

III. One or Many? Western Approaches to Security

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Is there a single, distinctive “Western” approach to security or are their meaningful differences between the United States, Europe, and a westward-looking Russia? Even during the Cold War, when faced with a common enemy, the United States and its European allies pursued different approaches to coping with the threat posed by the Soviet Union and the risk of nuclear war. In the wake of the attacks of 11 September 2001 and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States again found itself at odds with Europe. The European approach to terrorism, based in part on the lessons learned from the wave of terrorist attacks in Europe in the 1970s, differs considerably from that of the United States. The United States is actually closer to Russia in resorting to a “war” on terror, repeating many of the mistakes that Moscow has made in its conflict with Chechnya.

This chapter highlights the differences between the United States, the member-States of the European Union, and Russia in addressing the security concerns associated with the threat of terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. It maintains that the Europeans tend to favor police methods for dealing with terrorist violence, and they are attentive to political means of undermining support for terrorism by addressing some of the underlying motivations. Where the European approach falls short, however, is in the failure to recognize and deal with the link between immigration policy and terrorism. The United States and Russia have traditionally done better at assimilating their citizens of Muslim background, although recent changes in their approaches give cause for concern.

The chapter also evaluates explanations for the divergent approaches. Robert Kagan, for example, has argued that when it comes to dealing with security threats, “Europeans are from Venus, Americans are from Mars.” He associates the more peaceful, conciliatory, and multilateral approaches of the Europeans with their relative military weakness, and argues that the United

States engages in warfare as its preferred method of achieving security in effect because it can. Are the different European and U.S. approaches to terrorism indeed the result of disparities in relative power, as Kagan argues, or is there another underlying explanation? In evaluating Kagan's hypothesis, this chapter considers policy statements, such as the 2003 European Security Strategy, as well as actual behavior, as manifested, for example, in the European approach to the danger of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. It finds that the commitment to multilateralism and international institutions that characterizes European security policy is not the product of military weakness but is based on normative and pragmatic considerations.

The Cold War Legacy

In the early 1980s relations between what we used to call the Superpowers – the United States and the Soviet Union – were at a low point. Both countries were developing and deploying new generations of nuclear weapons and had concentrated in the center of Europe forces of conventional military power unprecedented in history. At the time there emerged in Europe a popular movement that was critical of both superpowers for their military policies and a group of scholars affiliated with universities and peace research institutes who proposed alternatives. In retrospect we can see that there was something like a European way of approaching the problems of security in the 1980s, one that made a major contribution to ending the superpower arms race and the Cold War. This legacy of the Cold War has arguably produced a particular European perspective on today's pressing security problems – terrorism and the spread of weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons. One can in fact identify a particular European approach to dealing with security issues, and it is most evident when contrasted to the approach pursued by the United States and by Russia.

A summary of the European role in helping to end the Cold War provides a useful historical background for understanding today's contrasting approaches to security in the West. A number of proposals emerged in the 1980s intended to improve the

Particularly influential were the Danish physicist Anders Boserup and the German military analyst Lutz Unterseher who proposed restructuring conventional forces in Europe to create systems of non-offensive defense. Within a few years, such proposals were making their way into the Soviet Union, and through the efforts of Aleksei Arbatov, Andrei Kokoshin, and other civilian experts they came to be adopted as part of the “new thinking” in security policy promoted by Mikhail Gorbachev.¹

Another important idea was the role that unilateral initiatives of restraint could play in bringing an end to the arms race. This was a time when the United States was deploying new nuclear missiles to Europe and a huge popular movement rose up in opposition. Many of the leaders of the European Nuclear Disarmament (END) movement, such as Mary Kaldor and E.P. Thompson, argued that the Europeans should renounce nuclear weapons unilaterally, both to improve their own security and to reduce the threat to the Soviet Union in hopes that it would in turn reduce its military forces. In fact, the NATO countries were unwilling to make any unilateral reductions, but under Gorbachev, the Soviet side undertook a number of initiatives of unilateral restraint, such as suspending nuclear testing, freezing the deployment of SS-20 missiles targeted against Europe, and carrying out major reductions in its conventional forces. The theory of unilateral restraint worked in practice and contributed to the end of the Cold War.

