense system against Iraqi SCUD missiles during the Persian Gulf War in 1990 gave proponents of defenses an opportunity to argue for systems directed not against other major powers but against countries in the Third World.

Gorbachev and Yeltsin on the defensive. In July 1990 Gorbachev cautiously proposed to the Group of 7 (G-7) industrialized countries the “development of joint ABM early warning systems to prevent unauthorized or terrorist operated launches of ballistic missiles.”⁹⁶ President Bush responded in September by agreeing to cooperative efforts on early warning, but he also called upon the Soviet Union to permit the limited deployment of nonnuclear defenses. The U.S. secretary of defense pursued the matter a few days later, remarking that in the Soviet Union, “There are signs that there are people in positions of responsibility who are willing to entertain the notion of discussing defenses for the first time. . . . I think there’s a growing awareness on the part of the Soviets of their vulnerability to ballistic missile attack from someplace besides the United States.”⁹⁷ At the same time, an official in the SDI office made clear that Gorbachev’s proposal for collaboration on early warning did not go far enough: “If we were to cooperate with them, it would have to be in the context of missile defenses. It wouldn’t be early warning for the sake of early warning.”⁹⁸ White House officials echoed that view.⁹⁹ Within a few days Gorbachev had conceded, stating, “We are ready to discuss the U.S. proposals on non-nuclear anti-missile defense systems. We propose to the U.S. side that the possibility of creating joint systems to avert nuclear missile strikes with ground- and space-based elements also be examined.”¹⁰⁰

Under pressure from domestic supporters of strategic defenses, and with few instruments available to control the debate, Russian President Boris Yeltsin allowed officials of his government to go even further in proposing joint efforts with the United States. In October 1991 several Soviet military officials, who simultaneously served on the Russian republic’s State Committee on Defense, attended a meeting in Washington to discuss ballistic missile defense. They argued that, owing to Russia’s relatively greater vulnerability to potentially hostile Third World countries, “our interest in joint work on ABM systems is obvious.” During the same month several articles in mass-circulation newspapers and specialist journals promoted the idea of ABM defenses for Russia.

95. In November 1990, Keith Payne, of the National Institute for Space Policy, for example, cited an article in the Soviet journal *Voennaia Mysl’* (Military thought) arguing that the Soviet Union was becoming more accepting of strategic defenses. See *Arms Control Reporter*, p. 575.B.399.

96. *Ibid.*, p. 575.B.403.

97. *Ibid.*

98. *Ibid.*, p. 575.B.405.

99. Matthew Bunn, “The ABM Talks: The More Things Change . . .,” *Arms Control Today* 22 (September 1992), pp. 15–23, especially p. 19.

100. *Arms Control Reporter*, p. 575.B.405.

The new transnational network of U.S. and Russian proponents of ballistic missile defenses was established.¹⁰¹

Alternative explanations. Both Gorbachev and Yeltsin had other reasons, besides pressure from transnational actors, for reconsidering the blanket Soviet condemnation of ballistic missile defense systems that could undermine the ABM treaty. As the various Soviet republics bordering Russia asserted their claims of sovereignty and independence, they put at risk the integrity of the Soviet early warning system against missile attack. Thus, one can understand Gorbachev's proposals to cooperate with the United States in developing a joint system of early warning. No doubt there is also some basis to Russian concerns about missile attacks by terrorists or aggressors from the Third World. In a sense though, these rationales mainly provided an opening for policy entrepreneurs—both in Russia and the United States—who wanted to promote the development of major strategic defense systems in any case.¹⁰² Those who have maintained a principled opposition to widespread strategic defenses had no trouble proposing alternative means to limit the threat of ballistic-missile attacks (e.g., measures to stem the proliferation of missile and nuclear technology) and suggesting collaboration in early warning while maintaining a commitment to the ABM treaty.¹⁰³

The teeter-totter of nuclear testing

The fate of nuclear testing in the Soviet Union from 1989 to 1993 depended on the relative strengths of the proponents and opponents of a unilateral Soviet moratorium. The transnational community of scientists no longer played a key role in influencing Soviet policy. They were eclipsed on the one hand by a mass movement of antinuclear activists who enjoyed considerable success in disrupting the Soviet nuclear test program. On the other hand, the transnational disarmament community helped give rise, and then gave way, to a competing transnational group of weapons designers who opposed even a bilateral test ban and who exerted substantial influence on the government of President Yeltsin. The politics of the test ban debate reveal the post-Soviet domestic structure as an unusual mix of societal activism and corporatist bargaining.

