Linking domestic politics to international relations constitutes one of the most traditional approaches to the study of international change. Indeed, the use of domestic explanations for international developments predates the creation of the discipline of political science. The central questions in the study of international relations have long focused on change—especially change from a state of peace to a state of war—and philosophers and historians have sought explanations at the level of domestic politics (Waltz 1959). Explanations linking representative forms of government to pacific foreign policies, for example, date back to Rousseau and earlier (Doyle 1986). Even Thucydides—best known among political scientists for the affinity of his explanations to realist, balance-of-power theories of war—highlighted the impact of the different domestic polities of Athens and Sparta.

What, if anything, then, do domestic explanations for international change have to offer that is new? Ironicaly, perhaps the most promising development in the field is the recognition among scholars inclined toward domestic explanations for foreign policy that these explanations are inadequate. Many scholars understand that they must incorporate factors at the level of the international system into their explanations and, moreover, that they must do so in ways that are more systematic than the mere assertion that "everything matters." In some respects, we might speak of a convergence of traditions, where scholars favorable to realist approaches and inclined to treat the state as a unitary actor have also sought to integrate other levels of analysis into their explanations and to collaborate with
those who were already doing so (e.g., Mastanduno, Lake, and Ikenberry 1989). Even the unalloyed neorealist accounts of international stability and change recognize that the impetus for international systemic transformations—for example, uneven economic growth that leads to shifts in the international distribution of power—resides in many instances in domestic causes: demographic changes, development of new technologies, and so on (Waltz 1979; Gilpin 1981).

The approach generally identified under the rubric “domestic structure” seeks to link the domestic and international levels of analysis by focusing on the state as the nexus of the two. The early work on domestic structure focused on the relative strengths of state and society—with the state defined most simply as the central government decisionmakers and bureaucratic apparatus (Krasner 1978)—the nature of their relationship, and especially the “policy networks” that linked them (Katzenstein 1978). 1 Purveyors of domestic structural analysis of international relations sought, among other things, to use their approach to bridge the gap between internal and external explanations for foreign policy and state development. 2 Both in the field of international political economy and in security studies, proponents argued that domestic structure provided a means of specifying the conditions under which external (realist) or internal (liberal or bureaucratic-politics) explanations would be more or less applicable. In the first part of this chapter I discuss some research that proposes domestic structure as a bridge between these competing theoretical approaches.

The state, as J. P. Nettl (1968) pointed out in an influential essay, is by its nature Janus-faced—it looks both to the domestic polity and to the external environment. Thus it lends itself particularly well to the role of analytic link between domestic and international levels, especially when understood as a component of the domestic structure. Domestic structure represents the relationship between state and society. In addition to helping to identify the most salient level of analysis for a given type of country or issue-area, it is often conceived as an intervening variable between domestic and international politics. Domestic structure works in both directions, providing domestic political forces access to foreign policymaking (what Kenneth Waltz [1959] called the “second image”) and filtering the impact of the international environment into domestic politics (what Peter Gourevitch [1978] dubbed the “second image reversed”). In the second part of this chapter I summarize examples of analyses that employ domestic structure as an intervening variable in this fashion.

The domestic structural approach seems especially appropriate to the study of comparative foreign policy, to answering the question of why states that face similar international pressures and constraints—including major changes in the external environment—often respond very differently. Its relevance to explaining major global change is more uncertain. If it has
any role to play, it is in linking the forces of the external environment to domestic political change and showing how the foreign policies that result from such linkages contribute to the transformation of the international system. It is a tall order, and one that the present theoretical development of the domestic structural approach suggests will not soon be filled. In the third section of this chapter I make a tentative effort to sketch out a role for domestic structural analysis in accounting for global change, using the case of the end of the Cold War as an example.

**Domestic Structure as a Theoretical Bridge**

The literature on domestic structures has served as a way of bridging the debate between internal and external explanations for foreign policy in issue-areas ranging from international political economy to international security policy. In political economy the external-internal divide is often characterized as a debate between realism and liberalism. In the security field the realist approach is contrasted to the bureaucratic-politics approach, which, as Theda Skocpol (1985, 4) put it, treats government agencies as "pure analogues of the competing societal interest groups of classical pluralism." Thus it makes claims for security policy similar to what the liberal approach makes for political economy. In both fields scholars have identified cases in which countries with divergent domestic structures faced common international pressures. They tested propositions derived from the competing internal and external theories and found that the relative power of each theory's predictions depended on the domestic structure.

The pioneering effort in this vein was Peter Katzenstein’s (1976) comparison of U.S. and French energy policy—the first study summarized here. The second comparison presented here is a summary of my own work on U.S. and Soviet security policy.

**Domestic Structure and International Economic Change**

Katzenstein sought to illustrate the role that domestic structure plays in mediating states' responses to international economic changes. He developed simple propositions from realist and liberal theories and tested them against cases of the United States and France. Both faced the same external shock—the energy crisis of the 1970s, triggered by the Arab oil embargo imposed in the wake of U.S. support for Israel in the 1973 war. Katzenstein argued that in the wake of the oil embargo and the dramatic increase in oil prices, realist, external explanations would predict that each state would act as a unitary actor to seek to secure a supply of oil at the lowest possible prices for the overall national interest. Liberal, internal explanations would
predict that government policy in each state would vary depending on the strength of the relevant interest groups, including the oil companies; the policy would be a result of competition between groups. Drawing on the traditional distinction in the study of international relations, Katzenstein suggested that given the same external impetus or constraints, realist theories would predict the pursuit of power by state actors, whereas liberal theories would predict the pursuit of wealth by societal actors.

France Versus the United States

To these approaches Katzenstein contrasted one based on analysis of domestic structures. This approach held that the response of each state to the oil crisis would depend on its domestic structure, in particular on the relationship between state and society. Katzenstein characterized France as having a strong state and a weak society, where political power was highly concentrated. He considered the United States, in contrast, to have a weak state and a strong society, where politics was characterized by social pluralism.  