Of course that is not the way many of the more hawkish elements in the United States tell the story of how the Cold War ended. For them, it was entirely a matter of U.S. military power and the policies of “peace through strength” that forced the Soviet Union to settle the Cold War on US terms. What role did the Europeans play? For many U.S. officials, the NATO allies, particularly the Federal Republic of Germany, were constantly threatening to undermine the firm position of the United States, and were always suspected of favoring policies of neutralism and appeasement. Initiatives such as German Chancellor Willy Brandt’s *Ostpolitik* or the Helsinki Accords were criticized

by some circles in the United States on precisely these grounds. And as for the popular movements against the arms race and the Cold War, President Ronald Reagan expressed a common view on the Right when he said that the mass demonstrations of the early 1980s were “bought and paid for by the Soviet Union.”² Evidently the divergence of views and the level of animosity between the United States and its European allies, that we observed in connection with the war on Iraq, are not without precedent in NATO’s history.

Security Threats of the 21st Century

Now the Cold War is past, Europe is united, and the United States and Russia no longer consider each other enemies and no longer compete for influence in the Third World. Nevertheless, we still find ourselves facing a dangerous world. The arsenals of Russia and the United States still contain thousands of nuclear weapons, and more states, such as India and Pakistan, have joined the nuclear club since the end of the Cold War. Between the deliberate, illegal sales of nuclear materials and their theft from insecure sites, the danger of nuclear proliferation seems to have increased. Finally, the threat of terrorists gaining access to weapons of mass destruction has come to replace our Cold War nightmare of nuclear holocaust with that of a nuclear 9-11, a nuclear Madrid, or a nuclear Dubrovka or Beslan.

Ironically, in retrospect, we could argue that many of today’s threats stem from the successes that the peace movement and the peace-research community achieved during the Cold War. The dismantling of the Iron Curtain, the withdrawal of Soviet military power from Eastern Europe, and ultimately the disintegration of the Soviet Union led to a vast reduction in the Soviet armed forces and the demobilization of thousands of soldiers and officers. With the end of the system of central planning and the opening up of the Russian economy to foreign competition and “shock

²The fuller quotation is that the demonstrations were “all sponsored by the

therapy,” many of these former soldiers faced dire economic prospects. With few skills, aside from the deployment of violence, many joined privatized security forces and organized criminal gangs, contributing to instability and terrorism on Russia’s vast territory. At one point Russian military units trained Chechen fighters to help the rebels in Abkhazia seeking to secede from Georgia; a couple of years later those same Chechens and others were killing Russian soldiers in a bid for Chechnya’s own secession from the Russian Federation.

This is a phenomenon that the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency has called “blowback,” and it has had disastrous consequences for the United States as well. The example that everyone knows is U.S. support for the forces in Afghanistan opposing the Soviet intervention there in 1979, the *mujahadeen* who evolved into Osama bin Laden’s al Qaeda organization and carried out the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. What is perhaps less known is that U.S. support for the Islamist radicals in Afghanistan began almost a half year before the Soviet invasion of late December 1979. In an interview with the Paris weekly *Nouvel Observateur* in 1998, Zbigniew Brzezinski, national security advisor to President Jimmy Carter, revealed that the president signed a directive authorizing the CIA to provide funds to the mujahadeen in early July 1979. Perhaps more surprising is that Brzezinski expressed no regrets, believing as he does, that the U.S. aid contributed to the end of the Cold War and the fall of communism in Eastern Europe.

Here is an excerpt from the exchange, starting with the journalist’s question:

QUESTION: [...] [D]o you regret having supported Islamic fundamentalism, having given arms and advice to future terrorists?

BRZEZINSKI: What is most important to the history of the world? The Taliban or the collapse of the Soviet empire? Some stirred-up Moslems or the liberation of Central Europe and the end of the cold war?

QUESTION: Some stirred-up Moslems? But it has been said and repeated Islamic fundamentalism represents a world menace today.

BRZEZINSKI: Nonsense! It is said that the West had a global military record

Pakistan militarism, Egyptian pro-Western or Central Asian secularism? Nothing more than what unites the Christian countries.³

Even after September 11th, one could argue that Brzezinski had a valid point, that it does not make sense to think of a united Islam aligned against the West. Clearly Brzezinski rejects the notion of a “clash of civilizations,” promoted by Samuel Huntington. But there are Muslims, still a minority, we hope, who consider that they are engaged in a global *jihād* against the West, and many have taken up arms and carried out terrorist acts. And where do they come from? They come from every country and region Brzezinski mentioned as reflecting the diversity of Islam, and others besides. What is it that has united all of these disparate fighters in a common cause? Clearly a main source of inspiration has been the U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq, acts justified as part of the global war on terrorism, but which in fact have served as a major recruiting tool for future terrorists. Critics of the war, including many European governments, anticipated this outcome and opposed the invasion on these and other grounds.