Test ban opponents speak up. Soviet military objections to the test moratorium in 1985 and 1986 were rather subdued—as one would expect, given the role of party discipline and restrictions on public discussion of security policy associated with the old domestic structure. What changed with the expansion of glasnost and especially with the transformation of the Supreme

101. See *ibid.*; and Fred C. Iklé, "Comrades in Arms," *New York Times*, 13 December 1991.

102. Golubev et al., "Proshloe i nastoiashchee Rossiiskikh sistem protivoraketnoi oborony."

103. Aleksei Arbatov and, to some extent, Andrei Kokoshin are good examples. See *Arms Control Reporter*, pp. 575.B.414–415.

Soviet into a medium of public debate was the ability of test ban opponents to promote their views openly. In July 1989, for example, Soviet Defense Minister Dmitrii Iazov responded to demands from parliamentary deputies to revive the moratorium by arguing that the Soviet Union's "unilateral suspension of nuclear weapons upgrading could cause the existing parity in this sphere to be upset and lead to catastrophic, unpredictable consequences."¹⁰⁴ The director of the main nuclear weapons laboratory argued that the Soviet nuclear arsenal must be developed "dynamically" in order to keep up with the United States: "I recall that when we asked the Japanese how far behind them we were in electronics, the answer was given, 'forever.' . . . If we fall behind the Americans it will be simply impossible to catch up."¹⁰⁵ Such hyperbolic defense of military prerogatives would have been considered a major breach of party discipline just two years earlier.¹⁰⁶

The Nevada–Semipalatinsk movement. Ranged in opposition to the increasingly outspoken proponents of Soviet nuclear testing was an unprecedented, large, and effective mass movement. The emergence of a popular grassroots movement against nuclear testing was both a consequence of the changing Soviet domestic structure and a catalyst for further change—namely, the disintegration of the multiethnic state. In 1989, an antinuclear group called Nevada was formed in Kazakhstan to protest nuclear testing at the main Soviet test site near Semipalatinsk.¹⁰⁷ The movement was transnational in its very conception: the name was chosen to attract the attention of grassroots antinuclear activists ("downwinders") working to shut down the U.S. test site in Nevada, and links between the two groups were quickly formed.

The Nevada movement was founded by renowned Kazakh poet Olzhas Suleimenov. In early 1989 Suleimenov was beginning his campaign for a seat in the newly created Congress of People's Deputies. He had scheduled an appearance on local television for 26 February when he learned that two

104. *Krasnaia zvezda*, 21 July 1989, quoted in *Arms Control Reporter*, p. 608.B.181.

105. *Krasnaia zvezda*, 25 December 1990, quoted in *Arms Control Reporter*, p. 608.B.208–9.

106. Other deputies, mainly military officers, also supported the continuation of testing in the absence of U.S. agreement to a mutual ban. See, for example, the remarks of Col. N.S. Petrushenko in *Krasnaia zvezda*, 29 November 1989, quoted in *Arms Control Reporter*, p. 608.B.188; and of retired Chief of the General Staff Marshal Sergei Akhromeev on Moscow television, 9 October 1990, quoted in the *Arms Control Reporter*, pp. 608.B.204–205.

107. My main sources on the Nevada movement include: Peter Zheutlin, "Nevada, U.S.S.R.," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* (March 1990) pp. 10–12; Ian Mather, "Life and Death Under a Cloud in Radiation City," *European*, weekend ed., 1–3 June 1990; various issues of the movement's newspaper, *Izbitatel'*; S. Erzhanov, "Krepnet golos razuma" (The voice of reason is becoming stronger), *Vecherniaia Alma-Ata*, 25 May 1990; "O Budushchem mira—s trevogoi i bol'iu" (About the future of the world—with worry and pain), *Kazakhstanskaia Pravda*, 26 May 1990; Iurii Dmitriev, "Semipalatinsk-Nevada as viewed by a people's deputy of the U.S.S.R.," interview with Olzhas Suleimenov, *Moscow News*, no. 51, 24–31 December 1989, p. 15; Daniel Young, "Thousands in Alma-Ata Demand Test Ban," *PSR Reports* 10 (Summer 1990); *Vital Signs* (IPPNW newsletter) vol. 3, no. 1, March 1990; vol. 3, no. 2, August 1990; and Peter Zheutlin, "Kazakhstan: Life and Death in the Shadow of the Mushroom Cloud," *Los Angeles Times*, 1 April 1990.