Katzenstein argued that the domestic structure of each country was mainly a product of its history. In France rationalization of authority structures preceded the development of participatory institutions—state power came first, then democracy. In the United States, the pattern was reversed. After the French Revolution, the centralized political institutions in Paris came over time to be seen as representing the broad public interest against the power of local elites. In the United States, in contrast, the notion of the public interest was seen as being best served by weak state institutions; decentralization and dispersion of government power were seen as the best way to protect individual rights.

For Katzenstein, the historical evolution of state-society relations in the two countries shaped their contemporary structures. Hence French governmental institutions are highly centralized and their functions are differentiated—each ministry knows for which policies it is responsible. In the United States the structure is decentralized and functions are fused. Departments, congressional committees, and the White House have overlapping jurisdictions—each organization feels entitled to promote its own policies, leading to national policy that is often stalemated or inconsistent. Concentration of power in the French state enhances its authority, whereas U.S. state power is circumscribed by a system of checks and balances.

In contrasting U.S. and French societies, Katzenstein argued that the impact of society on bureaucracy is the key to influence on government policy. In France the public bureaucracy traditionally has appeared to be above partisan politics, whereas in the United States bureaucracy is part of the political struggle (thus the mass exodus from government to think tank whenever the presidency switches from one party to another).
Katzenstein's domestic structural approach predicted that French policy would approximate the realist, state-dominated pursuit of power, whereas U.S. policy would resemble the liberal, society-driven pursuit of wealth. In France's energy policy the main goal seems to have been to increase the country's autonomy and its access to a secure supply of oil. This policy was not simply a reaction to the oil crisis of the 1970s but a long-range strategy, going back several decades, comprising several components. First, the government has played an active role in the oil market. It has directly owned 35 percent of the stock of the Compagnie Francaise de Pétoles (CFP) since 1924. In 1965 the government formed its own company, Entreprise de Recherches et d'Activité Pétrolières (ERAP), to exploit oil from Algeria.

The second component of its strategy was the government's support of French oil companies against foreign competition. Beginning in the 1920s, it maintained a system of quotas that limited the role of foreign companies in importing, refining, and exporting oil in the French market. Ninety percent of all finished oil products had to come from domestic refineries. As of 1964 no new retail gasoline outlets were allowed to be constructed without government approval—anoter means of limiting foreign access to the domestic market. As a consequence, by the mid-1970s the French government controlled 80 percent of the refining and 35 percent of the distribution of oil. U.S. and other foreign companies saw a steady decline in their share of investment in the French petroleum industry.

The third component of the strategy was the development of special relationships with former French colonies in order to make France less subject to supply fluctuations on the international market. This policy, too, predated the oil crisis. The French government supported the operations of its companies in French colonial areas, for example. It spent the equivalent of over a billion dollars to underwrite the cost of drilling for oil in the Sahara during the first fifteen years after World War II. In Katzenstein's estimation, this long-term strategy implemented by a strong state apparatus ensured that the realist goals of autonomy and security of supply were consistently and successfully pursued.

In the U.S. case, in contrast, a domestic structural analysis would predict that strong societal forces, especially corporations, would be interested more in economic wealth and profits than in enhancing state power and autonomy. Although U.S. dependence on foreign oil has increased since the end of World War II, the vast majority of it has been imported by U.S. companies. How have the companies achieved their goals of expanded profits? In Katzenstein's view, they took advantage of the government, especially during times of crisis, when a secure supply of oil was essential. During World War II and the Korean War, for example, the weak U.S. state had no
way to secure the flow of oil without relying on the big oil companies; they, in turn, demanded concessions. The oil companies cooperated with the U.S. war effort in the 1940s only in return for a government commitment to drop all pending antitrust legislation.

Even during normal times the oil industry has been able to exert its influence to extract concessions from the government, for example, in tax policy, overseas investment insurance, tanker subsidies, dry-hole drilling allowances, and the like. These policies are also used by the French government, but selectively and mainly to support particular goals, such as promoting French firms and decreasing the market share of U.S. firms. In the U.S. case the policies are straight subsidies with no strings attached.

In the early postwar period the oil companies used the U.S. government to help them dominate Middle Eastern oil. Between 1947 and 1950, as part of the Marshall Plan, the United States gave Western Europe US$384 million of oil produced by U.S. companies in the Middle East. As a result, the relative share of U.S.-produced oil in the Middle East rose from 38 percent in 1947 to 45 percent in 1950. More significantly, the dependence of Europe on U.S.-produced oil increased from 43 percent in 1947 to 85 percent in 1950. The U.S. companies during this period began to replace British companies as the main exporters of Middle Eastern oil. The French government was also involved in its companies' business in the Third World, especially the former French colonies. An important difference, though, is that the French state stayed involved in order to increase security of supply and autonomy. The U.S. state, in contrast, once it had been used by the oil companies to obtain a dominant position in the Middle East, could no longer influence the companies, except indirectly through fiscal policy (Ikenberry 1986). In the aftermath of the first oil crisis in October 1973, it became obvious that U.S. oil companies supported the price increase imposed by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) because it increased their profits. Oil interests and state policy coincided as the U.S. government came to favor decontrol of the industry so that market mechanisms would raise prices and provide incentives for domestic production and conservation (Ikenberry 1986).

To summarize: A realist, state-as-rational-actor approach would have predicted similar responses in France and the United States to the same external events. The state would seek to secure an oil supply and enhance the autonomy of the country's oil production. A liberal, domestic-interest-group approach would view the state's policies as the product of internal politics and pressure from corporations. External factors would only come into play as windows of opportunity, which the corporations would use to their advantage. The domestic structural approach seeks to reconcile these two competing perspectives. It holds that countries with strong states and weak societies would lean toward realist responses, whereas countries with
weak states and strong societies would lean toward liberal responses. Katzenstein's presentation of the French and U.S. cases seemed to bear out these predictions.