When we turn to Russia we see another case of a country opposing terrorism with a blunt military instrument that only makes the situation worse – namely, in Chechnya. The Russian government characterized its military presence there as an anti-terrorist operation, but we should not forget that the war, when it began in 1994, was originally intended to crush a separatist movement and that terrorist methods have been employed by all sides.⁴ As a result of the ongoing conflict we have seen terrorism spread beyond Chechnya, with bombings in Moscow, the downing of civilian airliners, and the barbarous seizure of the Beslan schoolhouse; from the Russian side we have seen sweep operations conducted against Chechen refugee camps in Ingushetia, with kidnappings, beatings, and executions. Russian military action has contributed to instability throughout the North Caucasus region – precisely the outcome that it was intended to forestall.

There are obvious differences between the Russian war in Chechnya and the U.S. war in Iraq. Russia has the legal right to

use military force to suppress a rebellion on its territory, whereas the U.S. invasion of a foreign country that posed no direct military threat was clearly illegal. My point, however, is not to assess the legality of the two actions, much less to offer any justification for the brutal acts of terror carried out by some Chechens and Iraqis. My argument is a simple one: both of these wars, justified as a means of combating terrorism, have probably served to exacerbate rather than eliminate the terrorist menace.

Do the Europeans have a better way? In the late 1980s, nationalists in the Baltic republics of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia were agitating for independence by arguing that their countries naturally belonged to Europe and should not be part of the Soviet Union. When one Lithuanian nationalist was asked for his definition of Europe, however, the best he could manage was that "Europe is... not Russia."⁵ That is the inspiration for my answer to the question of what is the European approach to dealing with terrorism: It is not the Russian one – and not the American one either. The U.S. and Russian governments have sought to deal with terrorism by declaring war on it, and waging actual wars, in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Chechnya. They have limited the rights of their citizens in the name of security, as many countries do in wartime. These policies have not shown much success.

It has become commonplace to say that Europe approaches terrorism differently, through the prism of law enforcement, rather than war. Robert Kagan has made the famous distinction between Europe and the United States by claiming that Europeans are from Venus and Americans from Mars. This answer, plausible as far as it goes, only gives rise to further questions. Does Europe's preference for reliance on law, international institutions, and peaceful resolution of conflict stem from its relative military weakness, as Kagan suggests? If the European Union disposed of military power comparable to that of the United States would it be more inclined to use force to deal with security threats, such as terrorism?

Given Europeans' reluctance to consider terrorism primarily a military problem (the "war on terrorism"), we should consider the effectiveness of alternative methods involving law enforcement.

In Europe, enforcing the law against suspected terrorists inevitably opens a discussion of immigrants and immigration policy. European countries that were major colonial powers in places like North Africa and South Asia for over a century are now home to millions of immigrants from those regions, many of them from Islamic backgrounds. Europe's success in fighting terrorism will depend very much on how it deals with its immigrants. Here, I would suggest, Europeans might have something to learn from the United States and from Russia.

This might be the right place to point out that I am not, of course, making generalizations about all Europeans, or all Russians, or all Americans, but rather the overall approach of their governments. In fact, some excellent critiques of the "war paradigm" as applied to terrorism have come from Americans, along with sensible suggestions for applying law enforcement techniques. At the same time, some of the most effective criticisms of Vladimir Putin's approach to Chechen terrorism have come from Russians.⁶ And finally, there are plenty of Europeans who have backed the war in Iraq and who have taken an approach to terrorism similar to what I associate with the U.S. government. But, by and large, European governments have taken a different approach.