underground nuclear tests at the Semipalatinsk test range earlier in the month had vented radioactive or other toxic materials into the atmosphere. He scrapped his original campaign speech and discussed the accidents instead. He called on all concerned citizens of Kazakhstan to meet at the writers' union hall in Alma Ata two days later. Five thousand people showed up at what turned out to be the founding meeting of the Nevada–Semipalatinsk movement. Among other demands, the movement called for the closing of the Semipalatinsk test site, an environmental cleanup program, and an end to secrecy concerning the fate of Soviet victims of radiation. Eventually over a million signatures were gathered in support of the petition.

Suleimenov handily won election to the Congress of People's Deputies and then to the Supreme Soviet. He became a prominent spokesperson for antinuclear and environmental issues throughout the Soviet Union, but he particularly tapped into the anti-Moscow sentiment of the citizens of his native Kazakhstan (about half of whom were ethnic Russians). As the efforts of the transnational community of scientists began to reach the limits of their effectiveness, the volatile mix of environmentalism, antinuclearism, and nationalism propelled the Nevada–Semipalatinsk movement into a central role in the struggle over Soviet nuclear testing. A mass demonstration on 6 August 1989 (Hiroshima Day) drew fifty thousand people. Another twenty thousand assembled to greet several hundred international delegates to a congress on nuclear testing in Alma Ata in May 1990, and thousands more met the delegates when they visited the city of Semipalatinsk and the village of Kara-aul near the test site.¹⁰⁸ The movement had such widespread support that Suleimenov could credibly threaten to call the coal miners of Kazakhstan—one of the main coal-producing regions of the Soviet Union—out to strike if the movement's demands were not met. In fact, closing the Semipalatinsk test site topped the list of the miners' demands when they threatened strikes in the summer of 1990.¹⁰⁹

The Nevada movement was a clear example of an effective transnational effort—at least in its impact on Soviet policy.¹¹⁰ An official in the Soviet foreign ministry admitted in early 1990 that the movement was responsible for forcing the Soviet military to cancel eleven of its eighteen scheduled nuclear tests for

108. *PSR Reports* (Summer 1990); and personal observation.

109. See William Mandel's collection of interviews, "Soviet Miners Speak," special issue, *The Station Relay* 5 (1989–91), p. 28; Peter Rutland, "Labor Unrest Movements in 1989 and 1990," *Soviet Economy* 6, no. 4 (1990), reprinted in Ed A. Hewett and Victor H. Winston, eds., *Milestones in Glasnost and Perestroika: Politics and People* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1991), pp. 287–325, esp. p. 315.

110. It received little attention, however, in the United States and had no impact on U.S. plans for nuclear testing. Members of the transnational test-ban coalition tried to come up with ways to tap the power of the grassroots Kazakh movement to influence U.S. policy. Velikhov at one point jokingly suggested flying one-hundred thousand Kazakhs to Washington, D.C., on Aeroflot, with or without visas, to demonstrate at the White House. Based on a personal interview with Thomas Cochran, Moscow, 22 May 1990.

1989.¹¹¹ In early 1990 the Soviet government promised to conduct only twenty-seven more tests at Semipalatinsk and then close the site in 1993, but that was not soon enough for the grassroots activists.¹¹² Ultimately the nuclear debate became caught up in the power struggle between “the center” (the Soviet government, ministerial, and party apparatus in Moscow) and the republics. In December 1990 the Kazakhstan parliament banned nuclear weapons testing on the republic’s territory. In the wake of the failed coup in August 1991, the President of Kazakhstan closed the Semipalatinsk range.¹¹³

Despite widespread domestic and international opposition, the Soviet military managed to conduct a nuclear test, unannounced, on 24 October 1990, at the backup test site at Novaia Zemlia. It was the first nuclear test in over a year and, as it turned out, the last. Further plans for tests were canceled owing to popular opposition at the grassroots level and within the Soviet parliament.¹¹⁴ In early October 1991, Gorbachev declared a yearlong moratorium on Soviet nuclear testing. Three weeks later, Yeltsin banned nuclear tests on Russian territory for a year and specifically decreed that the Novaia Zemlia archipelago no longer be used as a nuclear test range.¹¹⁵