**Domestic Structure and the Security Environment**

The literature on security policy, both within political science and in the broader policy discourse, has long been characterized by a debate between internal and external schools. It parallels the debate in international political economy, with realists favoring assumptions of the state-as-unitary-actor and proponents of domestic-level explanations focusing on the role of bureaucracies and interest groups. Both approaches are amply represented in the literature on security policy and, in particular, arms races (Gleditsch and Njolstad 1990). I have compared the arms policies of the United States and the Soviet Union—specifically the processes by which they developed major new weapons—drawing simple propositions from realist and bureaucratic-politics approaches (Evangelista 1988). I argued that realist theory would expect each country to develop weapons in response to those of the other side in an "action-reaction dynamic" (Rathjens 1969), directed from the top of the political-military system and resembling the behavior of a unitary actor. A bureaucratic-politics approach, in contrast, would expect the initiative for major weapons development to come unsolicited from weapons laboratories, military contractors, and military services (Allison and Morris 1975).

**The United States Versus the Soviet Union**

There is a long tradition of comparative historical analysis of Russia and the West—most notably the works of Alexander Gerschenkron (1962) and Barrington Moore Jr. (1966)—that identifies the importance of differences in domestic structures for both economic and security policy. The Russian pattern was very different from that of the United States and Britain. Those "early industrializing" countries took advantage of favorable geographic circumstances and a relative absence of international pressures to industrialize at a gradual pace. Industrialization was carried out by private manufacturers and financed by private capital; the limited role played by a weak state allowed for the development of democratic institutions.

Russia differed as well from the second pattern, the "late industrializers." In Germany and Japan the pressure of the international system and competition from more advanced countries required the state to take a leading role, for example, in mobilizing capital for industrial investment. This pattern resulted in strong authoritarian states with weak societal forces and a consequent absence of democracy. The third pattern, "late,
late industrialization," is typified by Russia and China. Under extreme international pressure, communist elites in these countries undertook costly campaigns of forced-draft industrialization to catch up with their more advanced competitors. The political outcome of such "revolutions from above" included highly centralized, strong states with weak, even atomized societies.

The pattern of sensitivity to foreign pressure leading to strong centralization and state intervention finds antecedents far back in Russian history, but for our purposes the early Soviet period is of most relevance. Here one finds a strong relationship between military requirements and centralized, forced-draft industrialization. Stalin's ruthless policies of collectivization of agriculture and rapid industrialization were plainly intended to contribute to the buildup of Soviet military power, albeit at terrible cost to the populace. It seems apparent, then, that the international pressures faced by a late, late industrializer such as the USSR affect the development of both military and economic policy by fostering the growth of a highly centralized, strong, hierarchically organized state at the expense of civil society.

Although in the realm of security policy—especially in the USSR—it is sometimes difficult to distinguish between state and societal actors, one can nevertheless make sharp comparisons between the United States and the USSR on the basis of historically conditioned domestic structures. In this respect, one could characterize the United States as a weak state whose fragmentation and decentralization of authority permit multiple inputs into the policy process from the "bottom up." Policy initiatives in the strong, centralized, hierarchical Soviet state, in contrast, came from the "top down." Thus one would anticipate U.S. policy to come closer to the bureaucratic-politics model, whereas Soviet behavior would conform more closely to realist expectations.

Weapons Innovation

My examination elsewhere (Evangelista 1988) of eighteen cases of U.S. and Soviet weapons innovation confirmed the expectations derived from comparing the two countries' domestic structures. Neither side's policies corresponded exactly to ideal-type realism or bureaucratic politics. Yet in the U.S. case the degree of independent initiative exerted from below, the efforts of political and technological entrepreneurs, and the frequent irrelevance of actual Soviet behavior to the success of new U.S. weapons programs bring the U.S. pattern much closer to an internal, bureaucratic-politics model than to a realist, unitary-actor model. The "bottom-up" approach was especially striking in the case of the development of the nuclear-powered submarine, the multiple nuclear warhead, and tactical nuclear weapons.
Major Soviet arms innovations were most typically reactions to Western initiatives (including, for the early Cold War period, weapons developed by Nazi Germany during World War II). Though the structure of domestic Soviet institutions of military research, production, and deployment gave peculiar features to Soviet responses, the Soviet case comes close in many respects to what a unitary-actor assumption would predict. Initiative came from the top of the political system to mobilize resources to meet the external challenge. The development of jet interceptor aircraft and ballistic missiles in response to the German wartime initiatives and development of the Soviet atomic bomb and tactical nuclear weapons during the postwar period are among the clearest examples of this phenomenon. Even in the late Brezhnev era, when Soviet military-industrial production seemed to be propelled largely by inertia, with greater scope for institutional and group interests, many weapons innovations, especially in aircraft, were direct responses to U.S. initiatives (Chaiko 1985; Lambeth 1991; Twigg 1994).

Thus, in both the economic and security-policy issue-areas, proponents of domestic structural approaches attempted to integrate competing theoretical perspectives and specify the conditions under which one or the other would apply.

**Domestic Structure as Intervening Variable**

Students of international relations and comparative foreign policy have increasingly drawn insights from the literature on domestic structures to apply to issues and countries that had fallen outside the scope of the original work. The trend has been toward broadening the domain of relevance of the approach. One area neglected by domestic structural analysis was the comparative study of the foreign policies of the Soviet-type countries. Simply describing them in that fashion—as “Soviet-type”—tells much of the story. Traditionally the East European states of the Soviet bloc were considered sufficiently similar to one another and different from other states to merit a category all their own. One study of the foreign economic strategies of these states explicitly argued that Katzenstein’s type of domestic structural analysis was not particularly useful for understanding political-economic systems modeled on the Soviet system (Comisso and Tyson 1986). It emphasized instead “the unique political and economic structure of members of the socialist bloc” (Comisso 1986, 195) and employed concepts that treated the Soviet-type system as sui generis.

In the first part of this section, I question such a rejection of the domestic structural approach to the East European states of the former Soviet bloc. I employ domestic structure as an intervening variable to compare how Poland and Romania responded to the oil crises of the 1970s and the prob-
lem of foreign debt in the early 1980s. I find the approach useful both for understanding the differences between the two countries and for understanding their similarities to non-Soviet-type states. Both aspects appear more relevant now that the adjective “Soviet-type” has lost its contemporary significance for the states of Eastern Europe, and the benefits of placing those states in a broader, comparative framework is widely recognized.