European Approaches to Terrorism

The first thing to say about European approaches to terrorism is that they are the product of considerable experience. Consider these statistics regarding a certain country: In the first six months of one year, there were 1400 episodes of political violence, including 925 bombings and shootings. Some 22 terrorist "groups organized on a permanent basis" were responsible for half of the incidents, but there were more than a hundred groups whose names were known to the authorities during that same period. About a

⁶ For examples, see P. HEYMANN, *Terrorism, Freedom, and Security: Winning without War* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003); D. COLE, *Enemy Aliens: Double Standards and Constitutional Freedoms in the War on Terrorism* (New York: New Press, 2003); A. DEUTSCHMANN, *A Small Country, a Big Problem* (New York: New Press, 2003).

thousand militants had gone underground and were involved in what were called “urban guerrilla activities.” An estimated 3000-8000 “part-time guerrillas” lived ordinary legal lives, but participated in some way in the terrorist acts. Sympathizers to those engaged in political violence were estimated to number between two and three hundred thousand. This may sound like a description of Iraq in 2006, but these statistics describe Italy in 1978.⁷

One should not, of course, assume that the political violence that afflicted several European countries in the 1970s is the same as the transnational Islamist terrorism of the al Qaeda sort. The differences between the two constitute an important research question in itself. But we understand enough about how European states dealt with the reality of terrorism in the 1970s to identify a European approach, and one that seems to have worked.

Among the generalizations that one encounters in the literature are the following: Many terrorists seem to have emerged from student and labor movements when pathways for peaceful participation and ways to address their demands were blocked. Activists who turned to violence had often been victims of state violence and repression themselves. As one observer mentioned in regard to the French war in Algeria and the troubles in Northern Ireland – prisons turn out to be “a marvelous recruiting and training centre.”⁸ How did the urban terrorism of 1970s Europe end? Here the generalization that seems most convincing is that political systems and social and political organizations became more inclusive and more open to the concerns that had earlier found expression only in political violence. By addressing the main grievances that underlay the violence, the authorities could isolate the relatively small number of terrorists from the much larger population of potential sympathizers. The point is not that every terrorist is motivated by a legitimate political grievance that

⁷ D. DELLA PORTA - S. TARROW, “Unwanted Children: Political Violence and the Cycle of Protest in Italy, 1966-1973”, *European Journal of Political Research* 14 (1986); Sidney Tarrow, *Democracy and Disorder: Protest and Politics in Italy 1965-1975* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989). For a good summary and application of

should be addressed. The point is rather that for terrorism to persist on any meaningful scale it has to have some at least passive support from a broader group of individuals who themselves might not consider engaging in violence. If those individuals find their concerns addressed by the government and society, they are more likely to withhold their support from the terrorists who remain committed to violence and even endorse state efforts to maintain order.

So how does this “European approach” differ from the way the United States and Russia have dealt with terrorism? In confronting terrorism Europeans are more likely to consider underlying motives and grievances rather than simply divide the world into good and evil. In the United States, in the immediate aftermath of the 11 September 2001 attacks, it was very difficult for people to talk about the political motives or possible grievances of the al Qaeda terrorists without being accused of justifying or apologizing for terrorism. In Russia, it has not been easy for people to call attention to the ongoing depredations against the civilian population in Chechnya when Chechen terrorists are blowing up airplanes and murdering school children. Indeed, journalists have endured various retaliatory measures and at least one – the brave Anna Politkovskaia – was assassinated for her efforts. In Russia, a vicious cycle of indiscriminate warfare followed by terrorist retaliation has corrupted the atmosphere for rational debate.⁹ Even academic scholarship has been tainted, as some Russian historians seek to justify earlier historical depredations against the Chechen civilian population, such as the mass forced deportation carried out on Stalin’s orders in 1943.¹⁰ In Europe, there seems more of a willingness to understand the motives of terrorists and to recognize the genuine grievances that might make ordinarily peaceful people sympathetic to the cause if not the methods of terrorists.

But surely this can be taken too far. Consider the argument made by the journalist Tiziano Terzani in a book that was at the top of the

⁹ See the testimony in *Chechnya: Zhits'na i smert'* [Chechnya: Life and Death] (Moscow: 2004).

bestseller lists in Italy in the months following the September 11th attacks. He equated Osama bin Laden with Warren Anderson, the head of the Union Carbide company whose chemical plant at Bhopal in India exploded in 1984, killing some 16,000 people. Anderson's company was clearly guilty of criminal negligence, but Terzani goes further: "Was he too a terrorist?" he asks. "From the point of view of these deaths, probably yes."¹¹ This kind of moral relativism does not, in my view, make a positive contribution to reducing terrorism.