The pronuclear countercoalition. Despite the seemingly decisive victory of the antinuclear movement in shutting down the Soviet Union’s two main test ranges and reinstating the unilateral test moratorium, the proponents of nuclear testing showed no sign of conceding. In February 1992, barely a month after the breakup of the Soviet Union, the Russian deputy minister for nuclear energy and industry began arguing for a resumption of nuclear tests following the end of Yeltsin’s moratorium in October 1992. Viktor Mikhailov expressed concern about the potential “degradation” of the country’s scientific expertise. He argued, “It is better for everyone to agree on a limited number of tests instead of a complete ban, because otherwise we might lose the level of [expertise] we now possess.”¹¹⁶

The arguments of the Russian proponents of nuclear testing sound remarkably similar to those of their American counterparts—and not by coincidence. During the late 1980s, Soviet advocates of nuclear testing were, like the Soviet proponents of strategic defenses, able to pursue transnational contacts with U.S. opponents of a test ban. They did so in some measure by taking advantage of the successful efforts of the pro-test ban community to get nuclear testing

111. Zheutlin, “Nevada, USSR,” p. 11.

112. “Soviet Union to Close Testing Site,” *Arms Control Today* (April 1990), p. 31.

113. *Arms Control Reporter*, pp. 608.B.208 and 608.B.216.

114. See I. Sichka, “We Blast Without Warning,” *Komsomol’skaia Pravda*, 26 October 1990; “Resolution Adopted on Novaya Zemlya Nuclear Test,” TASS report, 31 October 1990; and “Arkhangelsk Leadership Protests Nuclear Tests,” TASS report, 31 October 1990; all translations from the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Soviet Union*, FBIS-SOV-90-210, 30 October 1990.

115. *Arms Control Reporter*, pp. 608.B.220–21.

116. *Washington Post*, 5 February 1992, cited in *Arms Control Reporter*, p. 608.B.225.

and particularly verification back on the official Soviet–U.S. arms control agenda.

The progress in seismic monitoring of nuclear testing that the NRDC–SAS project had achieved, combined with the Reagan and Bush administrations' preoccupation with Soviet cheating, helped make verification a natural focus of official Soviet–U.S. negotiations. The community of American and Soviet test ban proponents had paved the way for such negotiations by bringing U.S. and Soviet weapons designers together for the first time to discuss verification at a conference in Moscow. The weapons designers got along remarkably well and seemed to sympathize with each other's desire to continue testing—much to the dismay of the conference organizers.¹¹⁷ One thing that both sides could agree upon was that “joint efforts were needed to upgrade verification methods.”¹¹⁸ In the view of the weapons scientists, joint efforts at evaluating verification methods required continued nuclear explosions so that there would be something on which to base the evaluations. This approach coincided exactly with that favored by the Reagan and Bush administrations. First with some reluctance, and then with increasing enthusiasm, Russian weapons scientists began observing U.S. nuclear tests in Nevada. In March 1992, twenty-three of them were on hand to observe the first U.S. nuclear test of that year.¹¹⁹ On their return home, they argued that carrying out the Russian–U.S. agreements on verification required further nuclear tests.

Corporatist bargaining on nuclear testing. The Russian nuclear-testing lobby appeared to have achieved considerable success in influencing President Yeltsin—thanks largely, it seems, to the efforts of Mikhailov. In January 1992, when Mikhailov was first deputy head of the Ministry of Nuclear Energy and Industry, he invited Yeltsin to visit the top-secret nuclear weapons laboratory at Arzamas-16. Mikhailov was searching for ways to keep his operations going. Rather than close the Novaia Zemlia test range, Mikhailov proposed using it to conduct tests of “peaceful nuclear explosions.” He suggested using the site as a disposal center for toxic materials, such as chemical and nuclear weapons, that were being reduced in connection with arms control treaties. The idea would be to blow them up with nuclear explosives.¹²⁰

According to a Russian foreign ministry official, Mikhailov had considerable success persuading Yeltsin of the merits of his proposals during a long, vodka-inspired discussion. Mikhailov presented three “treaties” for the President’s signature: (1) to resume nuclear testing at Novaia Zemlia after the

117. Based on discussions with Frank von Hippel of the FAS, Thomas Cochran of the NRDC, and Steve Fetter of the University of Maryland, in Moscow, Alma Ata, and Semipalatinsk, 22–25 May 1990.