By the late 1980s several scholars had used domestic structural analysis to explore aspects of security policy, including alliance strategy, force posture, and weapons deployment (e.g., Platias 1986; Evangelista 1988; Barnett 1990), that were originally deemed irrelevant to the debates over relative autonomy of the state (Krasner 1978). Thomas Risse-Kappen’s discussion (1991) of the relationship between public opinion and security policy represents a further advance both in the scope of the inquiry (the focus on mass publics) and in the sophistication of the notion of domestic structure. Risse-Kappen’s linking of the structure of domestic institutions with coalition-building processes benefited from previous critiques of the strong state–weak state dichotomy (e.g., Ikenberry 1986) as well as developments in the thinking of the original advocates of domestic structural approaches (e.g., Katzenstein 1978, 1985; Gourevitch 1986). The section Part of this section summarizes his use of domestic structure as an intervening variable between public opinion and security policy.

Economic Crisis, Domestic Structure, and Adjustment

Using domestic structures to compare how particular East European states reacted to common external economic events represents an endeavor similar to Katzenstein’s comparison (1976) of France and the United States and later edited volume (1978) comparing several advanced industrial states. Indeed, the initial external events are the same in each comparison—price shock of 1973—but the consequences for relatively poor states “Second World” could be expected to diverge considerably from the “First World.” At first glance it seems that until recently the states of the former Soviet bloc all had such similar domestic structures that we should expect them to respond in similar ways to the constraints and pressures of the international economy. They were all, for example, highly centralized, single-party states, with state-owned industry and weak, dependent labor unions. However, I argue that despite these similar characteristics, we can identify differences in responses that are linked with different domestic conditions, or, in essence, different domestic structures. Later, I draw such a comparison between Poland and Romania (before the events of 1989), but describe in more detail what external events triggered the states’ re-
International Economic Conditions

The same economic events that evoked divergent responses in the advanced industrial states had a substantial impact on economies of the Soviet bloc as well. First were the major increases in oil prices in 1973 and 1974 and then again in 1979 and 1980. These helped to trigger a recession in the industrialized countries and led to a slowdown in world trade. For the countries of Eastern Europe—as for many developing countries—the recession threatened to derail their strategies for outward-oriented growth, which were dependent on exporting products to the industrialized world (Tyson 1986).

In the wake of the oil price hikes, the abundance of "petrodollars" deposited in Western banks posed a temptation to East European regimes, as the banks offered loans on generous terms. Before the loans could be used to foster productive investment, however, the second oil-induced recession hit. The recession was the longest in postwar history, lasting from 1979 to 1983—and even longer in the Second and Third Worlds. The recession prevented the countries that had borrowed heavily from being able to pay back their loans: They were unable to sell their exports in order to earn dollars to make the repayments.

The possible policy responses to such a predicament were generally twofold. The state could find new markets for exports—the solution adopted by the newly industrializing countries of East Asia. Or it could implement austerity programs, as, for example, the government of Mexico did when it pushed real wages down by 24.3 percent in 1983 and another 7.5 percent in 1984. Poland and Romania were insufficiently flexible to shift their exports to new markets. Their governments chose austerity, and the comparative analysis of their domestic structures explains their relative degrees of success.

Domestic structure in Soviet-type systems includes not only state-society interactions but also the relationship of state and society to the Communist Party (or its equivalent). For purposes of this illustrative comparison domestic structure will not be defined as precisely as, for example, in Risse-Kappen's study. The contrast between Poland and Romania will be fairly striking, much as the differences between U.S. and Soviet domestic structures were in our consideration of arms policies.

Poland: The Party's Demise, Civil Society's Rise

Poland had a long history of economic crises preceding the oil shock of 1973. In 1970 workers protesting price increases were put down so harshly that a public outcry forced the removal of Władysław Gomulka, the party first secretary. His successor, Edward Gierek, immediately set out to transform the party. By the end of 1971 he had removed not only most
of Gomulka’s supporters but also many of the people who had helped him to get into office. He replaced these people with the youngest, best educated, party officials in Eastern Europe, people who saw the party as a career rather than as a mission. The careerist orientation of the young bureaucrats had two consequences. In their lack of interest in ideological purity, party members began to resemble society as a whole. At the same time, however, the party lost whatever coherence it had because it was no longer unified by a common mission.

As a by-product of an effort to streamline and reduce bureaucracy, the party transferred several of its functions in local regions to state institutions. The party lost some of its control over enterprises and ministries, especially on questions of investment. In dealing with society, the regime tried to improve relations with both the workers and the Catholic Church. Strikes were not legalized, but they were generally met with wage increases rather than repression.

Gierek’s economic policy entailed an expansion of involvement in the international market. He was personally interested in improving relations with the West, was on good terms with French president Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, spoke French, and spent a lot of time in Paris. The initial result of the international focus and the looser domestic atmosphere was positive, as reflected in a growth rate of 9.4 percent for the period 1971-1975.

When the economic situation began to deteriorate, with high oil prices and an inability to sell Polish goods abroad for hard currency, Gierek had to look for new policies. As Laura Tyson (1986) has noted, one of the first things most of the East European regimes did was to cut back on capital investment (new firms, new machinery, etc.) because these required imported inputs of equipment and raw materials. Gierek had some trouble controlling the level of investment because of his earlier reforms, which had given enterprises and ministries some autonomy from the party.

Another common area on which to focus, in order to implement an austerity program, is wages and price policy. Here there were three options: raise prices, decrease wages, or slow employment growth and even institute unemployment. The third option was basically ruled out for ideological reasons—a socialist country is supposed to provide secure employment. At first Gierek tried to hold down wages. Yet one consequence of the decentralization of the party and division within the top political leadership was that workers felt better able to assert their rights. They responded to pressure on their wages by launching a wave of several hundred strikes in the late 1970s. The strikes were generally followed by concessions in the form of wage increases, thereby defeating the purpose of the austerity program. With the failure of wage restraint, Gierek tried price increases. These too were met with protests and were reversed. The workers interpreted Gierek’s actions as a sign of weakness and pressed for more concessions. The failure
of his last attempt at an austerity program in the summer of 1980 led to the rise of the Solidarity trade union movement.