The contrast between U.S. and European counterterrorism policies became increasingly apparent in the years following the 11 September attacks. By the end of the administration of George W. Bush, European officials at the highest level were themselves calling attention to the differences. Perhaps the most striking example came in October 2008 when two British counterterror experts publicly criticized the United States for "its overly militaristic approach to fighting terrorism and warned of a further erosion of civil liberties." Stella Rimington, former director general of MI5, Britain's domestic intelligence agency, urged Bush's successor to "stop using the phrase 'war on terror.'" She argued that the administration's policies constituted a "huge overreaction" to the 9-11 attacks and that the war frame "got us off on the wrong foot because it made people think terrorism was something you could deal with by force of arms primarily." Similar criticisms came from Ken Macdonald, Britain's leading prosecutor of terrorist crimes, whose efforts had achieved a conviction rate of 90 percent. Macdonald criticized what he called "the Guantánamo model", which "says that we cannot afford to give people their rights, that rights are too expensive because of the nature of the threats." He contrasted the U.S. approach to the British one, which maintains that "the best way to face down those threats is to strengthen our institutions rather than to degrade them."¹²

¹¹ T. TERZANI, *Lettere contro la guerra* (Milan: Longanesi & C., 2002), p. 52. Terzani cites Arundhati Roy, who mentions Warren Anderson's crime in her article, A. ROY, "The algebra of infinite justice", *The Guardian*, 27 September 2001, and suggests that he should be extradited and put on trial, as the U.S. Government

Terrorism and Immigration Policy

I turn now to considering the links between counterterrorism and policy toward immigrants. Here I take a position opposite to what I have been arguing in these other security domains and suggest that the traditional approach by both the United States and Russia to its Muslim immigrant populations has been more effective than the European approach in containing and addressing the grievances that could spawn terrorism. Unfortunately, I have to emphasize that I am referring to the *traditional* approaches, in other words the ones of the past. Both the United States and Russia have recently departed from those approaches in ways that are likely to exacerbate rather than limit the risks of terrorism. So we might call these the “ideal types” of U.S. and Russian policy, whereas the actual policies have been moving away from the ideal.

A good expression of the ideal-type U.S. policy came in an article by the economist-journalist Robert Kuttner:

Unlike America, with its religious diversity and assimilation of immigrants, Europe’s Muslim communities tend to dwell in separate, hermetic worlds, whether in France, Germany, or Spain. Spanish police had little purchase on the terrorist cells, whose members moved easily in the Moroccan barrios of Madrid. By contrast, not one of the September 11 terrorists was a permanent immigrant to America; all had to be imported for the deed. America’s tradition of pluralism and its assimilationist tolerance based on a secular constitution are a little-appreciated source of our security as a nation.¹³

Recently, these positive features of U.S. immigration policy have come under assault from two directions. First, in the immediate aftermath of the 11 September attacks, a panicked U.S. government rounded up and arrested some 5000 immigrants, held them in detention without access to lawyers and unable even to notify their families, and then summarily deported many of them, without any right of appeal.¹⁴ Then, when faced with court challenges over policy towards detainees at Guantánamo, illegal wiretapping, “extraordi-

nary rendition” (kidnapping and transport of suspects to third countries where they would be tortured), and the limitation of *habeas corpus* rights for anyone accused of association with terrorism, the Bush administration sponsored legislation – the Military Commissions Act of 2006 – that would legalize many of these practices. Immigrants and non-citizens are at particular risk because they could be simply “disappeared” on suspicion of terrorist association, without the right to a lawyer or to confront the evidence against them.¹⁵

What about Russia’s policy towards Muslim immigrants? Why is there a lesson here for Europeans? Even though the Russian Federation is home to perhaps 20 million people of Muslim background – about the same number as Western Europe as a whole – most of them are not technically immigrants. In many cases their ancestors have lived on the same territory since before there was anything like a Russian state. In that respect, Islam is one of Russia’s traditional religions, along with Orthodox Christianity and Judaism. In the Soviet era, it suffered the same fate as the other religions, with an official policy that alternated between tolerance, attempts at cooptation, and repression.¹⁶

The main impact of the Soviet experience was economic development and modernization that brought in its train urbanization, education, secularization, and a high level of assimilation of Muslim groups, particularly those outside the isolated, traditional villages of the North Caucasus. Soviet nationalities policy fostered teaching and codification of native languages and development of local culture.¹⁷ Paradoxically, these Soviet policies helped contribute to the reemergence of nationalist and religious sentiment and a focus on “identity politics,” as the old political and economic order broke down.¹⁸

¹⁵ Military Commissions Act of 2006, available at <<http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?c109:3:./temp/~c109sYKxcU>>. For a discussion of the legality and morality of these measures, see M. EVANGELISTA, *Law, Ethics, and the War on Terror* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2008).