118. TASS report, 29 May 1990, cited in *Arms Control Reporter*, p. 608.B.199.

119. *Arms Control Reporter*, p. 608.B.227.

120. Mikhailov apparently had a direct financial stake in such operations. See *Arms Control Reporter*, pp. 605.B.120–22.

expiration of the one-year moratorium, thereafter conducting three or four tests per year; (2) to maintain the formerly closed nuclear research and test sites, such as Arzamas-16, under the central government's jurisdiction, in order to protect them from hardships of economic reform and from the interference of local authorities who might prefer to convert them to civilian activities; and (3) to promote Mikhailov to minister. Yeltsin signed all three.¹²¹

The Russian President's subsequent actions give this story the ring of truth. First, in February 1992, a month after his meeting with Mikhailov, Yeltsin instructed the Ministry of Nuclear Energy and Industry and the joint high command of the Commonwealth of Independent States "to continue in 1992 the necessary work involved in preparing tunnels and wells for conducting underground nuclear tests on Novaia Zemlia at a rate of two to four per year, if the declared moratorium expires."¹²² Second, Yeltsin signed a decree transferring Novaia Zemlia from the Soviet Defense Ministry's Sixth State Central Test Site to the Russian federation's control.¹²³ Finally, Mikhailov was promoted from first deputy to minister for nuclear energy. He became increasingly outspoken about the need to continue nuclear tests, relying on standard nostrums about "the need to maintain the country's defense sufficiency" as well as the newer arguments learned from his transnational allies in the United States: nuclear testing must continue in order to ensure proper verification of nuclear testing in compliance with current treaties.¹²⁴

Alternative explanations. One possible alternative explanation for the shifts in Soviet policy on nuclear testing that does not emphasize the change in domestic structure focuses on the nature of the American–Russian relationship. From the late 1980s two coinciding trends appeared: a weakening in Russia's economic and political situation and an improvement in American–Russian relations. The United States, especially during the Bush administration, consistently made promises to help the Soviet economy contingent on Soviet willingness to pursue policies congenial to the United States.¹²⁵ According to this argument, the Russian government saw no reason to push for a comprehensive test ban that the United States opposed or even to maintain its own moratorium, because the United States would continue testing whether or not the Russians did so. Only when U.S. policy changed toward support for a test ban under the Clinton administration would the Russians decide not to resume testing. This explanation has much to recommend it, although it gives insignificant attention to the pressures on President Yeltsin from both the

121. Discussion with Frank von Hippel, Princeton, N.J., 24 April 1992.

122. *Arms Control Reporter*, p. 608.B.226, citing *Nezavisimaia gazeta* (Independent newspaper), 24 March 1992, and the Russian television news program *Vesti* of 3 March 1992.

123. *Ibid.*

124. *Rossiiskaia gazeta* (Russian newspaper), quoted in the *Arms Control Reporter*, pp. 608.B.233–234.

125. Beschloss and Talbott, *At the Highest Levels*.

grassroots antinuclear activists and the nuclear establishment. Despite the important role of the United States, Russian testing policy often hinged on the delicate internal balance of pro- and antinuclear forces—a balance that emerged as a result of the change from a highly centralized, hierarchical domestic structure to a fragmented and fluid one.

Conclusions

The fate of transnational actors

The opening up of the Soviet system made it possible for transnational contacts to flourish. Paradoxically, the new circumstances meant that the particular transnational community of disarmament proponents that was so influential in the early Gorbachev years now had to compete with groups advocating very different policies. To the extent that transnational contacts give domestic groups more resources to influence their government, the new groups were often much better endowed than their predecessors. The public interest groups, peace activists, and university professors who made up the Western side of the transnational disarmament community typically did not possess the resources available to, say, the SDI Office, the U.S. government weapons laboratories, or TRW Corporation. Faced with such competition, the transnational disarmament advocates often saw their preferred policies threatened with reversal.