In December 1980 Gierek was removed from office (later, in the new capitalist Poland, he made a small fortune selling his memoirs). Stanislaw Kania, his replacement, had no better success. Why not? Because the main tool that a centralized one-party state needs—the party—was disintegrating. From September to December 1980, 50,000 members resigned. By December 1981 a half million members, or 17 percent of the membership, had left (reducing the party from 3.2 to 2.7 million members). Solidarity—already recognized by the government as an independent trade union in September 1980—was becoming increasingly popular.

Central control of the kind necessary to impose an austerity program and dominate strong social forces like Solidarity was not reestablished until the military took over in December 1981. The initial objective of General Wojciech Jaruzelski's coup was to crush Solidarity, but once that was done he put through an austerity program in February 1982. Prices of all consumer goods increased by 300 to 400 percent, increasing the cost-of-living index by 100 percent in the course of a year. Some compensation in wages followed, but real wages still fell by 25 percent as a result of the price reform. These measures succeeded in reversing the trade imbalance. With domestic consumption down, Poland began exporting more than it imported. But it still owed some US$25 billion to Western banks and was spending a large proportion of its export earnings simply to service the debt rather than to reinvest in the economy, renovate the technological infrastructure, and improve people's standard of living.

To summarize the case of Poland: In a centralized, communist-party state, one would expect to see quick responses to international economic disturbances and a great deal of flexibility. Society is considered weak relative to the state, and the state would be expected to implement an austerity program without much protest. In fact, in Poland, weakness and divisions within the party gave societal groups, especially workers, an opening to exert more influence and prevent the government from making adjustments to the international economy at their expense. Only when the army came in was it possible to enforce centralized control of the economy again—yet even this “success” was short-lived, owing to the tumultuous events of 1989.

Romania: Stalinism Confronts Economic Interdependence

In Romania there was never an erosion of centralized control and there was no assertion of independent power by social groups—until the violent upheaval of 1989-1990. Nicolae Ceaucescu, the last Romanian communist leader before the 1989 revolution, came into power in 1965. His first task was to increase the power of the already highly centralized party apparatus and, in particular, his own personal power. The role of the parliament, the
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Grand National Assembly, was limited to a largely symbolic function, and the same was true for the local people’s councils. Party secretaries became more responsible for the economy, and a number of party and economic positions were fused.

Ceaușescu also established a system of personal rule that bypassed the traditional party organizations. The year he came into office, he established a political executive committee in order to circumvent the Central Committee and its presidium (the politburo). In 1974 he established a Permanent Bureau limited to five close associates, later expanded to fifteen. He instituted a system of rotation to keep lower party officials from establishing themselves in Bucharest; he would send them out to the provinces for extended periods. The personal character of his rule can perhaps best be described by listing some of the offices he personally held: general secretary of the party; chairman of the council of state; president of the republic (a job created expressly for him); chairman of the national defense council; commander in chief of the armed forces. In comparison to this strong centralized authority, societal groups were relatively powerless: Trade unions and workers’ councils, originally intended to convey people’s concerns to the top leadership, were instead used, in the standard phrase, as “transmission belts” to implement government policy.

Romania was the least industrialized of the East European countries when communist regimes were imposed in the region after World War II. The highly centralized state and party apparatus was used to promote rapid industrialization on the Russian model. Romania was fortunate in having its own energy supply: oil and natural gas. For investment capital, it relied on restricting consumption, squeezing the population in the traditional Soviet fashion. Hence its early economic development was essentially self-sufficient.

When Ceaușescu entered the scene in 1965 he continued the industrialization drive, promoting what he called “multilateral development.” In Ceaușescu’s vision, Romania, which had traditionally been considered a producer of primary raw materials—it was known as the gas station and breadbasket of Europe—would now become a modern, balanced, industrial economy. This goal brought Ceaușescu into conflict with the Soviet Union, which had different plans for its regional economic organization—the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA). The Soviets were arguing for specialization of the economies into areas in which each had a comparative advantage. They were happy to have Romania remain the gas station and breadbasket.

Economic performance was reasonably good in Romania during Ceaușescu’s first decade in power, with a growth rate of about 6 percent per year. By the second half of the 1970s, things had taken a turn for the worse. The Romanians had been pretty much protected from the first oil-price shock, since they were self-sufficient in oil. In fact, they had invested heavily in oil refineries and so imported crude oil and reexported refined oil,
thus benefiting somewhat from the price increases. By the late 1970s, though, domestic production had dropped off, and they began importing from the Soviet Union and the Middle East. They began to run up a trade deficit and borrowed money from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Romania had been the first Soviet-bloc country to join the two institutions. It was also the first to recognize West Germany in 1967 and to develop economic relations with it. It maintained extensive contacts with China, despite Soviet criticism. This independence in foreign policy was also the product of Ceaușescu's role and was at the same time an instrument for supporting that role. He used independence from the Soviet Union to summon feelings of nationalism and thereby enhance his stature. Independence also gave him more options in the economic sphere than the other East European countries had.

By 1974 Romania was trading more with the Western countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) than with those of the Soviet-sponsored CMEA. With the last of its oil reserves depleted, Romania also became the leading importer among the CMEA countries of OPEC oil.

Another innovation that Ceaușescu introduced was to recharacterize Romania, changing it from a "socialist country" to a "socialist developing country." This was part of his plan to improve relations with the Third World, which paid off later. While the other East European countries' trade balances were hurt by the recessions in the West and the consequent lack of demand for their products, Romania was able to reorient much of its exports to the Third World, and so its trade balance did not suffer as much.