¹⁶ A. MALASHENKO, *Islamskoe vozrozhdenie v sovremennoi Rossii* [Islamic revival in contemporary Russia] (Moscow: Carnegie Center, 1998).

¹⁷ T. MARTIN, *The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet*

The post-Soviet success stories are the regions where governments are able to manage their economic and social policies to keep Islamic culture and religion from becoming politicized. Sometimes that may mean taking approaches that violate conventional understandings of secular government. Murtaza Rakhimov, the President of the Russian republic of Bashkortostan, for example, sought to win over local Muslim believers by signing a decree providing state funding for the restoration of a major mosque, while placating the Russian population by restoring the Orthodox cathedral.¹⁹ In Ingushetiia, during the presidency of Ruslan Aushev, the practice of polygamy was accepted as a way of providing protection for women in a dangerous and unstable region bordering Chechnya. Aushev also legalized a limited form of the traditional *vendetta* to deter kidnappings by authorizing the revenge killing of those responsible for them.²⁰ One need not favor precisely these policies for Western Europe, but only to recognize that Russia's long history of relations with its Muslim peoples has contributed to a certain flexibility in dealing with and anticipating possible problems that could give rise to violence if left unaddressed. That is a general lesson that European countries might appreciate.

Unfortunately, as with the U.S. case, the discussion of the Russian model cannot end on an entirely positive note. In recent years, the spillover from the Chechen war has created a climate of suspicion of any dark-skinned person who might be from the Caucasus region, and this includes genuine immigrants – migrant workers from Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan, for example, whose economies are heavily dependent on the wages that these workers send home. There have been many worrying instances of skin-head violence and also official policies of discrimination. Just as the first Chechen war was ending, some bombs went off in Moscow. In response, Mayor Iurii Luzhkov blamed Chechens and ordered his police officials to take “retaliatory actions” against

¹⁹F. SHAIKHMETOV, “Demokratizatsiia Bashkirskogo obshchestva i Islam” [Democratization of Bashkir society and Islam], in A. IUNOVSKII - A. MALASHENKO (eds.), *Etnicheskii faktor v razvitiu i stabilizatsii* (Moscow: Nauka, 1997), p. 112.

the city's Chechen *diaspora*.²¹ In September 1999, after a series of apartment bombings that coincided with the resumption of war in Chechnya, Luzhkov had thousands of people rounded up on the basis of their physical appearance and then expelled from the city if their residency permits were not in order. Similar incidents took place in other Russian cities, creating a climate of impunity for those who would engage in discrimination and violence.

Let me summarize my argument so far. European governments, perhaps because of their experience with terrorism in the 1970s, have sought to combat it through the use of intelligence, law enforcement, and addressing political grievances, whereas the U.S. and Russian governments have favored military methods. Contrary to Kagan's argument, the different preferences of Russian, American, and European governments are not a function of their military capabilities, as we see when we turn now to the question of nuclear proliferation.

The Nuclear Threat

Russians, Europeans, and Americans appear to share the perception that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear ones, threatens international security. One can readily understand the disastrous consequences of nuclear weapons in the hands of terrorists. When it comes to the development of nuclear-weapons programs by states, there might be more room for debate. First of all, there is something peculiar about countries that have built tens of thousands of nuclear weapons, capable of annihilating all life on the planet (and kept them on dangerous hair-trigger alert) arguing that they are the only ones responsible enough to maintain nuclear arsenals. With the end of the Cold War, the leading nuclear powers – the United States, Russia, France, Britain, and China – no longer consider each other enemies, yet they claim that nuclear deterrence is essential for their security. Would it be so unreasonable, then, to credit

aspiring nuclear powers such as Iran and North Korea with some legitimate security concerns, given that they have genuine enemies armed with nuclear weapons.²² Even if one agrees with the argument that the world would be safer with a nuclear-free Iran and North Korea (as I do), it does not follow that the best path to achieve that outcome is for the nuclear powers to insist that they are the law abiding states and the others are rogues. It is well known almost everywhere except in Washington D.C., that the reluctance of the United States and the other nuclear powers to pursue nuclear disarmament puts them in contravention of their commitments under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the legal basis for criticizing such countries as Iran and North Korea. In other words, the double standards and hypocrisy of the nuclear powers have contributed to the threat of nuclear proliferation.