Nothing in the theoretical framework proposed here predicts that a change in domestic structure will necessarily lead to such policy reversals. Rather, I argue that a highly centralized, authoritarian state can limit access to a broad range of societal groups, but can also privilege certain groups whose policy preferences would otherwise not get a hearing if access were based solely on relative power or resources. A shift to a more open, decentralized structure would lead to competition along more traditionally pluralistic lines, where resources and power would figure prominently. But if the “mean preference” of the groups now openly competing resembled that of the privileged transnational actors under the old, centralized structure, there would be no policy reversal.¹²⁶ The actors and institutions with the most power in the former Soviet national security establishment generally oppose the policies advocated by the transnational disarmament community, and they now have their own transnational links with counterparts in the United States.

Under the new circumstances, the role of the United States apparently becomes more important. If the U.S. government takes the side of the transnational and Russian disarmament proponents, it could shift the balance

126. Logically, a shift in domestic structure from less centralized to more centralized would have the opposite effect on the fortunes of transnational actors, all else being equal (including, for example, favorable “policy windows”). I owe these points to John Odell.

against the Russian military establishment. The Clinton administration, unlike its predecessors, came to embrace some of the policies advocated by the transnational disarmament groups. Its decision to abide by the congressional imposition of a U.S. moratorium on nuclear testing, for example, clearly undercut the Russian advocates of a test resumption.¹²⁷ President Yeltsin welcomed the move and agreed to maintain the Russian moratorium.¹²⁸ Clinton favored proponents of the 1972 ABM treaty by supporting the “narrow” or “traditional” interpretation that the treaty “prohibits the development, testing and deployment of sea-based, air-based, space-based and mobile land-based ABM systems and components without regard to the technology utilized.”¹²⁹

The administration’s position on ballistic missile defense in general, however, was more ambiguous. Although then Secretary of Defense Les Aspin declared the Star Wars era to be over in early 1993, the Pentagon created a Ballistic Missile Defense Program as a successor agency to the SDI Office and requested \$3.8 billion to fund it—the same amount that Congress had appropriated for SDI in the last year of the Bush administration.¹³⁰ In May 1994 a Pentagon delegation to Moscow tried to persuade the Russians to amend the ABM treaty to permit the development of theater ballistic missile defense systems—part of a campaign likely to bolster the fortunes of some members of the Russian military–technical establishment.¹³¹

Theoretical implications

The main conclusions of this study reinforce the utility of domestic structure as an intervening variable in the comparative analysis of foreign policy and are of direct theoretical relevance to the recently revived study of transnationalism. In particular, they lend support to the typology developed by Risse-Kappen and his colleagues to link domestic structures to transnational influence: the Russian and Soviet cases conform to the theoretical predictions about how transnational actors should operate and how successful they should be under

127. Clinton’s reversal of the Reagan and Bush policy owes a great deal to the efforts of members of the U.S. side of the transnational disarmament coalition, particularly Christopher Paine and Thomas Cochran of the NRDC and Frank von Hippel of the FAS. Their influence on U.S. policy grew as that of their counterparts in Russia declined. See *NRDC News* 15 (Fall 1993), p. 49; Douglas Jehl, “Energy Department Led Shift on A-Tests,” *New York Times*, 1 July 1993; and Mary McGrory, “O’Leary’s Energy Is Felt,” *Washington Post*, 14 December 1993.

128. *Arms Control Reporter*, p. 608.B.267.

129. Thomas L. Friedman, “U.S. Formally Rejects ‘Star Wars’ in ABM Treaty,” *New York Times*, 15 July 1993.

130. *Ibid.*

131. Stephen Foye, “U.S. Defense Team Presses Moscow on Cooperation,” *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Daily Report*, no. 87, 6 May 1994 (electronic version). For background on the administration’s position and opposition to it, see Seymour M. Hersh, “Missile Wars,” *The New Yorker*, 26 September 1994, pp. 86–99. For views of some of the Russian military technologists, see Golubev et al., “Proshloe i nastoiashchee Rossiiskikh sistem protivoraketnoi oborony.”

certain domestic structural conditions.¹³² Further research should not only investigate how various domestic structures influence transnational relations but also seek to elucidate the nonstructural influences on transnational activity to try to gain a more systematic understanding, for example, of the role of policy windows.