By the second oil shock of the late 1970s and the recession of the early 1980s, however, Romania was forced to rely on the traditional solution of depressing domestic demand through an austerity program. Unlike Poland, Romania was able to carry out a suppression of domestic consumption without triggering mass unrest (at least not for a decade). Starting in 1979, personal consumption was severely limited, prices were increased for almost everything, electric power was reduced and restricted, and by 1981 even food was rationed. In the early 1980s Romania shifted its trade back toward the Soviet bloc and refused to take any further Western loans. As a result of these measures, the balance of trade improved and some of the debt was paid off. But Ceaușescu was not satisfied. In an effort to make Romania more economically independent, he continued to squeeze the population. This situation was in marked contrast to that in Poland, where in the late 1980s the communist government felt it had to submit a referendum to the voters to see if they were willing to make some sacrifices in the interest of reform and future economic benefits (they were not).

We can summarize the differences between Romania and Poland in their response to the debt and energy crises by focusing on their domestic structures. Romania had what Ellen Comisso (1986) called a socialist patrimo-
nial system—power is concentrated in one person who could implement flexible adjustment policies at the expense of the population (with the help of a powerful security apparatus). Poland had, in Comisso’s terms, a collegial system, where no single leader had the authority to enforce radical policies to make the country adjust to international economic disturbances. More important than the differences encapsulated in this taxonomy, though, were the conditions of the main components of the domestic structure in each country: party, state, and society. In the 1970s Poland’s state and party apparatus was crumbling while societal forces, particularly workers, were growing in strength. The result was an inability to respond to economic shocks with the type of austerity measures adopted by Romania. In contrast, Romania, like some authoritarian regimes in the Third World, was able to squeeze a weak society because Ceaușescu controlled the instruments of a still strong, centralized state.

Public Opinion, Domestic Structure, and Security Policy

In his pioneering study of the links between public opinion, domestic structure, and security policy, Thomas Risse-Kappen (1991) sought to solve a puzzle: Why, given similar trends in public opinion toward military spending and relations with the Soviet Union during the 1980s, did the governments of four liberal democracies behave so differently in their policies toward security and the USSR? His basic answer is that domestic structure mediated public opinion and that his four democracies—the United States, France, Japan, and Germany—vary in their domestic structures and, consequently, in their governments’ responsiveness to public opinion on foreign policy.

Domestic Structure: The State of the Art

Risse-Kappen’s description of what constitutes domestic structure represented the accumulated wisdom of fifteen years (following Katzenstein’s 1976 article) of developing the concept for use in the comparative study of foreign policy. He refers to his approach as a mixed one, incorporating insights from the original state-society literature and the work on policy networks and coalition-building. Since his elaboration of domestic structure guides the coding of his four cases and has already proved to be valuable for subsequent comparative research (e.g., Evangelista 1995; Risse-Kappen 1994, 1995a), it is worth quoting in full:

1. The nature of the political institutions and the degree of their centralization: Is executive power concentrated in the hands of one decision maker (president, prime minister, chancellor) who controls the bureaucratic infighting among governmental agencies? To what extent can the government control the legislative process?
II. The *structure of society* regarding its polarization, the strength of social organization, and the degree to which societal pressure can be mobilized: How heterogeneous is the society in terms of ideological and/or class cleavages? How well developed are social coalitions and organizations in their ability to express grievances and raise demands?

III. Finally, the nature of the coalition-building processes in the *policy networks* linking state and society:

A. In countries with centralized political institutions but polarized societies and rather weak social organizations, the policy network is likely to be *state-dominated*. The policy-relevant coalition building would then be restricted to the political élites and would more or less exclude societal actors and/or public opinion.

B. By contrast, *societal control* of the policy network is to be expected in countries with comparatively homogeneous societies and a high degree of societal mobilization but weak state structures. The policy-relevant coalition building would take place among societal actors; accordingly, public opinion would play a major role.

C. Countries with political institutions and social organizations of comparable strength are likely to have a policy network characterized by *democratic corporatism*. Political and societal actors would be engaged in continuous bargaining processes in search of policy compromises in an environment of give-and-take. As a result, some sorts of middle-of-the-road policies are to be expected, reflecting the common denominator of public opinion. (Risse-Kappen 1991, 485-486.)

Risse-Kappen’s coding does not produce a continuum but rather four distinct types of countries that share certain aspects of domestic structure (see Table 8.1). In this framework Germany and Japan are similar to each other, whereas France and the United States are virtual opposites. In this respect his categorization is largely consistent with what other comparative studies, drawing on notions of domestic structure, have found (e.g., Katzenstein 1976, 1978; Ikenberry 1986).

*Responses to the Soviet Threat*

Risse-Kappen is explicitly interested in testing the effect of domestic structures as an intervening variable. He identifies the prerequisites for conducting such a test as follows: “To isolate the role of domestic structures as the intervening variable between public opinion and policy decisions requires a case in which the influence of the international environment appears constant for the four countries and in which under ideal conditions public attitudes are also more or less similar” (Risse-Kappen 1991, 493). In Risse-Kappen’s account, the dramatic change in Soviet behavior during the decade of the 1980s was reflected fairly uniformly in public perceptions of the Soviet threat and public attitudes toward military spending across his four cases. All four countries saw an increase in support for military spend-
TABLE 8.1 Risse-Kappen's Taxonomy of Domestic Structures of Liberal Democracies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political system</th>
<th>U.S.</th>
<th>West Germany</th>
<th>Japan</th>
<th>France</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Decentralized</td>
<td>Intermediate level of centralization</td>
<td>Intermediate level of centralization</td>
<td>Centralized</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Society</td>
<td>Heterogeneous weak organizations</td>
<td>Heterogeneous strong organizations</td>
<td>Homogeneous strong organizations</td>
<td>Heterogeneous weak organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy</td>
<td>Society-dominated</td>
<td>Democratic corporatist</td>
<td>Quasi-corporatist</td>
<td>State-dominated</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


ing coinciding with the deterioration of East-West relations in the late 1970s and early 1980s, and most saw support for military spending decline as relations improved. Most countries showed a reduced perception of Soviet threat following the ascendancy of Mikhail Gorbachev and his conciliatory foreign policies (the anomalous case is Japan, which still perceived a Soviet threat in the late 1980s, probably owing to unresolved territorial disputes over the Kuril Islands and Sakhalin).