A 2004 report commissioned by the secretary general of the United Nations made this point when it called attention to a number of measures that the nuclear powers could take to reinforce the Nonproliferation Treaty: honor their commitments under article VI of the Treaty to move towards disarmament; reaffirm their previous commitments not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states; commit to practical measures to reduce the risk of accidental nuclear war, including, where appropriate, a progressive schedule for de-alerting their strategic nuclear weapons; agree to have the Security Council explicitly pledge to take collective action in response to a nuclear attack or the threat of such attack on a non-nuclear-weapon state.²³ These are the sorts of measures that countries committed to the rule of law would

²² B. CUMINGS, "Chantage nucléaire en Corée du Nord", *Le Monde Diplomatique*, February 2003, available at <www.monde-diplomatique.fr/2003/02/CUMINGS/9950?var_recherche=coree+du+nord>; and B. CUMINGS, "Korea: forgotten nuclear threats", *Le Monde Diplomatique*, English edition, December 2004, available at <<http://mondediplo.com/2004/12/08korea>>.

²³ "A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility", summarized in C. DURRO, "UN High-Level Panel Report: Reducing Demand for Nuclear Weapons," *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, 23 December 2004, available at <www.carnegieendowment.org/npp/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=16304>; Panel Members include: Anand Panwarachun, Chair (Thailand); Robert B. Liston,

favor, and we have come to expect more support for such measures by European countries than by the U.S. government. Until recently, one might have made an exception for France, a country particularly attached to its nuclear arsenal as a symbol of prestige and *grandeur*. But in a December 2008 letter to the Ban Ki-Moon, secretary general of the United Nations, French President Nicolas Sarkozy, who at the time also held the rotating presidency of the European Union, suggested a change of heart. He advocated universal adherence to a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing, including dismantling of test facilities, a ban on the production of fissile material, global reductions in nuclear stockpiles, and the eventual elimination of so-called tactical nuclear weapons.²⁴

According to Kagan's Venus-Mars generalization, a militarily stronger Europe would express less commitment to the rule of law and to diplomacy and less enthusiasm about disarmament treaties than we see in the proclamations of the present-day European Union. It would tend instead to favor the forceful solutions to security problems now associated mainly with the United States. The United States dealt with suspicions about Saddam Hussein's nuclear intentions, for example, by launching a war. The Bush administration made contingency plans to invade Iran and Syria, and threatened North Korea. It is hard to believe that a European Union, even with powerful military forces, would engage in such behavior. It seems more likely that Europe would continue to favor a mix of diplomacy, with political and economic incentives and sanctions, and a continued commitment to international institutions and agreements.

The European Security Strategy, issued in 2003, provides a good summary of what I have characterized as the European approach to security. It also addresses indirectly the hypothetical question I raised about Kagan's assumptions. The introduction to the report points out that "the end of the Cold War has left the United States in the dominant position as a military actor. However, no single country is able to tackle today's complex problems on its own."²⁵

²⁴S. ERLANGER, "Europeans Seek to Revive Nuclear Ban", *New York Times*, 8 December 2008. For the text of the letter, see <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2008/12/20081208.fr01.html>.

In other words, even if a European country or the European Union disposed of the same military power as the United States – if it held the dominant position in the world from a military standpoint – that would not solve its security problems. It would still need the diplomatic skills, economic and political strengths, and the commitment to international law, institutions, and multilateralism that have characterized the European approach.²⁶

To summarize and conclude my argument: clearly there is still a distinctive European approach to security, as there was during the Cold War. One difference between that period and now, however, is that at least we were able to recognize the end of the Cold War when it happened. How will we know when the threat of terrorism or nuclear proliferation has ended? The U.S. policy of waging war against terrorism and continuing its love affair with nuclear weapons, if not changed under a new administration, makes it more likely that those threats will never go away. The European approach might offer more hope. Ideally, a model for security in the West would incorporate the best elements from Europe, the United States, and Russia as well.

GIAMPIERO GIACOMELLO
R. CRAIG NATION (eds.)

Security in the West

Evolution of a Concept

ESTRATTO

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