The cases fit less well as examples of epistemic communities. Although many of the transnational actors were scientists, their expertise and competence were not always recognized, and their claim to policy-relevant knowledge was often disputed rather than authoritative.¹³³ Their ideas and policy proposals frequently came under attack from the military establishments both in the East and the West.¹³⁴ Nevertheless, they succeeded in implementing some major initiatives, thanks to the peculiar nature of the Soviet domestic structure and the confluence of several policy windows—the severity of the economic crisis, the challenges of the Reagan administration, and, most important, the advent of a strong reformist leader. But because the transnational actors never achieved a policy consensus to endorse their views and never effected a durable “paradigm shift,” their role as agents of foreign policy learning at the level of the state is doubtful.¹³⁵

The members of the transnational disarmament community sometimes had divergent causal beliefs, understandings, and values underpinning their support for a common policy objective. To take a simple example, one could oppose SDI on economic grounds as a vast waste of money, on technical grounds as infeasible, or on strategic grounds as destabilizing. One might hold all these views (although they are in some respects contradictory) or only some of them and still oppose SDI and join a transnational effort to work against it. But that would not be an epistemic community by the prevailing definition, and there would be little profit in broadening the definition to encompass such an effort.¹³⁶ On the other hand, my findings reinforce Risse-Kapen’s contention

132. Risse-Kapen, “Brining Transnational Relations Back In.”

133. This terminology comes from Haas’s definition. See “Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination,” p. 3. For a related argument about environmental policy, see Sheila Jasanoff, “The Normative Structure of Scientific Agreements about the Global Environment,” in Fen O. Hampson and Judith Reppy, eds., “Global Environmental Change and Social Justice,” Cornell University, Ithaca, N.Y., 1994.

134. For representative Soviet critiques, see the comments of Lieutenant General (retired) E. Volkov, “Ne raz’iasniaet, a zatumanivaet,” *Krasnaia zvezda*, 28 September 1989; Major General G. Kirilenko, “Legko li byt’ oborone dostatochnoi?” *Krasnaia zvezda*, 21 March 1990; Major General Iu. Liubimov, “O dostatochnosti oborony i nedostatke kompetentnosti,” *Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil*, no. 16, August 1989, pp. 21–26; General M. A. Moiseev, “Eshche raz o prestizhe armii,” *Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil*, no. 13, July 1989, pp. 3–14; and Akhromeev and Kornienko, *Glazami marshala i diplomata*.

135. The use of Thomas Kuhn’s terminology from the *Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, 2d ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970) comes from Hall, “Policy Paradigms, Social Learning, and the State,” but seems to inform much of the literature on learning. For a more extensive critique of the learning metaphor as applied to Gorbachev’s foreign policy, see Evangelista, “Sources of Moderation in Soviet Security Policy.”

136. In “Internal Battles and External Wars,” Mendelson broadens the definition of epistemic community to “a group of experts in different fields who share common understandings and beliefs

that the epistemic community literature itself might profit from some of the insights of the domestic structure approach. Incorporating domestic structure as a variable influencing the relative degrees of states' receptivity to epistemic communities could be a way to say more about the conditions under which new ideas succeed or fail.¹³⁷

Many scholars have argued that new ideas are much more likely to be adopted and implemented as policy if they become associated with bureaucracies that have experience with similar policies or if they become embedded in powerful institutions that can promote new policies. As Emanuel Adler and Peter Haas argue, for example, "New ideas and policies, once institutionalized, can gain the status of orthodoxy."¹³⁸ What is surprising about the Soviet case is how unnecessary institutionalization appears to have been for the success of the ideas promoted by transnational actors. Once Gorbachev embraced a particular idea, he could often effect its implementation even against strong institutional resistance from the security establishment. This was particularly so in the frequent extensions of the unilateral nuclear test ban and the pursuit of arms reduction treaties in the absence of U.S. restraints on SDI.

This is not to argue that institutions are irrelevant to the Soviet case. On the contrary, Soviet institutions mattered a great deal. But it was the overall system of institutions—in other words, the domestic structure—that mattered most. The high centralization of the system and the enormous power and authority concentrated in the Politburo and in the person of the General Secretary are the main characteristics that fostered the promotion of innovations once a reformist leader came to power. The support of the General Secretary allowed policy entrepreneurs to prevail against strong institutional opposition.