Yet the behaviors of the four governments diverged as a consequence, according to Risse-Kappen, of the way different domestic structures filtered societal influences, especially public opinion. U.S. policy was hostile toward the USSR from the late 1970s until just before the 1984 presidential election, when President Ronald Reagan softened his rhetoric. After Gorbachev came into office, the Reagan administration eventually began to respond favorably to his many conciliatory initiatives in security policy. Risse-Kappen argued that the initially hostile U.S. government policy of the late 1970s reflected elite and public disillusion with the arms-control process and Soviet activity in the Third World, as one would expect in a weak state easily influenced by societal forces. By the early 1980s public concern about the danger of nuclear war promoted a growing peace movement to which the administration felt obliged to respond by toning down its hostile rhetoric, maintaining existing arms treaties, and pursuing continued negotiations. The new administration policies were also the product of fluid internal competition in a weak, decentralized state apparatus, which eventually resulted in a new coalition in favor of at least the appearance of moderation in policy toward the USSR. The delayed but positive Reagan response to Gorbachev also tracked public attitudes toward the new Soviet leader, with some time lag, and reflected the consolidation of the moderates' position and the hard-liners' defection from the administration.

In France public opinion was far more conciliatory toward the USSR and more accepting of Gorbachev than was actual government policy. Public
opinion had little impact on decisionmaking. Societal forces were weak and fragmented, as illustrated, for example, by the fractious and ineffectual French peace movement—a sharp contrast to its German, Dutch, British, and U.S. counterparts. These findings reconfirm the generalizations about the strong role of the French state in dominating public policy making.

German security policy mirrored the public's commitment to détente and arms control and the elite consensus that had emerged in the policy network during the 1970s. It maintained a fairly stable course despite the ups and downs of U.S.-Soviet relations. As the public became increasingly anti-nuclear and the peace movement flourished during the "new Cold War" of the early 1980s, however, government policy reflected the change. The main impact was felt in the coalition-building processes within the party system. The democratic corporatist state gradually forged a new consensus around changing societal and institutional values and was particularly well prepared to embrace the new Soviet policies pursued by Gorbachev.

At first glance Japanese policy seemed consistent with public opinion, as in the German case, and as one would expect from elements of domestic structure—intermediate degree of centralization and corporatist bargaining arrangements—that the two countries hold in common. Pacifist popular sentiments seemed to be embodied in the state's principle of spending no more on the military than 1 percent of the gross national product. And the public's concern about the northern islands would seem to bring it into accord with its government's skeptical and hard-line policy toward Gorbachev. Yet on closer inspection the views of state policymakers diverge considerably from popular opinion. The 1 percent ceiling on military spending, for example, gives prosperous Japan the second or third largest military budget in the world—and even this limit some Japanese leaders have found to be too constraining. As far as policy toward Gorbachev's USSR was concerned, despite the common popular and elite attention to the disputed territories, the public expressed considerable interest in engaging the Soviets in negotiations to seek their return, whereas the government refused to improve relations with the USSR until the Soviets conceded the Japanese position on the dispute. According to Risse-Kappen, this divergence of views has a muted impact on security policy because the quasi-corporatist policy network in Japan obliges its leaders to incorporate societal and opposition views on security that may be more moderate than their own.

Domestic Structure and Contemporary Global Change

Risse-Kappen's account suggests one way that major changes in the international environment—Gorbachev's successful efforts to end the Cold War as the case in point—are diffused throughout the system. The mechanism
consists of public responses to international stimuli, which are filtered through domestic structures in particular countries and result in foreign policies that eventually produce new interactions among states, thereby reinforing and "globalizing" the initial state-level transformation. This is my own tentative extrapolation of Risse-Kappen's findings, but it seems consistent with how a domestic structural approach would account for the momentous changes since the late 1980s.

The Gorbachev Phenomenon and the End of the Cold War

Clearly the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of one of its two main protagonists would be on anyone's list of major international changes in need of explanation. For our purposes the most important point to understand is that the initial impetus for the international transformation came from within the Soviet Union. Mikhail Gorbachev deliberately sought to end the Cold War as a prerequisite for carrying out fundamental internal reforms (Garthoff 1994; Gorbachev 1995). Soviet withdrawal from the political-military competition with the United States signaled the demise of the bipolar international system—long before most analysts would have predicted it on the basis of "objective," material factors (e.g., U.S.-Soviet military balance). Thus an explanation for this particular international systemic transformation must begin by explaining why Soviet foreign and domestic policy changed.

How should we account for the specific changes Gorbachev wrought? The candidate explanations are myriad (Deudney and Ikenberry 1991/1992; Evangelista 1991). A domestic structural approach would not at first glance seem to be a strong contender. A central tenet of the approach is that domestic structures are historically conditioned, especially by the interaction of the state with the external environment (Gerschenkron 1962; Moore 1966; Katzenstein 1984, 1985). The Gorbachev phenomenon, which entailed both domestic structural transformation (shifting the heavily skewed balance from the party-state to society) and international structural transformation (the move away from bipolarity), should not logically be explicable by an approach that takes structure as given.

Yet there are aspects of the domestic structural approach that seem applicable to the Gorbachev case. The simple fact that we associate the Soviet changes with his name is only possible because the Soviet-type political system gives its leaders scope to initiate major transformations as well as more modest policy innovations (Bunce 1981). Although the prerequisites for broad societal transformation—education, urbanization, professional diversification (Lewin 1988)—were decades in the making, they were not deterministic. They were satisfied long before Gorbachev came to power and would not have produced dramatic political change without someone like him as state leader. Domestic structural approaches to Soviet-type systems sensitize us to the likelihood of top-down policy initiatives (Brzezinski and
Huntington 1963; Evangelista 1988; Halpern 1989). The approach was far less successful, however, in anticipating the groundswell of popular response that overwhelmed an already ambitious liberalization initiated at the top.

Gorbachev’s internal initiatives were directed primarily at reviving the economy. The Soviet economic crisis had many causes and it would be claiming too much to argue that the domestic structural approach holds any particular advantage in accounting for it. In that aspect of the crisis that concerned the lack of technological dynamism, however, analyses that stressed the domestic structure definitely got the trend right, and for the right reasons. These included studies of the overall level of Soviet technological development (Amann, Cooper, and Davies 1977), the potential for technological innovation (Amann and Cooper 1982), and comparative analyses of the civilian and military sectors and Soviet versus Western cases using domestic structure as a key variable (Evangelista 1988; Holloway 1977, 1982; Kaldor 1981, 1986).

Not only the consequences but also the origins of the Soviet transformation had an international dimension—or several (Deudney and Ikenberry 1991/1992). Even the economic crisis cannot be understood solely as a domestic issue. As several observers have pointed out, it is the comparative international aspect of the economic crisis, the relative rather than absolute failure of the Soviet economic order, that helped to stimulate reform—“the perceived inability of the Soviet system to catch up [with], let alone overtake, the West” (Halliday 1992, 133). The “new thinking” in Soviet foreign policy, promoted by Gorbachev and his foreign minister, Eduard Shevardnadze, also derived in part from international—and transnational—sources. If domestic structure can serve, as the studies summarized in this chapter indicate, as an intervening variable between the international environment and domestic politics, then it should have something to say about these international influences on Gorbachev’s policy. In turn domestic structure should be able to say something about the mechanisms by which internal societal and institutional forces were able to get their objectives pursued in the new foreign policy. Several studies do suggest an important role for domestic structure in understanding the international and transnational dimensions of Soviet change (Snyder 1987/1988, 1991; Risse-Kappen 1994; Evangelista 1995). Yet in this case, as in others, domestic structure must be supplemented by other approaches to provide a full account of major international change.

Conclusion: Future Directions for Domestic Structural Analysis

The application of domestic structure to understanding the international-domestic linkages in the transformation and disintegration of the Soviet Union
is of more than historical interest. Many of the types of linkage are certain to recur with some frequency in the future course of international relations and they may bring further profound changes. These linkages include perceptions of relative economic (or social, or political) welfare and transnational relations of all sorts. Such external influences require points of access into domestic societies. Domestic structure might provide a way of indicating which countries are likely to be more or less receptive to such influences by calling attention to the links between domestic and international policy networks, coalition dynamics that might provide openings for transnational penetration, and so forth (Risse-Kappen 1995a, 1995b; Darst 1994). Domestic structure could also provide insights into how effectively a given country might take advantage of ideas and proposals of transnational coalitions or “epistemic communities” of specialists (Haas 1992; Darst 1994).

As the end of the Cold War shifts our attention away from superpower rivalry, it brings into focus the economic and security concerns of smaller states. Much of the most innovative work on post—Cold War foreign policies links politics, economics, and security through the medium of domestic structure. Domestic structural analysis has proved to be a powerful tool for understanding divergent state policies on such vital issues as nuclear proliferation, alliance policy, and regional security regimes (Barnett 1990, 1992; Gause 1990; Solingen 1994a, 1994b) as well as on issues of growing concern such as the environment (Darst 1994; Princen 1995). It continues to serve as a useful means of studying the differences between states’ foreign economic policies—the original domain of domestic structural analysis (Hart 1992; Clark and Chan 1995).

Finally, much of the recent work in domestic structure has paid particular attention to the interaction between a country’s domestic structure and the historically derived normative understandings embodied in its society. Much as the early work in domestic structure formed a theoretical bridge between realism and liberalism, this recent work offers the possibility of integrating the new “constructivist” challenge to international relations theory with more traditional approaches. Constructivism has so far lacked a model of domestic-international linkages to explain how international practices actually shape state interests and identities. In other words, what are the political mechanisms that facilitate or hinder the social construction of international reality? Recent work suggests that domestic structure might help to elucidate this question (Risse-Kappen 1995a, 1995b; Checkel 1995; Clark and Chan 1995; Katzenstein 1996).

As long as states play a role in initiating and responding to global change, they will do so through the vehicle of foreign policy, and they will do so in divergent fashions. As the international system changes in new and unexpected ways, scholars will debate in old and familiar ways the sources and consequences of those changes. In other words, international change will continue to be subject to rival theoretical interpretations. For those
reasons, we can anticipate that the analysis of domestic structures will continue to provide a valuable means of comparing foreign policies and of reconciling competing theories, and that domestic structure itself will remain a crucial intervening variable linking domestic and international politics.

**Notes**

1. For further reflection on the definition of the state, see Rueschemeyer and Evans 1985, pp. 46-48.
2. For discussions of the internal-external debate, see Russett 1983 and Rogowski 1985.
5. This section draws on Evangelista 1989.
6. For discussion, see Pintner and Rowney 1980; Klyuchevsky 1958; Seton-Watson 1967; and Gerschenkron 1968.
7. The top-down versus bottom-up analysis draws on Brzezinski and Huntington 1963, pp. 202-230, and is developed in Evangelista 1984. Some of the generalizations concerning domestic structure are familiar to students of comparative politics, who more often write of "state structures." See, for example, Hall 1983 and Weir and Skocpol 1985.
8. This section draws almost entirely on Poznanski 1986, although he might not agree fully with my interpretation of his history.
9. My source for most of this discussion is Linden 1986.
10. These terms appear to be mainly a restatement of the standard distinction in Soviet politics between the totalitarian and oligarchic models. For a discussion, see I lough 1977, pp. 19-48.
11. The source of Gorbachev's policy innovation is familiar to students of U.S. public policy: "People define conditions as problems by comparing current conditions with their values concerning more ideal states of affairs, by comparing their own performance with that of other countries, or by putting the subject into one category rather than another" (Kingdon 1984, 20-21; see also Walker 1981, 88).

**References**


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