Another expectation from the literature on ideas that the Soviet cases fail to bear out is the notion that transnational ideas would serve as "coalitional glue"—that they would help political factions to identify their common interests, suggest new possibilities for coalition building, and, as Ikenberry puts it, define "a 'middle ground' between old political divisions."¹³⁹ This was

about certain issues as well as some idea of how best to implement their belief"; see p. 329 n. 7. This definition is broader than that of Haas and his colleagues. Given that Mendelson's actors comprise people at several levels of the Soviet system, from politicians, to scholars, to journalists, and that her community is not a transnational one, it is not clear that her otherwise fine analysis either contributes to or benefits from the literature on epistemic communities.

137. Risse-Kappen, "States and Transnational Relations: What Have We Learned?" in *Bringing Transnational Relations Back In*. See the similar criticisms raised by Helen Milner, "International Theories of Cooperation among Nations: Strengths and Weaknesses," *World Politics* 44 (April 1992), pp. 466–96.

138. Emanuel Adler and Peter M. Haas, "Conclusion: Epistemic Communities, World Order, and the Creation of a Reflective Research Program," *International Organization* 46 (Winter 1992), pp. 367–90, especially pp. 384–385. For similar arguments, see Hall, "Policy Innovation and the Structure of the State; Weir and Skocpol, "State Structures and the Possibilities for 'Keynesian' Responses"; Weir, "Ideas and Politics"; Sikkink, *Ideas and Institutions*; and Goldstein and Keohane, "Ideas and Foreign Policy."

139. Ikenberry, "A World Economy Restored," p. 292; Hall, *Political Power of Economic Ideas*; Goldstein and Keohane, "Ideas and Foreign Policy," pp. 17–18.

certainly a reasonable expectation. Indeed, many contemporary analysts interpreted the Gorbachev security policy innovations as serving the interests of both the civilian reformers and the military.¹⁴⁰ To some extent, policy entrepreneurs such as Velikhov did seek to tailor their proposals to address the putative concerns of the Soviet military.

We now know—thanks in part to Marshal Akhromeev's memoirs, but also to considerable evidence available at the time as well—that Soviet military officials were very wary of the transnational initiatives. Yet, when Soviet policy entrepreneurs managed to create the appearance of common interests, when their proposals seemed ostensibly to address the military's concerns and objectively to serve Soviet security interests, they were often able to convince Gorbachev that enough support existed to merit launching a new initiative. Rather than speak then of their ideas as coalitional glue, the more appropriate metaphor might be "coalitional Velcro." The coalitions were ephemeral and pulled apart as soon as the divergence of interests between the military and the reformers became apparent—for example, as the transnational actors sought to extend the unilateral Soviet test moratorium indefinitely, regardless of what the United States did, or as they promoted such notions as "asymmetric response" and "unilateral restraint" from the status of occasional tactic to universal principle.¹⁴¹ Nevertheless, as long as the Soviet domestic structure remained highly centralized, with power heavily concentrated in the General Secretary, forming large winning coalitions need not have been a major function of transnational actors or their ideas.¹⁴²

This article has sought to demonstrate the value of including security policy in the study of transnational relations and employing domestic structure as a variable helping to account for variations in states' receptivity to transnational influence. Transnational actors played a significant role in Soviet security policy during the Gorbachev era and contributed to the end of the cold war. Paradoxically, the demise of the Soviet threat and the transformation and then disintegration of the Soviet state diminished their influence and enhanced the power of traditional security institutions throughout the former Soviet republics. Transnational relations between Russia and the United States in the security field are likely to continue, especially concerning conversion of the former Soviet military industry to civilian production and the dismantling of its nuclear complex. The achievements of the transnational disarmament community of the Gorbachev era are, however, unlikely to be matched anytime soon.

140. For a particularly strong but not exceptional statement of this view, see Dale Herspring, *The Soviet High Command, 1967–1989: Personalities and Politics* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990). For a critique, see Matthew Evangelista, "New Politics in the Soviet Union," *American Political Science Review* 85 (December 1991), pp. 1433–36.

141. See especially Vitalii Zhurkin, Sergei Kortunov, and Andrei Kortunov, "Reasonable sufficiency—or how to break the vicious circle," *New Times* 40, 12 October 1987; and the discussion in Evangelista, "Sources of Moderation," especially pp. 329–30.

142. This finding calls into question Risse-Kappen's emphasis on winning coalitions in his discussion of transnational relations in the Soviet Union. See his "Ideas Do Not Float Freely."